Re: Kiddie exercises his right to bear arms

On Tue, 25 Nov 2003 10:26:08 -0800, "Kevin C." <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
wrote:

>Don, nothing you've pointed out here counteracts "The right of the people to
>keep and bear arms shall not be infringed."

It's all just the one sentence.

>While it is Congresses job to provide for the Militia, it is not the same
>job as Art 1(8)(12-13) which states:
>
>To raise and support armies, but no appropriation of money to that use shall
>be for a longer term than two years;

The Constitution differentiates between armies and the Militia --
which was a creature of shared administration with the several 
States.

>To provide and maintain a navy;

Never was an issue worth discussing.

>The only relevent part of Art 2(2)(1) is that the militia is under the
>control of the president when they are called into service.  Still doesn't
>discount "The right of the people to Keep and bear arms shall not be
>infringed."

It's all just the one sentence.

>The Federalist Papers have been used in the past in interpreting the
>Constitution in US courts.
>
>Hamilton stated in the Federalist Papers under No. 28
>
>"The militia is a voluntary force not associated or
>under the control of the States except when
>called out; [when called into actual service] a
>permanent or long standing force would
>be entirely different in make-up and call."

Sigh.  You really should read All of the FPs in their entirety, before
you go about quoting them.

Try this one for size:

>From FP 29:

...It requires no skill in the science of war to discern that
uniformity in the organization and discipline of the militia would be
attended with the most beneficial effects, whenever they were called
into service for the public defense. It would enable them to discharge
the duties of the camp and of the field with mutual intelligence and
concert an advantage of peculiar moment in the operations of an army;
and it would fit them much sooner to acquire the degree of proficiency
in military functions which would be essential to their usefulness.
This desirable uniformity can only be accomplished by confiding the
regulation of the militia to the direction of the national authority.
It is, therefore, with the most evident propriety, that the plan of
the convention proposes to empower the Union ``to provide for
organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing
such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United
States, RESERVING TO THE STATES RESPECTIVELY THE APPOINTMENT OF THE
OFFICERS, AND THE AUTHORITY OF TRAINING THE MILITIA ACCORDING TO THE
DISCIPLINE PRESCRIBED BY CONGRESS.'' 

...and...

``The project of disciplining all the militia of the United States is
as futile as it would be injurious, if it were capable of being
carried into execution. A tolerable expertness in military movements
is a business that requires time and practice. It is not a day, or
even a week, that will suffice for the attainment of it. To oblige the
great body of the yeomanry, and of the other classes of the citizens,
to be under arms for the purpose of going through military exercises
and evolutions, as often as might be necessary to acquire the degree
of perfection which would entitle them to the character of a
well-regulated militia, would be a real grievance to the people, and a
serious public inconvenience and loss. It would form an annual
deduction from the productive labor of the country, to an amount
which, calculating upon the present numbers of the people, would not
fall far short of the whole expense of the civil establishments of all
the States. To attempt a thing which would abridge the mass of labor
and industry to so considerable an extent, would be unwise: and the
experiment, if made, could not succeed, because it would not long be
endured. Little more can reasonably be aimed at, with respect to the
people at large, than to have them properly armed and equipped; and in
order to see that this be not neglected, it will be necessary to
assemble them once or twice in the course of a year. 

``But though the scheme of disciplining the whole nation must be
abandoned as mischievous or impracticable; yet it is a matter of the
utmost importance that a well-digested plan should, as soon as
possible, be adopted for the proper establishment of the militia. The
attention of the government ought particularly to be directed to the
formation of a select corps of moderate extent, upon such principles
as will really fit them for service in case of need. By thus
circumscribing the plan, it will be possible to have an excellent body
of well-trained militia, ready to take the field ...

