Re: What is the "Presumption of Innocence"

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> "Immortalist" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
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> >
> > "Not so quick" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
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> >
> > > Re: Can somebody please say "unless proven guilty"
> > > instead of "until proven guilty".
> > > Comment?
> > >
> >
> > No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges
> or
> > immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
> any
> > person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny
> > to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
> >
> > 14th Ammendment:
> > http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/constitution/amendment14/index.html
> >
> > -------------------------------
> >
> > "Better that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer," 2
> > says English jurist William Blackstone.  The ratio 10:1 has become known
> as
> > the "Blackstone ratio."
> >
> > http://www1.law.ucla.edu/~volokh/guilty.htm
> >
> > --------------------------------
> >
> > What is the "presumption of innocence?"
> >
> > All people accused of a crime are legally presumed to be innocent until
> they
> > are convicted, either in a trial or as a result of pleading guilty. This
> > presumption means not only that the prosecutor must convince the jury of
> the
> > defendant's guilt, but also that the defendant need not say or do
anything
> > in his own defense. If the prosecutor can't convince the jury that the
> > defendant is guilty, the defendant goes free.
> >
> > The presumption of innocence, coupled with the fact that the prosecutor
> must
> > prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt (see below), makes
> it
> > difficult for the government to put people behind bars.
> >
> > Legal FAQ:
> > http://tinyurl.com/wdqg
> >
> > ------------------------------------
> >
> > The Presumption of Innocence in a Criminal Trial
> >
> > What then is the appropriate role for the presumption of innocence? In a
> > criminal trial, the presumption of innocence is an important
> constitutional
> > protection for the accused. It means that the jury may only pronounce
the
> > defendant guilty if the physical and testimonial evidence presented
prove
> > guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Put differently, the jury must say "not
> > guilty" even when it believes the defendant is guilty and often, it
> follows,
> > even when the defendant in fact is guilty. Until the evidentiary
threshold
> > of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is reached, the judge and the
> > Constitution order the jury to acquit.
> >
> > The reason for this rule is that a guilty verdict subjects a person to
> > incarceration, the deprivation of freedom that we all cherish and that
is
> > guaranteed us under normal circumstances. Though the acquittal of a
> > factually guilty man is unfortunate and costly, it is an inevitable
> > byproduct of a system designed to reduce to close to zero the odds that
a
> > factually innocent person will be convicted of a crime.
> >
> > http://writ.corporate.findlaw.com/colb/20020617.html
> >
> > ---------------------------
> >
> > How come they treat me as if I am guilty when I am presumed innocent
until
> > proven otherwise?
> >
> > By reading this page you will know what less then 1 in 1,000 know, and
> what
> > many attorneys and Judges only think they know.
> >
> > In an argument a presumption is what someone owns. Think of an argument
as
> a
> > scale. If both sides of the scale are equal the one that owns the
> > presumption wins. A presumption can be a presumption of debt, a
> presumption
> > of title and so on. As a defendant you own the "presumption of
innocence".
> >
> > Many confuse presumption with assumption or assertion. An assumption is
a
> > position that is not proven but because of the circumstances can be
> > considered correct. An assertion is a claim made justifying the
> assumption.
> > If challenged by the owner of the presumption the Burdon of proving the
> > assertion is placed upon the party making the assertion. Failure to
prove
> > the assertion results in the owner of the presumption prevailing in the
> > dispute.
> >
> > In an arrest the person making the arrest warrants to the court (makes a
> > type of guarantee) that there is a warrant (a link between a claim and
> > evidence) to prove an assertion. In other words the arresting officer
when
> > he fills out your ticket swears to the court that there is sufficient
> > evidence to to prove his assertion that you were speeding.
> >
> > http://www.tipmra.com/presumption_of_innocence.htm
> >
> > --------------------------------
> >
> > Proof, Burden of Proof, and Presumptions.--The due process clauses of
the
> > Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments ''[protect] the accused against
conviction
> > except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
> > constitute the crime with which he is charged.''83 ''The reasonable
doubt
> > standard plays a vital role in the American scheme of criminal
procedure.
