Wolpert criticizes Secular biologists in his review of Dembski (Part 4)

[This is Part 4 of a continuing review.]

D. H. Wolpert, et al, have written two important reports:  "No Free
Lunch Theorems for Search," and "No Free Lunch Theorems for
Optimization."  Dembski applied the results from Wolpert's work to the
optimization and search problems associated with neoDarwinian
evolutionary algorithms.

Wesley Elsberry, one of our resident credentialed academians, in a
recent attack on Dembski's theory used a recent article written by D.
H. Wolpert about Dembski's application of the NFL Theorems.  Wolpert's
review of Dembski can be found at
http://www.talkreason.org/articles/jello.cfm    

Elsberry did little more than paraphrase the title of Wolpert's paper,
"William Dembski's Treatment of the No Free Lunch Theorems Is Written
in Jello."   But did Elsberry actually read what Wolpert had to say,
what did Wolpert assert, and what were Wolpert's criticisms?
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Pagano notes:
Below Wolpert argues that it isn't so much that anti darwinians are
gaining ground but that darwinians are loosing ground because of
confusion and poor defense.  Does Wolpert sustain this?  Take a look
below:


Wolpert wrote:
"Nonetheless, there are several points intimately related to Dembski's
work that bear emphasizing. First, biologists in particular and
scientists in general are horribly confused defenders of their field.
When responding to attacks from non-scientists, rather than attempt
the rigor that the geometry of induction and similar bodies of
statistics provide, they fall back on Popperian incantations, trying
to browbeat their opponents into acceding to the homily that if one
follows certain magic rituals---the vaunted "scientific method"---then
one is rewarded with The Truth."

        Paganor replies:
I'll defer to Wolpert as to whether secular biologists are confused;
however, biologists do employ induction of the sort that Wolpert
advocates. And while they often (but not always) vocalize the spirit
of Popper's falsificationism/critical rationalism they rarely if ever
follow it.   Like Wolpert they too see scientific practice as one
which seeks certainty or reliability rather than truth.  

Wolpert sees his "geometry of induction" as a rational act of putting
our trust in hypotheses that are certain (or reliable).  This is
precisely how biologists and secularists practice their trade and
defend it.  They argue as verificationists that level of corroboration
gives rise to a level of confidence that their pet theories are worthy
of pursuit and defense.  Wolpert's Bayesianism is merely a formalized
verificationism.  Bayesianism offers a formalized means of updating
the probability of a hypothesis in the face of new or additional
evidence. 

This verficationism is the antithesis of Poperianism.  Popper's
position was that "in order to to discover something new we propose
conjectures, which might be true, and incorporate them into science,
without regard for whether there is anything that could be called
evidence in their favor, without any reason to think that they are
true.  We then make the most ruthless and uncompromising efforts to
show that these hypotheses are not true, and to reject them from
science." 
************************************************************


Wolpert wrote:
"No mathematically precise derivation of these rituals from first
principles is provided. The "scientific method" is treated as a
first-category topic, opening it up to all kinds of attack. In
particular, in defending neo-Darwinism, no admission is allowed that
different scientific disciplines simply cannot reach the same level of
certainty in their conclusions due to intrinsic differences in the
accessibility of the domains they study."


        Pagano replies:
Unfortunately Wolpert's Bayesian hammer of "certainty" is diluted to
"probability" and because what is probably true need not be true,
probable truth is not truth attained with probability.   The
connection between truth and probable truth is no firmer than that
between truth and rumoured truth, or between truth and improbable
truth.  That is to say there is no logical connection at all.

The best Bayesians----like Wolpert----recognize all this, and being
good deductivists do not pretend to espy a logical connection where
there is none.  Wishing to be alone with their beliefs, they therefore
find that they must divorce themselves from truth.  And so they do.
Whether a given hypothesis----like neoDarwinian evolution----is true
or false is no longer a matter of concern.  Wolpert would be preaching
to the evolutionist choir.   I report, you decide.


Concerning Elsberry:
Either Elsberry never read beyond the title of Wolpert's review of
Dembski or he never though anyone would check.     Similarly, several
months ago, when Elsberry offered the citation (as I recall Pearson,
et al.) in defense of his (now defunct) Transitional Challenge there
was strong evidence that he failed to read beyond the abstract until
it was too late to save his discredited challenge.



Regards,
T Pagano