Re: What is the "Presumption of Innocence"

"Immortalist" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
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>
> "Not so quick" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
> news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>
> > Re: Can somebody please say "unless proven guilty"
> > instead of "until proven guilty".
> > Comment?
> >
>
> No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or
> immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any
> person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny
> to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
>
> 14th Ammendment:
> http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/constitution/amendment14/index.html
>
> -------------------------------
>
> "Better that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer," 2
> says English jurist William Blackstone.  The ratio 10:1 has become known
as
> the "Blackstone ratio."
>
> http://www1.law.ucla.edu/~volokh/guilty.htm
>
> --------------------------------
>
> What is the "presumption of innocence?"
>
> All people accused of a crime are legally presumed to be innocent until
they
> are convicted, either in a trial or as a result of pleading guilty. This
> presumption means not only that the prosecutor must convince the jury of
the
> defendant's guilt, but also that the defendant need not say or do anything
> in his own defense. If the prosecutor can't convince the jury that the
> defendant is guilty, the defendant goes free.
>
> The presumption of innocence, coupled with the fact that the prosecutor
must
> prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt (see below), makes
it
> difficult for the government to put people behind bars.
>
> Legal FAQ:
> http://tinyurl.com/wdqg
>
> ------------------------------------
>
> The Presumption of Innocence in a Criminal Trial
>
> What then is the appropriate role for the presumption of innocence? In a
> criminal trial, the presumption of innocence is an important
constitutional
> protection for the accused. It means that the jury may only pronounce the
> defendant guilty if the physical and testimonial evidence presented prove
> guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Put differently, the jury must say "not
> guilty" even when it believes the defendant is guilty and often, it
follows,
> even when the defendant in fact is guilty. Until the evidentiary threshold
> of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is reached, the judge and the
> Constitution order the jury to acquit.
>
> The reason for this rule is that a guilty verdict subjects a person to
> incarceration, the deprivation of freedom that we all cherish and that is
> guaranteed us under normal circumstances. Though the acquittal of a
> factually guilty man is unfortunate and costly, it is an inevitable
> byproduct of a system designed to reduce to close to zero the odds that a
> factually innocent person will be convicted of a crime.
>
> http://writ.corporate.findlaw.com/colb/20020617.html
>
> ---------------------------
>
> How come they treat me as if I am guilty when I am presumed innocent until
> proven otherwise?
>
> By reading this page you will know what less then 1 in 1,000 know, and
what
> many attorneys and Judges only think they know.
>
> In an argument a presumption is what someone owns. Think of an argument as
a
> scale. If both sides of the scale are equal the one that owns the
> presumption wins. A presumption can be a presumption of debt, a
presumption
> of title and so on. As a defendant you own the "presumption of innocence".
>
> Many confuse presumption with assumption or assertion. An assumption is a
> position that is not proven but because of the circumstances can be
> considered correct. An assertion is a claim made justifying the
assumption.
> If challenged by the owner of the presumption the Burdon of proving the
> assertion is placed upon the party making the assertion. Failure to prove
> the assertion results in the owner of the presumption prevailing in the
> dispute.
>
> In an arrest the person making the arrest warrants to the court (makes a
> type of guarantee) that there is a warrant (a link between a claim and
> evidence) to prove an assertion. In other words the arresting officer when
> he fills out your ticket swears to the court that there is sufficient
> evidence to to prove his assertion that you were speeding.
>
> http://www.tipmra.com/presumption_of_innocence.htm
>
> --------------------------------
>
> Proof, Burden of Proof, and Presumptions.--The due process clauses of the
> Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments ''[protect] the accused against conviction
> except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
> constitute the crime with which he is charged.''83 ''The reasonable doubt
> standard plays a vital role in the American scheme of criminal procedure.
It
> is a prime instrument for reducing the risk of convictions resting on
> factual error. The standard provides concrete substance for the
presumption
> of innocence--that bedrock 'axiomatic and elementary' principle whose
> 'enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal
> law.'''84 In many past cases, this standard was assumed to be the required
> one,85 but because it was so widely accepted only recently has the Court
had
> the opportunity to pronounce it guaranteed by due process.86 The
presumption
> of inno cence is valuable in assuring defendants a fair trial,87 and it
> operates to ensure that the jury considers the case solely on the
> evidence.88
>
> The Court has long held it would set aside under the due process clause
> convictions that are supported by no evidence at all,89 but Winship
> necessitated a reconsideration of whether it should in reviewing state
cases
> weigh the sufficiency of the evidence. Thus, in Jackson v. Virginia,90 it
> held that federal courts, on direct appeal of federal convictions or
> collateral review of state convictions, must satisfy themselves whether
the
> record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a
> reasonable doubt. The question the reviewing court is to ask itself is not
> whether it believes the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a
> reasonable doubt, but whether, after viewing the evidence in the light
most
> favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found
> the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.91
>
> Inasmuch as due process requires the prosecution to prove beyond a
> reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime charged, the
> Court held in Mullaney v. Wilbur92 that it was a denial of this
> constitutional guarantee to require a defendant charged with murder to
prove
> that he acted ''in the heat of passion on sudden provocation'' in order to
> reduce the homicide to manslaughter. The Court indicated that a balancing
of
> interests test was to be employed to determine when the due process clause
> re quired the prosecution to carry the burden and when some part of the
> burden might be shifted to the defendant, but the decision called into
> question the practice in many States under which some burdens of
persuasion
> were borne by the defense, and raised the prospect that the prosecution
must
> bear all burdens of persuasion, a significant and weighty task given the
> large numbers of affirmative defenses.