> It
> > is a prime instrument for reducing the risk of convictions resting on
> > factual error. The standard provides concrete substance for the
> presumption
> > of innocence--that bedrock 'axiomatic and elementary' principle whose
> > 'enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our
criminal
> > law.'''84 In many past cases, this standard was assumed to be the
required
> > one,85 but because it was so widely accepted only recently has the Court
> had
> > the opportunity to pronounce it guaranteed by due process.86 The
> presumption
> > of inno cence is valuable in assuring defendants a fair trial,87 and it
> > operates to ensure that the jury considers the case solely on the
> > evidence.88
> >
> > The Court has long held it would set aside under the due process clause
> > convictions that are supported by no evidence at all,89 but Winship
> > necessitated a reconsideration of whether it should in reviewing state
> cases
> > weigh the sufficiency of the evidence. Thus, in Jackson v. Virginia,90
it
> > held that federal courts, on direct appeal of federal convictions or
> > collateral review of state convictions, must satisfy themselves whether
> the
> > record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a
> > reasonable doubt. The question the reviewing court is to ask itself is
not
> > whether it believes the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a
> > reasonable doubt, but whether, after viewing the evidence in the light
> most
> > favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have
found
> > the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.91
> >
> > Inasmuch as due process requires the prosecution to prove beyond a
> > reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime charged,
the
> > Court held in Mullaney v. Wilbur92 that it was a denial of this
> > constitutional guarantee to require a defendant charged with murder to
> prove
> > that he acted ''in the heat of passion on sudden provocation'' in order
to
> > reduce the homicide to manslaughter. The Court indicated that a
balancing
> of
> > interests test was to be employed to determine when the due process
clause
> > re quired the prosecution to carry the burden and when some part of the
> > burden might be shifted to the defendant, but the decision called into
> > question the practice in many States under which some burdens of
> persuasion
> > were borne by the defense, and raised the prospect that the prosecution
> must
> > bear all burdens of persuasion, a significant and weighty task given the
> > large numbers of affirmative defenses.
> >
> > But the Court soon summarily rejected the argument that Mullaney means
> that
> > the prosecution must negate the insanity defense,93 and in full-scale
> > consideration upheld a state statute that provided that an intentional
> > killing is murder but permitted the defendant to assert ''extreme
> emotional
> > disturbance'' as an affirmative defense which, if proved by the defense
by
> a
> > preponderance of the evidence, would reduce the murder offense to
> > manslaughter.94 According to the Court, the constitutional deficiency in
> > Mullaney was that the statute made malice an element of the offense but
> > permitted malice to be presumed upon proof of the other elements and
> > required the defendant to prove the absence of malice. In Patterson the
> > statute obligated the State to prove each element of the offense (the
> death,
> > the intent to kill, and the causation) beyond a reasonable doubt, but
> > allowed the defendant to present an affirmative defense that would
reduce
> > the degree of the offense, and as to which the defendant bears the
burden
> of
> > persuasion by a preponderance of the evidence. The decisive issue, then,
> was
> > whether the statute required the state to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt
> > each element of the offense. So defined, the distinction and the
> > constitutional mandate are formalistic, and the legislature can shift
> > burdens of persuasion between prosecution and defense easily through the
> > statutory definitions of the offenses.95 Also formalistic is the
> distinction
> > between elements of the crime and sentencing factors; a state may treat
as
> a
> > sentencing consideration provable by a preponderance of the evidence the
> > fact that the defendant ''visibly possessed a firearm'' during
commission
> of
> > the offense.96
> >
> > Quite closely related is the issue of statutory presumptions; these
> > generally provide for the proof of the presumed fact, an element of a
> crime,
> > by the establishment of another fact, the basic fact.97 In Tot v. United
> > States,98 the Court held that a statutory presumption was valid under
the
> > due process clause if it met a ''rational connection'' test. ''Under our
> > decisions, a statutory presumption cannot be sustained if there be no
> > rational connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact
> presumed,
> > if the inference of the one from the proof of the other is arbitrary
> because
> > of lack of connection between the two in common experience.'' In Leary
v.
> > United States,99 however, the due process test was stiffened to require
> that
> > for such a ''rational connection'' to exist, it must ''at least be said
> with
> > substantial assurance that the presumed fact is more likely than not to
> flow
> > from the proved fact on which it is made to depend.'' Thus, a provision
> > which permitted a jury to infer from defendant's possession of marijuana
> his
> > knowledge of its illegal importation was voided. A lengthy canvass of
> > factual materials established to the Court's satisfaction that while the
> > greater part of marijuana consumed here is of foreign origin there was
> still
> > a good amount produced domestically and there was thus no way to assure
> that
> > the majority of those possessing marijuana have any reason to know their
> > marijuana is imported.100 The Court left open the question whether a
> > presumption which survived the ''rational connection'' test ''must also
> > satisfy the criminal 'reasonable doubt' standard if proof of the crime
> > charged or an essential element thereof depends upon its use.''101
> >
> > In its most recent case, a closely divided Court drew a distinction
> between
> > mandatory presumptions, which a jury must accept, and permissive
> > presumptions, which may be presented to the jury as part of all the
> evidence
> > to be considered. With respect to mandatory presumptions, ''since the
> > prosecution bears the burden of establishing guilt, it may not rest its
> case
> > entirely on a presumption, unless the fact proved is sufficient to
support
> > the inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.'' But, with respect to
> > permissive presumptions, ''the prosecution may rely on all of the
evidence
> > in the record to meet the reasonable doubt standard. There is no more
> reason
> > to require a permissive statutory presumption to meet a reasonable-doubt
> > standard before it may be permitted to play any part in a trial than
there
> > is to require that degree of probative force for other relevant evidence
> > before it may be admitted.''102 Thus, because the jury was told it had
to
> > believe in defendants' guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and that it could
> > consider the inference, due process was not violated by the application
of
> > the statutory presumption that the presence of a firearm in an
automobile
> is
> > presumptive evidence of its illegal possession by all persons then
> occupying
> > the vehicle.103
> >
> > The division of the Court in these cases and in the Mullaney v. Wilbur
> line
> > of cases clearly shows the unsettled doctrinal nature of the issues.
