No Deal

The Dalai Lama has repeatedly emphasized that he no longer wants
independence, only autonomy.  To him, no doubt this is a major
concession; yet for two inter-related reasons the probability of this
demand being fulfilled is in fact no better than a demand of outright
independence.

The first reason might be called a lack of bargaining power.  To put
it simply, for what he is asking for, the Dalai Lama has nothing of
equivalent value to offer to Beijing in return.  The second reason can
be called a lack of trust, which is to say that Beijing can never
trust that a period of autonomy will not be used as a cover to prepare
for eventual independence.

The autonomy he demands is in fact quite extensive: with the exception
of military and foreign affairs, all other decisions, including those
related to economy, justice, education, environment, internal
security, etc., are to be made by a politically independent Tibetan
government.  There is only one region in China that has this degree of
autonomy: Hong Kong.  Therefore it's useful to compare the two in
order to explain the two reasons.

Before signing the agreement with UK in 1984 (which guaranteed the
return of HK to China in 1997), Hong Kong was not part of China.  In
order to get HK back as a formal part of China, Beijing had to agree
to granting HK extensive autonomy.  In other words, that agreement can
be seen as a bargain: China gives up direct administrative control of
HK, but receives it as part of its territory.  But in the case of
Tibet, China already has Tibet as part of its territory.  The Dalai
Lama is asking what UK had asked, but unlike UK, he has nothing of
equivalent value to offer in return.  This is what I meant by "lack of
bargaining power."

The second reason is a lack trust.  The situation in Iraq today
clearly demonstrates one thing: one cannot establish an independent
and functioning nation-state overnight.  It takes enormous amount of
resources, manpower, and above all time to establish functioning
institutions in administration, economy, education, security, etc. 
Therefore if a territory wants eventual independence from a central
government, the best deal it can get in fact is not necessarily
immediate independence, but a period of local autonomy.  Such a period
will give the territory the critical time to set up its institutions
and organize politically to prepare for independence.  When the
groundwork has been layed, and an opportunity presents itself, it can
then declare formal independence.

Since granting complete local autonomy presents such a huge risk for
the central government in Beijing, why did it do it in the case of HK?
 Above all, because no one of any political significance had seriously
advocated for independence.  Even those who hold the most abiding
suspicion and hatred toward everything the Beijing government says and
does insist that they are Chinese patriots.  Even if the call for an
independent Republic of Hong Kong exists, it will have no support in
HK.  In fact, it doesn't even exist.

The case is of course drastic different with regard to Tibet.  From
what I understand, even in the exile community the Dalai Lama's
"middleway" approach for autonomy is a minority position.  The
majority of the exile community in fact doesn't care for autonomy. 
They want independence.  The only reason they don't come out and say
so is because the Dalai Lama has such enormous prestige and commands
such respect that few are willing to publicly oppose him.  Of course
no reliable poll has been conducted on this question among Tibetans
inside China today, but from anecdotal evidences it seems at least a
very substantial minority favors this, if not a majority.  As a result
the Beijing central government can never trust that the Tibetans, if
given autonomy, will not use the opportunity to prepare for eventual
independence.  But what about the Dalai Lama's promise of only
autonomy, not independence?

First, Beijing simply doesn't trust the Dalai Lama.  Now he calls for
autonomy, but -- Beijing will ask -- what is to stop him from
repudiating this claim and go back to the old claim of independence
once he has prepared Tibet for it after a period of autonomy?

Second, even if the Dalai Lama is sincere and tries his hardest to
follow through on his promise, he is only one man.  Already it's
likely that at least a substantial minority of Tibetans want
independence.  With autonomy, there is almost certainly going to be a
surge of Tibetan nationalism.  It's perfectly possible that the Dalai
Lama will be out-maneuvered politically by those who favor
independence.  An analogy of this can be Yasser Arafat -- it's very
likely that he is sincere in wanting a peaceful solution with Israel,
but in any event he simply cannot control the more radical elements
among the Palestinians.  If Beijing takes the role of Israel -- trying
to plant a pliable figure to control the more radical elements -- it
will likely end up in a situation similar to what faces Israel today.

Finally, even if the Dalai Lama is sincere, and he proves able to
control the pro-independence elements, he is still a mortal.  He will
die sooner or later.  What then?  Who or what, at that point, can
guarantee that Tibet will not turn its autonomy to a declaration of
independence?

In conclusion, if the Dalai Lama thinks by asking for autonomy instead
of independence he makes it easier to strike a deal with Beijing, he
is almost certainly mistaken.  Due to a lack of bargaining power and
trust, he might as well be demanding independence.  The chances are
slim to none that he will get either in any event.