>
> But the Court soon summarily rejected the argument that Mullaney means
that
> the prosecution must negate the insanity defense,93 and in full-scale
> consideration upheld a state statute that provided that an intentional
> killing is murder but permitted the defendant to assert ''extreme
emotional
> disturbance'' as an affirmative defense which, if proved by the defense by
a
> preponderance of the evidence, would reduce the murder offense to
> manslaughter.94 According to the Court, the constitutional deficiency in
> Mullaney was that the statute made malice an element of the offense but
> permitted malice to be presumed upon proof of the other elements and
> required the defendant to prove the absence of malice. In Patterson the
> statute obligated the State to prove each element of the offense (the
death,
> the intent to kill, and the causation) beyond a reasonable doubt, but
> allowed the defendant to present an affirmative defense that would reduce
> the degree of the offense, and as to which the defendant bears the burden
of
> persuasion by a preponderance of the evidence. The decisive issue, then,
was
> whether the statute required the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
> each element of the offense. So defined, the distinction and the
> constitutional mandate are formalistic, and the legislature can shift
> burdens of persuasion between prosecution and defense easily through the
> statutory definitions of the offenses.95 Also formalistic is the
distinction
> between elements of the crime and sentencing factors; a state may treat as
a
> sentencing consideration provable by a preponderance of the evidence the
> fact that the defendant ''visibly possessed a firearm'' during commission
of
> the offense.96
>
> Quite closely related is the issue of statutory presumptions; these
> generally provide for the proof of the presumed fact, an element of a
crime,
> by the establishment of another fact, the basic fact.97 In Tot v. United
> States,98 the Court held that a statutory presumption was valid under the
> due process clause if it met a ''rational connection'' test. ''Under our
> decisions, a statutory presumption cannot be sustained if there be no
> rational connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact
presumed,
> if the inference of the one from the proof of the other is arbitrary
because
> of lack of connection between the two in common experience.'' In Leary v.
> United States,99 however, the due process test was stiffened to require
that
> for such a ''rational connection'' to exist, it must ''at least be said
with
> substantial assurance that the presumed fact is more likely than not to
flow
> from the proved fact on which it is made to depend.'' Thus, a provision
> which permitted a jury to infer from defendant's possession of marijuana
his
> knowledge of its illegal importation was voided. A lengthy canvass of
> factual materials established to the Court's satisfaction that while the
> greater part of marijuana consumed here is of foreign origin there was
still
> a good amount produced domestically and there was thus no way to assure
that
> the majority of those possessing marijuana have any reason to know their
> marijuana is imported.100 The Court left open the question whether a
> presumption which survived the ''rational connection'' test ''must also
> satisfy the criminal 'reasonable doubt' standard if proof of the crime
> charged or an essential element thereof depends upon its use.''101
>
> In its most recent case, a closely divided Court drew a distinction
between
> mandatory presumptions, which a jury must accept, and permissive
> presumptions, which may be presented to the jury as part of all the
evidence
> to be considered. With respect to mandatory presumptions, ''since the
> prosecution bears the burden of establishing guilt, it may not rest its
case
> entirely on a presumption, unless the fact proved is sufficient to support
> the inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.'' But, with respect to
> permissive presumptions, ''the prosecution may rely on all of the evidence
> in the record to meet the reasonable doubt standard. There is no more
reason
> to require a permissive statutory presumption to meet a reasonable-doubt
> standard before it may be permitted to play any part in a trial than there
> is to require that degree of probative force for other relevant evidence
> before it may be admitted.''102 Thus, because the jury was told it had to
> believe in defendants' guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and that it could
> consider the inference, due process was not violated by the application of
> the statutory presumption that the presence of a firearm in an automobile
is
> presumptive evidence of its illegal possession by all persons then
occupying
> the vehicle.103
>
> The division of the Court in these cases and in the Mullaney v. Wilbur
line
> of cases clearly shows the unsettled doctrinal nature of the issues.