> >
> > http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/constitution/amendment14/16.html
> >
> > ------------------------------
> >
> > The History of the Presumption of Innocence
> >
> > It is better than 5, 10, 20, or 100 guilty men go free than for one
> innocent
> > man to be put to death. This prinicple is embodied in the presumption of
> > innocence. In 1895, the U.S. Supreme Court, in a decision in the case
> Coffin
> > v. United States, 156 U.S. 432; 15 S. Ct. 394, traced the presumption of
> > innocence, past England, Ancient Greece and Ancient Rome, and, at least
> > according to Greenleaf, to Deuteronomy. [also, Alexander Volokh wrote a
> law
> > review article on the issue, available free here.]
> >
> > The Coffin case stands for the proposition that at the request of a
> > defendant, a court must not only instruct on the prosecution's burden of
> > proof--that a defendant cannot be convicted unless the government has
> proven
> > his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt--but also must instruct on the
> > presumption of innocence--by informing the jury that a defendant is
> presumed
> > innocent. The Court stated,
> >
> > The principle that there is a presumption of innocence in favor of the
> > accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its
> enforcement
> > lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.
> >
> > In tracing the presumption of innocence, the Court goes on to state:
> >
> > It is stated as unquestioned in the text-books, and has been referred to
> as
> > a matter of course in the decisions of this court and in the courts of
the
> > several States. See Taylor on Evidence, vol. 1, c. 5, 126, 127; Wills on
> > Circumstantial Evidence, c. 5, 91; Best on Presumptions, part 2, c. 1,
63,
> > 64; c. 3, 31-58; Greenleaf on Evidence, part 5, § § 29, &c.; 11 Criminal
> Law
> > Magazine, 3; Wharton on Evidence, § 1244; Phillips on Evidence, Cowen &
> > Hill's Notes, vol. 2, p. 289; Lilienthal v. United States, 97 U.S. 237;
> Hopt
> > v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430; Commonwealth v. Webster, 5 Cush. 295, 320; State
v.
> > Bartlett, 43 N.H. 224; Alexander v. People, 96 Illinois, 96; People v.
> > Fairchild, 48 Michigan, 31; People v. Millard, 53 Michigan, 63;
> Commonwealth
> > v. Whittaker, 131 Mass. 224; Blake v. State, 3 Tex. App. 581; Wharton v.
> > State, 73 Alabama, 366; State v. Tibbetts, 35 Maine, 81; Moorer v.
State,
> 44
> > Alabama, 15.
> >
> > Greenleaf traces this presumption to Deuteronomy, and quotes Mascardus
De
> > Probationibus to show that it was substantially embodied in the laws of
> > Sparta and Athens. Greenl. Ev. part 5, section 29, note. Whether
Greenleaf
> > is correct or not in this view, there can be no question that the Roman
> law
> > was pervaded with the results of this maxim of criminal administration,
as
> > the following extracts show:
> >
> > "Let all accusers understand that they are not to prefer charges unless
> they
> > can be proven by proper witnesses or by conclusive documents, or by
> > circumstantial evidence which amounts to indubitable proof and is
clearer
> > than day." Code, L. IV, T. XX, 1, 1. 25.
> >
> > The noble (bivus) Trajan wrote to Julius Frontonus that no man should be
> > condemned on a criminal charge in his absence, because it was better to
> let
> > the crime of a guilty person go unpunished than to condemn the
innocent."
> > Dig. L. XLVIII, Tit. 19, 1. 5. "In all cases of doubt, the most merciful
> > construction of facts should be preferred." Dig. L. L, Tit. XVII, 1. 56.
> "In
> > criminal cases the milder construction shall always be preserved." Dig.
L.
> > L, Tit. XVII, 1. 155, s. 2. "In cases of doubt it is no less just than
it
> is
> > safe to adopt the milder construction." Dig. L. L, Tit. XVII, 1. 192, s.
> 1.
> >
> > Ammianus Marcellinus relates an anecdote of the Emperor Julian which
> > illustrates the enforcement of this principle in the Roman law.
Numerius,
> > the governor of Narbonensis, was on trial before the Emperor, and,
> contrary
> > to the usage in criminal cases, the trial was public. Numerius contented
> > himself with denying his guilt, and there was not sufficient proof
against
> > him. His adversary, Delphidius, "a passionate man," seeing that the
> failure
> > of the accusation was inevitable, could not restrain himself, and
> exclaimed,
> > "Oh, illustrious Caesar! if it is sufficient to deny, what hereafter
will
> > become of the guilty?" to which Julian replied, "If it suffices to
accuse,
> > what will become of the innocent?" Rerum Gestarum, L. XVIII, c. 1. The
> rule
> > thus found in the Roman law was, along with many other fundamental and
> > humane maxims of that system, preserved for mankind by the canon law.