>From FP 28:

....It may safely be received as an axiom in our political system,
that the State governments will, in all possible contingencies, afford
complete security against invasions of the public liberty by the
national authority. Projects of usurpation cannot be masked under
pretenses so likely to escape the penetration of select bodies of men,
as of the people at large. The legislatures will have better means of
information. They can discover the danger at a distance; and
possessing all the organs of civil power, and the confidence of the
people, they can at once adopt a regular plan of opposition, in which
they can combine all the resources of the community. They can readily
communicate with each other in the different States, and unite their
common forces for the protection of their common liberty. 

The great extent of the country is a further security. We have already
experienced its utility against the attacks of a foreign power. And it
would have precisely the same effect against the enterprises of
ambitious rulers in the national councils. If the federal army should
be able to quell the resistance of one State, the distant States would
have it in their power to make head with fresh forces. The advantages
obtained in one place must be abandoned to subdue the opposition in
others; and the moment the part which had been reduced to submission
was left to itself, its efforts would be renewed, and its resistance
revive. 

...and back in 289 again....

There is something so far-fetched and so extravagant in the idea of
danger to liberty from the militia, that one is at a loss whether to
treat it with gravity or with raillery; whether to consider it as a
mere trial of skill, like the paradoxes of rhetoricians; as a
disingenuous artifice to instil prejudices at any price; or as the
serious offspring of political fanaticism. Where in the name of
common-sense, are our fears to end if we may not trust our sons, our
brothers, our neighbors, our fellow-citizens? What shadow of danger
can there be from men who are daily mingling with the rest of their
countrymen and who participate with them in the same feelings,
sentiments, habits and interests? What reasonable cause of
apprehension can be inferred from a power in the Union to prescribe
regulations for the militia, and to command its services when
necessary, while the particular States are to have the SOLE AND
EXCLUSIVE APPOINTMENT OF THE OFFICERS? If it were possible seriously
to indulge a jealousy of the militia upon any conceivable
establishment under the federal government, the circumstance of the
officers being in the appointment of the States ought at once to
extinguish it. There can be no doubt that this circumstance will
always secure to them a preponderating influence over the militia. 

...and finally:

There is something so far-fetched and so extravagant in the idea of
danger to liberty from the militia, that one is at a loss whether to
treat it with gravity or with raillery; whether to consider it as a
mere trial of skill, like the paradoxes of rhetoricians; as a
disingenuous artifice to instil prejudices at any price; or as the
serious offspring of political fanaticism. Where in the name of
common-sense, are our fears to end if we may not trust our sons, our
brothers, our neighbors, our fellow-citizens? What shadow of danger
can there be from men who are daily mingling with the rest of their
countrymen and who participate with them in the same feelings,
sentiments, habits and interests? What reasonable cause of
apprehension can be inferred from a power in the Union to prescribe
regulations for the militia, and to command its services when
necessary, while the particular States are to have the SOLE AND
EXCLUSIVE APPOINTMENT OF THE OFFICERS? If it were possible seriously
to indulge a jealousy of the militia upon any conceivable
establishment under the federal government, the circumstance of the
officers being in the appointment of the States ought at once to
extinguish it. There can be no doubt that this circumstance will
always secure to them a preponderating influence over the militia. 

>The National Guard is a permanent standing force, under the direct control
>of the President.  They are not a true militia.

It is the *only* Militia to which the Constitution makes reference,
however.  If you like, I can come up with the USSC opinion that states
that forthrightly. Or you can find it on your own as well.

>Hamilton further stated in the Federalist Papers under No. 69:
>
>"The President, and government, will only control
>the militia when a part of them is in the actual
>service of the federal government, else, they are
>independent and not under the command of the
>president or the government.

Which seems to contradict your assertion above, that the Militia is
under control of the President at all times.

>... The states would
>control the militia, only when called out into the
>service of the state, and then the governor would
>be commander in chief where enumerated
>in the respective state constitution."

Same observation applies -- it is the several States that are jointly
responsible for the Militia.

The US Constitution is silent on all local militias, save the one
specifically referred to within the body of it.  Unless you are of the
opinion that the terms State and Militia mean one thing in the body,
but quite another in the Second Amendment.

They don't.