>
> http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/constitution/amendment14/16.html
>
> ------------------------------
>
> The History of the Presumption of Innocence
>
> It is better than 5, 10, 20, or 100 guilty men go free than for one
innocent
> man to be put to death. This prinicple is embodied in the presumption of
> innocence. In 1895, the U.S. Supreme Court, in a decision in the case
Coffin
> v. United States, 156 U.S. 432; 15 S. Ct. 394, traced the presumption of
> innocence, past England, Ancient Greece and Ancient Rome, and, at least
> according to Greenleaf, to Deuteronomy. [also, Alexander Volokh wrote a
law
> review article on the issue, available free here.]
>
> The Coffin case stands for the proposition that at the request of a
> defendant, a court must not only instruct on the prosecution's burden of
> proof--that a defendant cannot be convicted unless the government has
proven
> his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt--but also must instruct on the
> presumption of innocence--by informing the jury that a defendant is
presumed
> innocent. The Court stated,
>
> The principle that there is a presumption of innocence in favor of the
> accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its
enforcement
> lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.
>
> In tracing the presumption of innocence, the Court goes on to state:
>
> It is stated as unquestioned in the text-books, and has been referred to
as
> a matter of course in the decisions of this court and in the courts of the
> several States. See Taylor on Evidence, vol. 1, c. 5, 126, 127; Wills on
> Circumstantial Evidence, c. 5, 91; Best on Presumptions, part 2, c. 1, 63,
> 64; c. 3, 31-58; Greenleaf on Evidence, part 5, § § 29, &c.; 11 Criminal
Law
> Magazine, 3; Wharton on Evidence, § 1244; Phillips on Evidence, Cowen &
> Hill's Notes, vol. 2, p. 289; Lilienthal v. United States, 97 U.S. 237;
Hopt
> v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430; Commonwealth v. Webster, 5 Cush. 295, 320; State v.
> Bartlett, 43 N.H. 224; Alexander v. People, 96 Illinois, 96; People v.
> Fairchild, 48 Michigan, 31; People v. Millard, 53 Michigan, 63;
Commonwealth
> v. Whittaker, 131 Mass. 224; Blake v. State, 3 Tex. App. 581; Wharton v.
> State, 73 Alabama, 366; State v. Tibbetts, 35 Maine, 81; Moorer v. State,
44
> Alabama, 15.
>
> Greenleaf traces this presumption to Deuteronomy, and quotes Mascardus De
> Probationibus to show that it was substantially embodied in the laws of
> Sparta and Athens. Greenl. Ev. part 5, section 29, note. Whether Greenleaf
> is correct or not in this view, there can be no question that the Roman
law
> was pervaded with the results of this maxim of criminal administration, as
> the following extracts show:
>
> "Let all accusers understand that they are not to prefer charges unless
they
> can be proven by proper witnesses or by conclusive documents, or by
> circumstantial evidence which amounts to indubitable proof and is clearer
> than day." Code, L. IV, T. XX, 1, 1. 25.
>
> The noble (bivus) Trajan wrote to Julius Frontonus that no man should be
> condemned on a criminal charge in his absence, because it was better to
let
> the crime of a guilty person go unpunished than to condemn the innocent."
> Dig. L. XLVIII, Tit. 19, 1. 5. "In all cases of doubt, the most merciful
> construction of facts should be preferred." Dig. L. L, Tit. XVII, 1. 56.
"In
> criminal cases the milder construction shall always be preserved." Dig. L.
> L, Tit. XVII, 1. 155, s. 2. "In cases of doubt it is no less just than it
is
> safe to adopt the milder construction." Dig. L. L, Tit. XVII, 1. 192, s.
1.
>
> Ammianus Marcellinus relates an anecdote of the Emperor Julian which
> illustrates the enforcement of this principle in the Roman law. Numerius,
> the governor of Narbonensis, was on trial before the Emperor, and,
contrary
> to the usage in criminal cases, the trial was public. Numerius contented
> himself with denying his guilt, and there was not sufficient proof against
> him. His adversary, Delphidius, "a passionate man," seeing that the
failure
> of the accusation was inevitable, could not restrain himself, and
exclaimed,
> "Oh, illustrious Caesar! if it is sufficient to deny, what hereafter will
> become of the guilty?" to which Julian replied, "If it suffices to accuse,
> what will become of the innocent?" Rerum Gestarum, L. XVIII, c. 1. The
rule
> thus found in the Roman law was, along with many other fundamental and
> humane maxims of that system, preserved for mankind by the canon law.