> > Decretum Gratiani de Presumptionibus, L. II, T. XXIII, c. 14, A.D. 1198;
> > [***492] Corpus Juris Canonici Hispani et Indici, R.P. Murillo Velarde,
> Tom.
> > 1, L. II, n. 140. Exactly when this presumption was in precise words
> stated
> > to be a part of the common law is involved in doubt. The writer of an
able
> > article in the North American Review, January, 1851, tracing the genesis
> of
> > the principle, says that no express mention of the presumption of
> innocence
> > can be found in the books of the common law earlier than the date of
> > McNally's Evidence (1802). Whether this statement is correct is a matter
> of
> > no moment, for there can be no doubt that, if the principle had not
found
> > formal expression in the common law writers at an earlier date, yet the
> > practice which flowed from it has existed in the common law from the
> > earliest time.
> >
> > Fortescue says: "Who, then, in England can be put to death unjustly for
> any
> > crime? since he is allowed so many pleas and privileges in favor of
life;
> > none but his neighbors, men of honest and good repute, against whom he
can
> > have no probable cause of exception, can find the person accused guilty.
> > Indeed, one would much rather that twenty guilty persons should escape
the
> > punishment of death than that one innocent person should be condemned
and
> > suffer capitally." De Laudibus Legum Angliae, Amos' translation,
> Cambridge,
> > 1825.
> >
> > [*456] Lord Hale (1678) says: "In some cases presumptive evidence goes
far
> > to prove a person guilty, though there be no express proof of the fact
to
> be
> > committed by him, but then it must be very warily pressed, for it is
> better
> > five guilty persons should escape unpunished than one innocent person
> should
> > die." 2 Hale P.C. 290. He further observes: "And thus the reasons stand
on
> > both sides, and though these seem to be stronger than the former, yet in
a
> > case of this moment it is safest to hold that in practice, which hath
> least
> > doubt and danger, quod dubitas, ne faceris." 1 Hale P.C. 24.
> >
> > Blackstone (1753-1765) maintains that "the law holds that it is better
> that
> > ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer." 2 Bl. Com. c.
> 27,
> > margin page 358, ad finem. How fully the presumption of innocence had
been
> > evolved as a principle and applied at common law is shown in McKinley's
> case
> > (1817), 33 St. Tr. 275, 506, where Lord Gillies says: "It is impossible
to
> > look at it [a treasonable oath which it was alleged that [**404]
McKinley
> > had taken] without suspecting, and thinking it probable, it imports an
> > obligation to commit a capital crime. That has been and is my
impression.
> > But the presumption in favor of innocence is not to be reargued by mere
> > suspicion. I am sorry to see, in this information, that the public
> > prosecutor treats this too lightly; he seems to think that the law
> > entertains no such presumption of innocence. I cannot listen to this. I
> > conceive that this presumption is to be found in every code of law which
> has
> > reason, and religion, and humanity, for a foundation. It is a maxim
which
> > ought to be inscribed in indelible characters in the heart of every
judge
> > and juryman; and I was happy to hear from Lord Hermand he is inclined to
> > give full effect to it. To overturn this, there must be legal evidence
of
> > guilt, carrying home a decree of conviction short only absolute
> certainty."
> >
> > The Coffin case was later overruled on other grounds, having nothing to
do
> > with these principles.
> >
> > http://www.talkleft.com/archives/001907.html
> >
> > --------------------------------
> >
> > INTERNATIONAL LAW PRESUMPTIONS
> >
> > 1. The presumption of innocence: an integral part of international human
> > rights law
> >
> > Chapter 1: The presumption of innocence: an integral part of
international
> > human rights law
> > The principle that anyone who is accused of a penal offence shall be
> > considered innocent until proven guilty is, as stated above, a
fundamental
> > principle in any state with a just legal system. It is also an important
> > part of universal human rights law, and is laid down in Article 11 of
the
> > United Nations Universal Declaration on Human Rights (December 10,
1948):
> >
> > "Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed
> innocent
> > until proven guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has
had
> > all the guarantees necessary for his defence."
> >
> > This principle is also established in Article 6 (2) of the Council of
> > Europe's European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
> > Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) :
> >
> > "Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent
until
> > proven guilty according to law."
> >
> > The wording of Article 14 (2) of the United Nations International
> Convention
> > on Civil and Political Rights (December 14, 1966) is almost identical:
> >
> > "Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be
> > presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law."
> >
> > The former Soviet Union/Russia signed and ratified both the Universal
> > Declaration of Human Rights and the International Convention on Civil
and
> > Political Rights, and when Russia became a member of the Council of
Europe
> > in February, 1996, the governing authorities declared that the country
> would
> > fulfil all of the requirements of the ECHR so as to sign the convention
> and
> > its accompanying protocol within a year. Russia also agreed to ratify
the
> > Convention within three years (opinion 193/1996). Furthermore, the
Russian
> > Constitution of 1993 states that the country is a democratic judicial
> > society (Article 1) and a number of provisions have been made in which
it
> is
> > stated that international human rights are binding for Russian
> authorities.
