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Spike <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]: > In article > <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, > [EMAIL PROTECTED] says... >> Of course, there's never been any personal gun right under >> the Second Amendment, > Could you forward your copy to me? Mine's different and is > about individual rights.... Sure. Read this. [begin excerpts] U. S. Constitution Second Amendment A well-regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed. * * * * * The Texas Constitution Article 1, Section 23 Every citizen shall have the right to keep and bear arms in the lawful defense of himself or the State; but the Legislature shall have power, by law, to regulate the wearing of arms, with a view to prevent crime. * * * * * The clause in the constitution of the United States, that it is said to be in violation of, is the 2d article of the amendments: "A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed." O. & W. Dig. 7. The clause in the constitution of this state, which it is said to violate, is the 13th section of the bill of rights: "Every citizen shall have the right to keep and bear arms, in the lawful defense of himself or the state." O. & W. Dig. 14. The object of the clause first cited, has reference to the perpetuation of free government, and is based on the idea, that the people cannot be effectually oppressed and enslaved, who are not first disarmed. The clause cited in our bill of rights, has the same broad object in relation to the government, and in addition thereto, secures a personal right to the citizen. The right of a citizen to bear arms, in the lawful defense of himself or the state, is absolute. He does not derive it from the state government, but directly from the sovereign convention of the people that framed the state government. The clause cited in our bill of rights, has the same broad object in relation to the government, and in addition thereto, secures a personal right to the citizen. The right of a citizen to bear arms, in the lawful defense of himself or the state, is absolute. He does not derive it from the state government, but directly from the sovereign convention of the people that framed the state government. It is one of the "high powers" delegated directly to the citizen, and "is excepted out of the general powers of government." A law cannot be passed to infringe upon or impair it, because it is above the law, and independent of the law-making power. Cockrum v. State, 24 Texas 394 (1859) [end excerpts] Simple once you pay attention, eh Spoke? _________________ In United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. .04, 59 S.Ct. 816, 83 L.Ed. 1206 (1939), the Supreme Court held that the National Firearms Act of 1934 did not violate the Second Amendment. In its opinion the Court stated: "In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of a 'shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in length' at this time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument. Certainly it is not within judicial notice that this weapon is any part of the ordinary military equipment or that its use could contribute to the common defense. Id. at 178, 59 S.Ct. at 818 (citation omitted)." Warin argues that the necessary implication of the quoted language is that a member of the "sedentary militia" may possess any weapon having military capability and that application of 26 U.S.C. section 5861(d) [footnote 2] to such a person violates the Second Amendment. We disagree. In Miller the Supreme Court did not reach the question of the extent to which a weapon which is "part of the ordinary military equipment" or whose "use could contribute to the common defense" may be regulated. In holding that the absence of evidence placing the weapon involved in the charges against Miller in one of these categories precluded the trial court from quashing the indictment on Second Amendment grounds, the Court did not hold the converse-that the Second Amendment is an absolute prohibition against all regulation of the manufacture, transfer and possession of any instrument capable of being used in military action. Within a few years after Miller v. United States was announced the First Circuit dealt with arguments similar to those made by Warin in the present case. In Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916 (1st Cir 1942), cert. denied sub nom, Velazquez v. United States, 319 U.S. 770, 63 S.Ct. 1431, 87 L.Ed. 1718 (1943), the court held that the Supreme Court did not intend to formulate a general rule in Miller, but merely dealt with the facts of that case. The court of appeals noted the development of new weaponry during the early years of World War II and concluded that it was not the intention of the Supreme Court to hold that the Second Amendment prohibits Congress from regulating any weapons except antiques "such as a flintlock musket or a matchlock harquebus." 131 F.2d at 922. If the logical extension of the defendant argument for the holding of Miller was inconceivable in 1942, it is completely irrational in this time of nuclear weapons. Agreeing as we do with the conclusion in Cases v. United States, supra, that the Supreme Court did not lay down a general rule in Miller, we consider the present case on its own facts and in light of applicable authoritative decisions. It is clear that the Second Amendment guarantees a collective rather than an individual right. In Stevens v. United States, 440 F.2d 144, 149 (6th Cir. 1971), this court held, in a case challenging the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. App. section 1202(a)(1): Since the Second Amendment right "to keep and bear Arms" applies only to the right of the State to maintain a militia and not to the individual's right to bear arms, there can be no serious claim to any express constitutional right of an individual to possess a firearm. See also, United States v. Johnson, 497 F.2d 648, 560 (4th Cir. 1974); United States v. Tot, 131 F.2d 261, 266 (3d Cir. 1942), rev'd on other grounds, 319 U.S. 463, 63 S.Ct. 1241, 87 L.Ed. 1619 (1943). It is also established that the collective right of the militia is limited to keeping and bearing arms, the possession or use of which "at this time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, . . ." United States v. Miller, supra, 307 U.S.at 178, 59 S.Ct at 819. See also, United States v. Johnson, supra; Cody v. United States, 460 F.2d 34, 37 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1010, 93 S.Ct. 454, 34 L.Ed.2d 303 (1972). The fact that the defendant Warin, in common with all adult residents and citizens of Ohio, is subject to enrollment in the militia of the State confers upon him no right to possess the submachine gun in question. By statute the State of Ohio exempts "members of . . . the organized militia of this or any other state . . .," (emphasis added) from the provision, "No person shall knowingly acquire, have, carry, or use any dangerous ordnance." Ohio Revised Code section 2923.17. "Dangerous ordnance" is defined to include any automatic firearm. O.R.C. section 2923.11. There is no such exemption for members of the "sedentary militia." Furthermore, there is absolutely no evidence that a submachine gun in the hands of an individual "sedentary militia" member would have any, much less a "reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia." Miller, supra, 307 U.S. at 178, 59 S.Ct. at 819. Thus we conclude that the defendant has no private right to keep and bear arms under the Second Amendment which would bar his prosecution and conviction for violating 26 U.S.C. section 5861(d). U.S. v. Warin, 530 F.2d 130 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 948 (1976) -- Join the NRA Blacklist! http://www.nrablacklist.com/ The Lone Weasel
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