> Decretum Gratiani de Presumptionibus, L. II, T. XXIII, c. 14, A.D. 1198;
> [***492] Corpus Juris Canonici Hispani et Indici, R.P. Murillo Velarde,
Tom.
> 1, L. II, n. 140. Exactly when this presumption was in precise words
stated
> to be a part of the common law is involved in doubt. The writer of an able
> article in the North American Review, January, 1851, tracing the genesis
of
> the principle, says that no express mention of the presumption of
innocence
> can be found in the books of the common law earlier than the date of
> McNally's Evidence (1802). Whether this statement is correct is a matter
of
> no moment, for there can be no doubt that, if the principle had not found
> formal expression in the common law writers at an earlier date, yet the
> practice which flowed from it has existed in the common law from the
> earliest time.
>
> Fortescue says: "Who, then, in England can be put to death unjustly for
any
> crime? since he is allowed so many pleas and privileges in favor of life;
> none but his neighbors, men of honest and good repute, against whom he can
> have no probable cause of exception, can find the person accused guilty.
> Indeed, one would much rather that twenty guilty persons should escape the
> punishment of death than that one innocent person should be condemned and
> suffer capitally." De Laudibus Legum Angliae, Amos' translation,
Cambridge,
> 1825.
>
> [*456] Lord Hale (1678) says: "In some cases presumptive evidence goes far
> to prove a person guilty, though there be no express proof of the fact to
be
> committed by him, but then it must be very warily pressed, for it is
better
> five guilty persons should escape unpunished than one innocent person
should
> die." 2 Hale P.C. 290. He further observes: "And thus the reasons stand on
> both sides, and though these seem to be stronger than the former, yet in a
> case of this moment it is safest to hold that in practice, which hath
least
> doubt and danger, quod dubitas, ne faceris." 1 Hale P.C. 24.
>
> Blackstone (1753-1765) maintains that "the law holds that it is better
that
> ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer." 2 Bl. Com. c.
27,
> margin page 358, ad finem. How fully the presumption of innocence had been
> evolved as a principle and applied at common law is shown in McKinley's
case
> (1817), 33 St. Tr. 275, 506, where Lord Gillies says: "It is impossible to
> look at it [a treasonable oath which it was alleged that [**404] McKinley
> had taken] without suspecting, and thinking it probable, it imports an
> obligation to commit a capital crime. That has been and is my impression.
> But the presumption in favor of innocence is not to be reargued by mere
> suspicion. I am sorry to see, in this information, that the public
> prosecutor treats this too lightly; he seems to think that the law
> entertains no such presumption of innocence. I cannot listen to this. I
> conceive that this presumption is to be found in every code of law which
has
> reason, and religion, and humanity, for a foundation. It is a maxim which
> ought to be inscribed in indelible characters in the heart of every judge
> and juryman; and I was happy to hear from Lord Hermand he is inclined to
> give full effect to it. To overturn this, there must be legal evidence of
> guilt, carrying home a decree of conviction short only absolute
certainty."
>
> The Coffin case was later overruled on other grounds, having nothing to do
> with these principles.
>
> http://www.talkleft.com/archives/001907.html
>
> --------------------------------
>
> INTERNATIONAL LAW PRESUMPTIONS
>
> 1. The presumption of innocence: an integral part of international human
> rights law
>
> Chapter 1: The presumption of innocence: an integral part of international
> human rights law
> The principle that anyone who is accused of a penal offence shall be
> considered innocent until proven guilty is, as stated above, a fundamental
> principle in any state with a just legal system. It is also an important
> part of universal human rights law, and is laid down in Article 11 of the
> United Nations Universal Declaration on Human Rights (December 10, 1948):
>
> "Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed
innocent
> until proven guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had
> all the guarantees necessary for his defence."
>
> This principle is also established in Article 6 (2) of the Council of
> Europe's European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
> Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) :
>
> "Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until
> proven guilty according to law."
>
> The wording of Article 14 (2) of the United Nations International
Convention
> on Civil and Political Rights (December 14, 1966) is almost identical:
>
> "Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be
> presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law."
>
> The former Soviet Union/Russia signed and ratified both the Universal
> Declaration of Human Rights and the International Convention on Civil and
> Political Rights, and when Russia became a member of the Council of Europe
> in February, 1996, the governing authorities declared that the country
would
> fulfil all of the requirements of the ECHR so as to sign the convention
and
> its accompanying protocol within a year. Russia also agreed to ratify the
> Convention within three years (opinion 193/1996). Furthermore, the Russian
> Constitution of 1993 states that the country is a democratic judicial
> society (Article 1) and a number of provisions have been made in which it
is
> stated that international human rights are binding for Russian
authorities.