> > Subsequently, Article 14, Section 4 of the Russian Constitution states
> that
> > "recognised principles and rules of international law make up a part of
> the
> > internal law;" it also establishes that in the event of a conflict,
> > international law takes precedence over national law. Furthermore, the
> > Russian Constitution guarantees human rights in accordance with
recognised
> > principles and norms of international law (Article 17) and establishes
> that
> > human rights have immediate effect in national law (Article 18).[2]
Hence
> on
> > these grounds Russian authorities are bound both politically and legally
> by
> > the international principles of law that anyone accused of a penal
offence
> > shall be presumed innocent until proven guilty. It is also inherent in
> this
> > that any reasonable doubt in a criminal case must be applied in favour
of
> > the accused. The presumption of innocence applies to individuals who are
> > suspected of or accused of having committed a crime, and it grants
> citizens
> > general protection from being singled out by the authorities as
criminals
> > before their guilt has been established in a court of law. Thus it may
be
> > considered a breach of the presumption of innocence when the police and
> the
> > public prosecution issue statements and pronouncements that may form a
> basis
> > for drawing conclusions about the guilt of the accused person. The same
is
> > true if a representative for the state publicly asserts that a person is
> > guilty of a crime before the person's guilt has been established by a
> court,
> > cf. the statement from the Human Rights Commission of the Council of
> Europe
> > in the case "Petra Krause vs. Switzerland" (1979) which addressed
certain
> > statements made by the Swiss Justice Minister during a television
> broadcast.
> >
> > In most instances, the eventual trial of a penal case in court
sufficient
> to
> > "repair" those violations to the individual's rights which, seen in
> > isolation, pronouncements of guilt issuing from the police, the
> prosecution,
> > or other representatives of the state may represent. Yet in the Nikitin
> > case, there appear to have been so many isolated instances whereby the
> > presumption of innocence has been ignored that it is uncertain whether
> > acquittal in court will, of itself, be sufficient to offset the damage.
In
> > any case, developments in the case so far give the impression that the
> FSB,
> > along with actors in the prosecution and in the local courts who have
thus
> > far handled the case has already decided that Nikitin is guilty.
> >
> > It remains an indisputable fact that a number of different
representatives
> > for the federal security police and prosecuting authorities have held up
> > Nikitin as guilty of having committed serious criminal offences even
> before
> > the investigation of the case had been concluded and before the
> defendant's
> > case has been tried and his guilt established by an independent court.
> Their
> > pronouncements have appeared partly in the form of interviews on the
> > television and in newspapers, and partly in the form of official letters
> to
> > persons or groups who have spoken critically about or who have requested
> > further information about the basis for the charges against Nikitin.
Other
> > authorities too have come forward with statements in which there is
raised
> > little doubt about Nikitin's guilt. In Section 3, a chronological
overview
> > of a number of these pronouncements is presented along with accompanying
> > commentaries.
> >
> > Over the entire course of the case against Nikitin, the FSB has also
stood
> > behind a number of "planted" newspaper articles in which the reader is
> left
> > in little doubt as to the question of guilt, and in which Nikitin and
his
> > defence counsel are discussed in quite negative terms. Such newspaper
> > articles do not often have great impact with respect to the presumption
of
> > innocence in a case in that they normally do not influence the court's
> > consideration of the case. However, in Russia the effect may be
different,
> > in part because the country's judicial branch hardly enjoys the same
> > independence with respect to other bodies of state as would be true of a
> > Western system of justice. Furthermore, in Russia the security police
has
> > traditionally held an extremely strong position with respect to other
> bodies
> > of state. Hence it may be of some relevance to evaluate some of the
> various
> > "planted" FSB articles on the Nikitin case with respect to the
presumption
> > of innocence. However, an examination of such extent is beyond the scope
> of
> > this note; subsequently articles of this type are not addressed in the
> > ensuing discussion.
> >
> > http://tinyurl.com/wdro
> >
> >
> > XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
> > XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
> > WHATISLYNCHMOB
> > XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
> >
> > The sheriff listens to Little Hawk, who tries to convince him of his
> > innocence: He only wanted to lead the horses to better pastures. By now
> the
> > pursuer is questioned by his boss: Why didn't he kill the Indian- he had
> > been ordered to cause Indian trouble in the area.  He tried, but Little
> Hawk
> > was too quick. And he tells his boss that the Padre has seen Little Hawk
> > steal the mission ponies, while Little Hawk was thinking he took a nap.
> Now
> > they plan a lynch mob to cause trouble with the Indians. When the editor
> > sees the mob coming, he quickly warns the sheriff. Sheriff Hollister
knows
> > that they do not have much of a chance against all and takes Little Hawk
> to
> > the mission through the back door, riding with two other cowboys and
asks
> > the editor: "Do you think you can hold them up until we are gone?"
"Well,
> I
> > think so, they are not mad at me ... yet." He answers.
> >
> > http://www.ponilla.org/Nimoy/TVFilms_Tombstone.htm
> >
> > ---------------------------------
> >
> > The actions of the authorities so angered the people, that on the night
of
> > August 9th, a group of them, wearing masks and cloaks, broke into the
> jail,
> > bound up the jailer and proceeded to drag the prisoner from his cell.
They
> > tied a rope around his neck and looped the end of it around the bars of
> the
> > jailhouse door. Pulling up on the rope, they drew him hard up to the
door
> > until he died of strangulation. In this manner, William Otis Hall became
> the
> > first known victim of a lynch mob in the central coast region.
> >
> > A flurry of such activities was quick to follow, including, in 1856, the
> > hanging of three Indians who were suspects in the murders of Francois
> Picart
> > and A. Mellon in the Carmel Valley. Also in 1856, two brothers, Juan and
> > Jose Alvitre, both hard cases who had served time at San Quentin, died
at
> > the hands of the vigilance committee in Monterey. The following year,
the
> > infamous Anastacio Garcia was found hanging from the beams in the same
> cell
> > where Otis Hall had met his fate five years earlier. The lynchings
> continued
> > on into the next decade with the executions of Carmel Indian Gregoria,
who
> > admitted shooting John Martin in the valley on January 6, 1864, and Juan
> > Valenzuela for the murder of Natividad store keeper Frank Johnson during
> the
> > month of September, 1866.
> >
> > http://www.santacruzpl.org/history/crime/pajaro2.shtml
> >
> > --------------------------------
> >
> > Their arraignment took place on June 6, 1986, in the Nazareth office of
> > District Justice Elmo Frey Jr. The unprovoked bank murders aroused
> > law-abiding citizens of Allentown as no earlier crime had done. A lynch
> mob
> > formed, and state troopers were brought in to protect the killers. "It
was
> > scary," said Appel.
> >
> > The following morning someone spray-painted "Hang 'Em High" on the side
of
> > Appel's trailer.
> >
> > http://www.cybersleuths.com/billkelly/bkchap3.htm
> >
> > -------------------------------
> >
> > Only once in its history has the United States Supreme Court conducted a
> > criminal trial.  The trial, taking place in both Tennessee and the
> District
> > of Columbia in 1907 and 1908, resulted in the conviction of a sheriff, a
> > deputy sheriff, and four members of a Chattanooga lynch mob.  Outraged
> > justices ordered the trial on criminal contempt charges after an almost
> > certainly innocent black man, having been convicted of raping a white
> woman,
> > was lynched less than a day after word reached Chattanooga that his
> > scheduled execution had been stayed by the U. S. Supreme Court...
> >
> > ...Word of Johnson's arrest spread quickly. That evening a large
> crowd--many
> > carrying guns--gathered in front of the Hamilton County Jail.  Bullets
> were
> > fired into the sky.  Nevada Taylor's younger brother adds fuel to the
fire
> > in a brief speech he delivers to the mob:  "The time for justice and
> > punishment has come.  We want the Negro.  He must be punished for what
he
> > did to my sister."  Soon one member of the mob stepped forward to tell
> > Captain George Brown, second in command at the jail, that he would allow
> > five minutes for someone to turn over the keys or he would lead a
violent
> > assault on the jail.  No keys were delivered. Leaders of the mob grabbed
a
> > steel post and began ramming it against the front door.  Others in the
mob
> > took over the electric plant, throwing the jail into darkness.  Men
stole
> > sledgehammers from a nearby blacksmith shop and started working on
hinges
> of
> > the heavy door.
> >
> > The jail sustained heavy damage from the attack, but there was to be no
> > lynching of Ed Johnson--at least not yet.  Deputies and members of Troop
B
> > of the National Guard--ordered to the scene by Governor Cox--arrived at
> the
> > jail.  A group of deputies succeeded in grabbing away the sledgehammers.
> > Minutes later, Judge Samuel McReynolds showed up.  "The jury is in,
Judge,
> > we find him guilty and sentence him to hang by the neck until dead," one
> man
> > in the crowd announces.  McReynolds replied, "Go home."  Then the judge
> told
> > the crowd that the man they were looking for was not in the jail, that
he
> > had been sent to Knoxville a few hours earlier.  (In fact, Johnson had
> been
> > sent to Nashville.)  McReynolds offered to let five men from the
> > disbelieving crowd inspect the jail: "See for yourself he is not there."
> > After a cell-by-cell search, the five chosen men told the crowd that the
> > judge was right: Johnson was gone.
> >
> > http://tinyurl.com/wduk
> >
> > ----------------------------
> >
> > LYNCHING. Lynching is the illegal killing of a person under the pretext
of
> > service to justice, race, or tradition. Though it often refers to
hanging,
> > the word became a generic term for any form of execution without due
> process
> > of law. Though it is hard to estimate the frequency of lynchings before
> the
> > 1880s, it seems that they occurred only sporadically before 1865, and
were
> > likely to be the result of "frontier justice" dispensed in areas where
> > formal legal systems did not exist.
> >
> > In antebellum Texasqv and earlier, vigilantes instigated most lynchings.