> Subsequently, Article 14, Section 4 of the Russian Constitution states
that
> "recognised principles and rules of international law make up a part of
the
> internal law;" it also establishes that in the event of a conflict,
> international law takes precedence over national law. Furthermore, the
> Russian Constitution guarantees human rights in accordance with recognised
> principles and norms of international law (Article 17) and establishes
that
> human rights have immediate effect in national law (Article 18).[2] Hence
on
> these grounds Russian authorities are bound both politically and legally
by
> the international principles of law that anyone accused of a penal offence
> shall be presumed innocent until proven guilty. It is also inherent in
this
> that any reasonable doubt in a criminal case must be applied in favour of
> the accused. The presumption of innocence applies to individuals who are
> suspected of or accused of having committed a crime, and it grants
citizens
> general protection from being singled out by the authorities as criminals
> before their guilt has been established in a court of law. Thus it may be
> considered a breach of the presumption of innocence when the police and
the
> public prosecution issue statements and pronouncements that may form a
basis
> for drawing conclusions about the guilt of the accused person. The same is
> true if a representative for the state publicly asserts that a person is
> guilty of a crime before the person's guilt has been established by a
court,
> cf. the statement from the Human Rights Commission of the Council of
Europe
> in the case "Petra Krause vs. Switzerland" (1979) which addressed certain
> statements made by the Swiss Justice Minister during a television
broadcast.
>
> In most instances, the eventual trial of a penal case in court sufficient
to
> "repair" those violations to the individual's rights which, seen in
> isolation, pronouncements of guilt issuing from the police, the
prosecution,
> or other representatives of the state may represent. Yet in the Nikitin
> case, there appear to have been so many isolated instances whereby the
> presumption of innocence has been ignored that it is uncertain whether
> acquittal in court will, of itself, be sufficient to offset the damage. In
> any case, developments in the case so far give the impression that the
FSB,
> along with actors in the prosecution and in the local courts who have thus
> far handled the case has already decided that Nikitin is guilty.
>
> It remains an indisputable fact that a number of different representatives
> for the federal security police and prosecuting authorities have held up
> Nikitin as guilty of having committed serious criminal offences even
before
> the investigation of the case had been concluded and before the
defendant's
> case has been tried and his guilt established by an independent court.
Their
> pronouncements have appeared partly in the form of interviews on the
> television and in newspapers, and partly in the form of official letters
to
> persons or groups who have spoken critically about or who have requested
> further information about the basis for the charges against Nikitin. Other
> authorities too have come forward with statements in which there is raised
> little doubt about Nikitin's guilt. In Section 3, a chronological overview
> of a number of these pronouncements is presented along with accompanying
> commentaries.
>
> Over the entire course of the case against Nikitin, the FSB has also stood
> behind a number of "planted" newspaper articles in which the reader is
left
> in little doubt as to the question of guilt, and in which Nikitin and his
> defence counsel are discussed in quite negative terms. Such newspaper
> articles do not often have great impact with respect to the presumption of
> innocence in a case in that they normally do not influence the court's
> consideration of the case. However, in Russia the effect may be different,
> in part because the country's judicial branch hardly enjoys the same
> independence with respect to other bodies of state as would be true of a
> Western system of justice. Furthermore, in Russia the security police has
> traditionally held an extremely strong position with respect to other
bodies
> of state. Hence it may be of some relevance to evaluate some of the
various
> "planted" FSB articles on the Nikitin case with respect to the presumption
> of innocence. However, an examination of such extent is beyond the scope
of
> this note; subsequently articles of this type are not addressed in the
> ensuing discussion.
>
> http://tinyurl.com/wdro
>
>
> XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
> XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
> WHATISLYNCHMOB
> XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
>
> The sheriff listens to Little Hawk, who tries to convince him of his
> innocence: He only wanted to lead the horses to better pastures. By now
the
> pursuer is questioned by his boss: Why didn't he kill the Indian- he had
> been ordered to cause Indian trouble in the area.  He tried, but Little
Hawk
> was too quick. And he tells his boss that the Padre has seen Little Hawk
> steal the mission ponies, while Little Hawk was thinking he took a nap.
Now
> they plan a lynch mob to cause trouble with the Indians. When the editor
> sees the mob coming, he quickly warns the sheriff. Sheriff Hollister knows
> that they do not have much of a chance against all and takes Little Hawk
to
> the mission through the back door, riding with two other cowboys and asks
> the editor: "Do you think you can hold them up until we are gone?" "Well,
I
> think so, they are not mad at me ... yet." He answers.
>
> http://www.ponilla.org/Nimoy/TVFilms_Tombstone.htm
>
> ---------------------------------
>
> The actions of the authorities so angered the people, that on the night of
> August 9th, a group of them, wearing masks and cloaks, broke into the
jail,
> bound up the jailer and proceeded to drag the prisoner from his cell. They
> tied a rope around his neck and looped the end of it around the bars of
the
> jailhouse door. Pulling up on the rope, they drew him hard up to the door
> until he died of strangulation. In this manner, William Otis Hall became
the
> first known victim of a lynch mob in the central coast region.
>
> A flurry of such activities was quick to follow, including, in 1856, the
> hanging of three Indians who were suspects in the murders of Francois
Picart
> and A. Mellon in the Carmel Valley. Also in 1856, two brothers, Juan and
> Jose Alvitre, both hard cases who had served time at San Quentin, died at
> the hands of the vigilance committee in Monterey. The following year, the
> infamous Anastacio Garcia was found hanging from the beams in the same
cell
> where Otis Hall had met his fate five years earlier. The lynchings
continued
> on into the next decade with the executions of Carmel Indian Gregoria, who
> admitted shooting John Martin in the valley on January 6, 1864, and Juan
> Valenzuela for the murder of Natividad store keeper Frank Johnson during
the
> month of September, 1866.
>
> http://www.santacruzpl.org/history/crime/pajaro2.shtml
>
> --------------------------------
>
> Their arraignment took place on June 6, 1986, in the Nazareth office of
> District Justice Elmo Frey Jr. The unprovoked bank murders aroused
> law-abiding citizens of Allentown as no earlier crime had done. A lynch
mob
> formed, and state troopers were brought in to protect the killers. "It was
> scary," said Appel.
>
> The following morning someone spray-painted "Hang 'Em High" on the side of
> Appel's trailer.
>
> http://www.cybersleuths.com/billkelly/bkchap3.htm
>
> -------------------------------
>
> Only once in its history has the United States Supreme Court conducted a
> criminal trial.  The trial, taking place in both Tennessee and the
District
> of Columbia in 1907 and 1908, resulted in the conviction of a sheriff, a
> deputy sheriff, and four members of a Chattanooga lynch mob.  Outraged
> justices ordered the trial on criminal contempt charges after an almost
> certainly innocent black man, having been convicted of raping a white
woman,
> was lynched less than a day after word reached Chattanooga that his
> scheduled execution had been stayed by the U. S. Supreme Court...
>
> ...Word of Johnson's arrest spread quickly. That evening a large
crowd--many
> carrying guns--gathered in front of the Hamilton County Jail.  Bullets
were
> fired into the sky.  Nevada Taylor's younger brother adds fuel to the fire
> in a brief speech he delivers to the mob:  "The time for justice and
> punishment has come.  We want the Negro.  He must be punished for what he
> did to my sister."  Soon one member of the mob stepped forward to tell
> Captain George Brown, second in command at the jail, that he would allow
> five minutes for someone to turn over the keys or he would lead a violent
> assault on the jail.  No keys were delivered. Leaders of the mob grabbed a
> steel post and began ramming it against the front door.  Others in the mob
> took over the electric plant, throwing the jail into darkness.  Men stole
> sledgehammers from a nearby blacksmith shop and started working on hinges
of
> the heavy door.
>
> The jail sustained heavy damage from the attack, but there was to be no
> lynching of Ed Johnson--at least not yet.  Deputies and members of Troop B
> of the National Guard--ordered to the scene by Governor Cox--arrived at
the
> jail.  A group of deputies succeeded in grabbing away the sledgehammers.
> Minutes later, Judge Samuel McReynolds showed up.  "The jury is in, Judge,
> we find him guilty and sentence him to hang by the neck until dead," one
man
> in the crowd announces.  McReynolds replied, "Go home."  Then the judge
told
> the crowd that the man they were looking for was not in the jail, that he
> had been sent to Knoxville a few hours earlier.  (In fact, Johnson had
been
> sent to Nashville.)  McReynolds offered to let five men from the
> disbelieving crowd inspect the jail: "See for yourself he is not there."
> After a cell-by-cell search, the five chosen men told the crowd that the
> judge was right: Johnson was gone.
>
> http://tinyurl.com/wduk
>
> ----------------------------
>
> LYNCHING. Lynching is the illegal killing of a person under the pretext of
> service to justice, race, or tradition. Though it often refers to hanging,
> the word became a generic term for any form of execution without due
process
> of law. Though it is hard to estimate the frequency of lynchings before
the
> 1880s, it seems that they occurred only sporadically before 1865, and were
> likely to be the result of "frontier justice" dispensed in areas where
> formal legal systems did not exist.
>
> In antebellum Texasqv and earlier, vigilantes instigated most lynchings.