> > Often acting under the leadership of the local elite, the vigilante mob
> > usually handled its victims with considerable formality, imitating legal
> > court procedure. The captured offender was "tried" before a vigilante
> judge
> > and a jury consisting of either a select group of vigilantes or the
whole
> of
> > the assembled mob. Convictions most often resulted in whipping, followed
> by
> > expulsion from the community, but at least seventeen vigilante
> organizations
> > resorted to the noose, claiming some 140 lives. The earliest of these
> > groups, the Shelby County Regulators of 1840-44, killed at least ten
> people
> > during the Regulator-Moderator War.qv The San Saba County lynchers, the
> > deadliest of the lot, claimed some twenty-five victims between 1880 and
> > 1896. Vigilante lynching died out in the 1890s, but other varieties of
> mobs
> > continued.
> >
> > It is uncertain when the first of the non-vigilante lynch mobs appeared
in
> > Texas, but certainly they increased in frequency with the approach of
the
> > Civil War.qv In the five years preceding the war, mobs frequently sought
> out
> > suspected slave rebels and white abolitionists. The most serious
outbreak
> of
> > this sort occurred in North Texas in 1860, when rumors of a slave
> > insurrection led to the lynching of an estimated thirty to fifty slaves
> and
> > possibly more than twenty whites (see TEXAS TROUBLES, SLAVE
> INSURRECTIONS).
> > The stresses of the Civil War, such as racism, regional loyalties,
> political
> > factionalism, economic tension, and the growth of the abolition
movement,
> > inured people to violence in a way that seemed to make lynching
> increasingly
> > easy to contemplate. War-generated tensions produced the greatest mass
> > lynching in the history of the state, the Great Hanging at
Gainesville,qv
> > when vigilantes hanged forty-one suspected Unionists during a
thirteen-day
> > period in October 1862.
> >
> > The use of organized terror by lynch mobs appeared in Texas during
> > Reconstruction as the Ku Klux Klanqqv and similar organizations resorted
> to
> > violent methods of restoring white supremacy. The humiliation of defeat,
> > increasing idleness and violence, mistrust of all levels of government,
> > alteration of the traditional racial order, and fear of violence by
blacks
> > all contributed to a great outbreak of lynch-mob activity and instilled
in
> > many whites a belief in a "right to lynch." The Klan declined in Texas
in
> > the early 1870s and experienced a brief resurgence in the 1920s.
> Immediately
> > after Reconstruction, lynch law evidently declined somewhat, but it soon
> > increased again, and began to be characterized by events in which mobs
> > removed victims from legal custody, sometimes with the cooperation of
> legal
> > authorities. In 1885 an estimated twenty-two mobs lynched forty-three
> > people, including nineteen blacks and twenty-four whites, one of whom
was
> > female. After this the number of lynching victims generally decreased,
> > dropping to five in 1893, but increased again to twenty-six in 1897. The
> > number of victims continued to decline (to twenty-three in 1908 and
> fifteen
> > in 1909) until 1915, when there were thirty-two. The 1915 figure, which
is
> > probably an underestimate, reflected an increase in racial hostility
that
> > accompanied the spread of Jim Crow laws and border troubles growing out
of
> > the Mexican Revolution.qv Six mobs in Cameron, Willacy, and Hidalgo
> counties
> > accounted for twenty-six of the victims. In 1922 thirteen mobs claimed
> > fifteen victims. After this there was a sharp decline; 1925 was the
first
> > lynching-free year. The Sherman Riotqv in 1930, however, was a notable
> > example of racial violence committed by a mob. After 1930 there was
never
> > more than one mob a year. Six years without a lynching preceded the
final
> > clear-cut case, the lynching of accused rapist William Vinson at
Texarkana
> > on July 13, 1942.
> >
> > Texas stands third among the states, after Mississippi and Georgia, in
the
> > total number of lynching victims. Of the 468 victims in Texas between
1885
> > and 1942, 339 were black, 77 white, 53 Hispanic, and 1 Indian. Half of
the
> > white victims died between 1885 and 1889, and 53 percent of the
Hispanics
> > died in the 1915 troubles. Between 1889 and 1942 charges of murder or
> > attempted murder precipitated at least 40 percent of the mobs; rape or
> > attempted rape accounted for 26 percent. Blacks were more likely to be
> > lynched for rape than were members of other groups, although even among
> > blacks murder-related charges accounted for 40 percent of the lynchings
> and
> > rape for only 32 percent. All but 15 of the 322 lynching incidents that
> have
> > a known locality occurred in the eastern half of the state. The heaviest
> > concentration of mob activity was along the Brazos River from Waco to
the
> > Gulf of Mexico, where eleven counties accounted for 20 percent of all
> lynch
> > mobs. Other concentrations were in Harrison and neighboring counties on
> the
> > Louisiana border, adjacent to Caddo Parish, Louisiana, one of the most
> > lynching-prone areas in the country, and in Lamar and surrounding
counties
> > in Northeast Texas.
> >
> > Texans also made important contributions to the antilynching movement.