> Often acting under the leadership of the local elite, the vigilante mob
> usually handled its victims with considerable formality, imitating legal
> court procedure. The captured offender was "tried" before a vigilante
judge
> and a jury consisting of either a select group of vigilantes or the whole
of
> the assembled mob. Convictions most often resulted in whipping, followed
by
> expulsion from the community, but at least seventeen vigilante
organizations
> resorted to the noose, claiming some 140 lives. The earliest of these
> groups, the Shelby County Regulators of 1840-44, killed at least ten
people
> during the Regulator-Moderator War.qv The San Saba County lynchers, the
> deadliest of the lot, claimed some twenty-five victims between 1880 and
> 1896. Vigilante lynching died out in the 1890s, but other varieties of
mobs
> continued.
>
> It is uncertain when the first of the non-vigilante lynch mobs appeared in
> Texas, but certainly they increased in frequency with the approach of the
> Civil War.qv In the five years preceding the war, mobs frequently sought
out
> suspected slave rebels and white abolitionists. The most serious outbreak
of
> this sort occurred in North Texas in 1860, when rumors of a slave
> insurrection led to the lynching of an estimated thirty to fifty slaves
and
> possibly more than twenty whites (see TEXAS TROUBLES, SLAVE
INSURRECTIONS).
> The stresses of the Civil War, such as racism, regional loyalties,
political
> factionalism, economic tension, and the growth of the abolition movement,
> inured people to violence in a way that seemed to make lynching
increasingly
> easy to contemplate. War-generated tensions produced the greatest mass
> lynching in the history of the state, the Great Hanging at Gainesville,qv
> when vigilantes hanged forty-one suspected Unionists during a thirteen-day
> period in October 1862.
>
> The use of organized terror by lynch mobs appeared in Texas during
> Reconstruction as the Ku Klux Klanqqv and similar organizations resorted
to
> violent methods of restoring white supremacy. The humiliation of defeat,
> increasing idleness and violence, mistrust of all levels of government,
> alteration of the traditional racial order, and fear of violence by blacks
> all contributed to a great outbreak of lynch-mob activity and instilled in
> many whites a belief in a "right to lynch." The Klan declined in Texas in
> the early 1870s and experienced a brief resurgence in the 1920s.
Immediately
> after Reconstruction, lynch law evidently declined somewhat, but it soon
> increased again, and began to be characterized by events in which mobs
> removed victims from legal custody, sometimes with the cooperation of
legal
> authorities. In 1885 an estimated twenty-two mobs lynched forty-three
> people, including nineteen blacks and twenty-four whites, one of whom was
> female. After this the number of lynching victims generally decreased,
> dropping to five in 1893, but increased again to twenty-six in 1897. The
> number of victims continued to decline (to twenty-three in 1908 and
fifteen
> in 1909) until 1915, when there were thirty-two. The 1915 figure, which is
> probably an underestimate, reflected an increase in racial hostility that
> accompanied the spread of Jim Crow laws and border troubles growing out of
> the Mexican Revolution.qv Six mobs in Cameron, Willacy, and Hidalgo
counties
> accounted for twenty-six of the victims. In 1922 thirteen mobs claimed
> fifteen victims. After this there was a sharp decline; 1925 was the first
> lynching-free year. The Sherman Riotqv in 1930, however, was a notable
> example of racial violence committed by a mob. After 1930 there was never
> more than one mob a year. Six years without a lynching preceded the final
> clear-cut case, the lynching of accused rapist William Vinson at Texarkana
> on July 13, 1942.
>
> Texas stands third among the states, after Mississippi and Georgia, in the
> total number of lynching victims. Of the 468 victims in Texas between 1885
> and 1942, 339 were black, 77 white, 53 Hispanic, and 1 Indian. Half of the
> white victims died between 1885 and 1889, and 53 percent of the Hispanics
> died in the 1915 troubles. Between 1889 and 1942 charges of murder or
> attempted murder precipitated at least 40 percent of the mobs; rape or
> attempted rape accounted for 26 percent. Blacks were more likely to be
> lynched for rape than were members of other groups, although even among
> blacks murder-related charges accounted for 40 percent of the lynchings
and
> rape for only 32 percent. All but 15 of the 322 lynching incidents that
have
> a known locality occurred in the eastern half of the state. The heaviest
> concentration of mob activity was along the Brazos River from Waco to the
> Gulf of Mexico, where eleven counties accounted for 20 percent of all
lynch
> mobs. Other concentrations were in Harrison and neighboring counties on
the
> Louisiana border, adjacent to Caddo Parish, Louisiana, one of the most
> lynching-prone areas in the country, and in Lamar and surrounding counties
> in Northeast Texas.
>
> Texans also made important contributions to the antilynching movement.