> Part
> > of this was unintentional: the gruesome and widely publicized 1893
> > torture-burning of Henry Smith before an assembly of thousands at Paris
> > helped galvanize the infant antilynching movement into action. In a more
> > positive vein, Texas native Jessie Daniel Amesqv of Georgetown founded
and
> > served as president of the Association of Southern Women for the
> Prevention
> > of Lynching,qv the most effective antilynching group in the country. The
> > legislature passed an antilynching law in 1897, governors called out the
> > Texas Volunteer Guard to help defend prisoners on numerous occasions,
and
> > local officers sometimes went to great lengths to protect their
prisoners.
> >
> > BIBLIOGRAPHY: Norman D. Brown, Hood, Bonnet, and Little Brown Jug: Texas
> > Politics, 1921-1928 (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1984).
> > David Chapman, Lynching in Texas (M.A. thesis, Texas Tech University,
> 1973).
> > Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, Revolt Against Chivalry: Jessie Daniel Ames and the
> > Women's Campaign Against Lynching (New York: Columbia University Press,
> > 1979). Lawrence D. Rice, The Negro in Texas, 1874-1900 (Baton Rouge:
> > Louisiana State University Press, 1971). John Ross, At the Bar of Judge
> > Lynch: Lynching and Lynch Mobs in America (Ph.D. dissertation, Texas
Tech
> > University, 1983). Allen W. Trelease, White Terror: The Ku Klux Klan
> > Conspiracy and Southern Reconstruction (New York: Harper and Row, 1971).
> >
> > John R. Ross
> > http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook/online/articles/view/LL/jgl1.html
> >
> > -----------------------------------
> >
> > III.  LAW ON THE ISLAND
> >
> > As noted at the outset of this essay, numerous episodes of Gilligan's
> Island
> > contain legal references, and many employ legal themes as their central
> > storyline. In Episode 7, entitled "The Sound of Quacking," for example,
> > Gilligan dreams that he is Marshal Gilligan, a lawman of the Old West.
> > Despite the demands of a lynch mob (led by the Professor and Mr.
Howell),
> he
> > refuses to surrender the object of the crowd's bloodlust: a duck they
want
> > to turn into dinner.
> >
> > In Episode 13, entitled "Three Million Dollars More or Less," Gilligan
> wins
> > $ 3 million from Mr. Howell in a golf game. When it comes time to pay,
Mr.
> > Howell uses a convoluted explanation of the federal tax laws to convince
> > Gilligan that receiving stock in a (worthless) oil company is better
than
> > getting cash.
> >
> > In Episode 16, entitled "Plant You Now, Dig You Later,"
> >
> > LEGAL TALES FROM GILLIGAN'S ISLAND
> > http://www.law.utexas.edu/lpop/etext/jarvis.htm
> >
> > ------------------------------------
> >
> > In one of the most compelling scenes in the film, as the children begin
> > taking a shortcut home, four cars noisily converge on the jail from the
> > Meridian Highway. The children hide and watch from the cover of the
> bushes.
> > The armed men get out of their cars and surround Atticus - they are a
> > self-appointed lynch mob that has gathered to take justice into its own
> > hands after diverting Sheriff Tate. To get a closer look, the three kids
> run
> > over to the cars. Scout, in particular, who is oblivious to the danger,
> > pushes her way through the crowd to glimpse her stern-faced father - he
> > immediately fears for their safety. While Jem stands by his father and
> > stubbornly refuses to leave after his father's command, a stalwart Scout
> > faces down the crowd and sees someone she recognizes. She conducts an
> > innocent, uninhibited exchange with Walter Cunningham Sr., and engages
him
> > in a disarming, candid, yet humanized conversation. Scout makes him
> > uncomfortable in front of the mob:
> >
> > I said, 'Hey,' Mr. Cunningham. How's your entailment getting along? (He
> > turns and looks away.) Don't you remember me, Mr. Cunningham? I'm Jean
> > Louise Finch. You brought us some hickory nuts one early morning,
> remember?
> > We had a talk. I went and got my daddy to come out and thank you. I go
to
> > school with your boy. I go to school with Walter. He's a nice boy. Tell
> him
> > 'hey' for me, won't you? You know something, Mr. Cunningham, entailments
> are
> > bad. Entailments...(She suddenly becomes self-conscious) Atticus, I was
> just
> > saying to Mr. Cunningham that entailments were bad but not to worry.
Takes
> a
> > long time sometimes...(To the men who are staring up at her) What's the
> > matter? I sure meant no harm, Mr. Cunningham.
> >
> > Scout's words cause him to break up the potential lynching. The
> embarrassed
> > crowd disbands.
> >
> > To Kill A Mockingbird (1962)
> > http://www.filmsite.org/toki2.html
> >
> > >
> >
> >
> >
>
> I see that the constitution itself uses the phrase "until proven guilty",
> but it still makes sense to say this in the best way, which to me is
> "unless proven guilty".
>

But until has a special meaning when combined in coherence with other
proposition in the constitution. Until has been quantified:

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual
service in time of War or public danger;

[nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb; ]

nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.

http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/constitution/amendment05/index.html

> I wonder if this isn't a case of status quo reigning over common sense.
>
>