Part
> of this was unintentional: the gruesome and widely publicized 1893
> torture-burning of Henry Smith before an assembly of thousands at Paris
> helped galvanize the infant antilynching movement into action. In a more
> positive vein, Texas native Jessie Daniel Amesqv of Georgetown founded and
> served as president of the Association of Southern Women for the
Prevention
> of Lynching,qv the most effective antilynching group in the country. The
> legislature passed an antilynching law in 1897, governors called out the
> Texas Volunteer Guard to help defend prisoners on numerous occasions, and
> local officers sometimes went to great lengths to protect their prisoners.
>
> BIBLIOGRAPHY: Norman D. Brown, Hood, Bonnet, and Little Brown Jug: Texas
> Politics, 1921-1928 (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1984).
> David Chapman, Lynching in Texas (M.A. thesis, Texas Tech University,
1973).
> Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, Revolt Against Chivalry: Jessie Daniel Ames and the
> Women's Campaign Against Lynching (New York: Columbia University Press,
> 1979). Lawrence D. Rice, The Negro in Texas, 1874-1900 (Baton Rouge:
> Louisiana State University Press, 1971). John Ross, At the Bar of Judge
> Lynch: Lynching and Lynch Mobs in America (Ph.D. dissertation, Texas Tech
> University, 1983). Allen W. Trelease, White Terror: The Ku Klux Klan
> Conspiracy and Southern Reconstruction (New York: Harper and Row, 1971).
>
> John R. Ross
> http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook/online/articles/view/LL/jgl1.html
>
> -----------------------------------
>
> III.  LAW ON THE ISLAND
>
> As noted at the outset of this essay, numerous episodes of Gilligan's
Island
> contain legal references, and many employ legal themes as their central
> storyline. In Episode 7, entitled "The Sound of Quacking," for example,
> Gilligan dreams that he is Marshal Gilligan, a lawman of the Old West.
> Despite the demands of a lynch mob (led by the Professor and Mr. Howell),
he
> refuses to surrender the object of the crowd's bloodlust: a duck they want
> to turn into dinner.
>
> In Episode 13, entitled "Three Million Dollars More or Less," Gilligan
wins
> $ 3 million from Mr. Howell in a golf game. When it comes time to pay, Mr.
> Howell uses a convoluted explanation of the federal tax laws to convince
> Gilligan that receiving stock in a (worthless) oil company is better than
> getting cash.
>
> In Episode 16, entitled "Plant You Now, Dig You Later,"
>
> LEGAL TALES FROM GILLIGAN'S ISLAND
> http://www.law.utexas.edu/lpop/etext/jarvis.htm
>
> ------------------------------------
>
> In one of the most compelling scenes in the film, as the children begin
> taking a shortcut home, four cars noisily converge on the jail from the
> Meridian Highway. The children hide and watch from the cover of the
bushes.
> The armed men get out of their cars and surround Atticus - they are a
> self-appointed lynch mob that has gathered to take justice into its own
> hands after diverting Sheriff Tate. To get a closer look, the three kids
run
> over to the cars. Scout, in particular, who is oblivious to the danger,
> pushes her way through the crowd to glimpse her stern-faced father - he
> immediately fears for their safety. While Jem stands by his father and
> stubbornly refuses to leave after his father's command, a stalwart Scout
> faces down the crowd and sees someone she recognizes. She conducts an
> innocent, uninhibited exchange with Walter Cunningham Sr., and engages him
> in a disarming, candid, yet humanized conversation. Scout makes him
> uncomfortable in front of the mob:
>
> I said, 'Hey,' Mr. Cunningham. How's your entailment getting along? (He
> turns and looks away.) Don't you remember me, Mr. Cunningham? I'm Jean
> Louise Finch. You brought us some hickory nuts one early morning,
remember?
> We had a talk. I went and got my daddy to come out and thank you. I go to
> school with your boy. I go to school with Walter. He's a nice boy. Tell
him
> 'hey' for me, won't you? You know something, Mr. Cunningham, entailments
are
> bad. Entailments...(She suddenly becomes self-conscious) Atticus, I was
just
> saying to Mr. Cunningham that entailments were bad but not to worry. Takes
a
> long time sometimes...(To the men who are staring up at her) What's the
> matter? I sure meant no harm, Mr. Cunningham.
>
> Scout's words cause him to break up the potential lynching. The
embarrassed
> crowd disbands.
>
> To Kill A Mockingbird (1962)
> http://www.filmsite.org/toki2.html
>
> >
>
>
>

I see that the constitution itself uses the phrase "until proven guilty",
but it still makes sense to say this in the best way, which to me is
"unless proven guilty".

I wonder if this isn't a case of status quo reigning over common sense.