Re: the science of psychology and the psychology of science 2 of 2

>"Mr Michael Bibby" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message news:<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>...
>> <snip>
>> 
>> >Yes.  This is a significant problem with subjectivity, from a
>> >metaphysically realistic perspective such as mine.  You are correct in
>> >that it may prove impossible, using such a methodology as mine, to
>> >completely overcome the impasse and completely account for
>> >subjectivity scientifically when we ourselves are enclosed in a
>> >"subjective bubble" of our own construction.  But an incomplete and
>> >tentative solution may be better than none at all, or better than an
>> >evasion of the question.
>> >
>> >And I take you at your word that you're sincere when you say that "I
>> >fail to see how such an intellectual project could have any hope of
>> >success when it is doomed to fail from the outset..."  But just
>> >because you "fail to see" how it could have any hope of success, that
>> >doesn't mean that it is "doomed to fail" from the outset.  For my
>> >part, I fail to see how denying reality can get us anywhere at all,
>> >seeing as how I interpret that as evading the whole question of
>> >subjectivity. 
>> 
>> RC is not anti-realist. It makes no ontological commitments at all, it neither
>> asserts or denies ontologically objective reality: it is only from a point of
>> view that we represent reality, every representation has an 'aspectual shape',
>> but ontologically objective reality does not have a point of view. As I see it
>> *your* problem arises because any representation of the relation between the set
>> of representational states and the representational system, on the one hand, and
>> the reality represented, on the other, also occurs within some representational
>> system, that is, there is no Gods-eye view from which we can survey the
>> relations between our representations and the reality they are alleged to
>> represent... there is no way we can see these relations from the outside;
>> rather, we are always inside our representations. This is only problematic in a
>> metaphysical realists ('positivists') world view. RC is completely immune from
>> the problem of representationalism  ('truth as correspondence with reality')
>> becuase it doesnt purport to 'represent' anything! Realism, sooner or latter,
>> gives way to scepticism; constructivism, on the other hand, says that everything
>> is constructed and that nothing is 'given', including itself!
>> 
>> So our respective failures to see how something could
>> >be done doesn't necessarily mean that that something is impossible to
>> >do.  One should remember that what constitutes "failure" and what
>> >constitutes "success" are also of our own construction. 
>> 
>> Yes. What constitutes a ligitimate problem and a ligitimate solution is always
>> what is at stake in argument. 
>> 
>> >We have,
>> >after all, failed to "completely account" for aerodynamics, yet the
>> >planes still manage to fly.
>> >
>> >Do you believe that if you put your hand in a fire, that there is no
>> >ontological reality to the fire, 
>> 
>> No, I would not say that. Again, RC is metaphysically agnostic. 
>> 
>> and that if you get burned, that's
>> >all a construction in your mind?  
>> 
>> This kind of rhetorical argument is old, its called 'hitting the furniture'
>> i.e., when Johnstone kicked a stone and said of Berkelian Idealism "i refute it
>> thus!" I do not doubt the 'reality' of my sensations, indeed, these are all that
>> I have direct access to, but I have no operational basis upon which to make
>> ontological claims. 
>> 
>> It may be so, but it makes more
>> >sense to me believing that the fire is real. 
>> 
>> 'real' in what sense?
>> 
>> >Otherwise, it seems to
>> >me that I'm flirting with some sort of metaphysical idealism or
>> >solipsism. 
>> 
>> (I knew this was coming sooner or later) RC does not 'fall on the slippery slid
>> to solipsism' because it is metaphysically agnostic: it is a theory of doing and
>> not of 'being'. 
>> 
>> Do you really believe that matter and energy are just
>> >constructions of our minds? 
>> 
>> Yes. As for whether they have any subsistence outside of the mind in a
>> non-thinking substance or substratum, well, who am I to say.... (hence
>> agnosticism)
>> 
>> To someone with a background in the
>> >physical sciences like me, that seems very strange.
>> 
>> on the contrary, in quantum physics, as you well know, it makes absolutely no
>> sense to talk of 'observer independent properties' (hence the 'copenhagen
>> interpretation'). Ive gotta run (sorry about continually leaving in mid stride
>> but I have heaps to do). 
>> 
>> <snip>
>
>I stand corrected.  A position of metaphysical agnosticism is not the
>same as one that denies metaphysical realism outright.  I would very
>much like to discuss this difference on a theoretical level, and its
>implications for RC methodology, in the near future.
>
>But you still haven't answered the question I asked about examples of
>RC models having to do with the kind of practical questions that I'm
>interested in, even though I've already asked the same question twice
>now.  If it turns out that RC doesn't consider such questions to be
>within the scope of its methodology, or if no RC theorist has ever
>bother to "get around" to addressing such "real world" questions yet,
>then it may be that the theoretical and methodological distinction
>between metaphysical agnosticism and anti-realism is moot (as least
>from my perspective), since RC methodology itself would be of no
>practical use to me, and would be merely an academic exercise.
>
>So I'll ask it again (quoting from my last post):
>
>
>"I still have yet to hear from you how RC has addressed such tangible
>problems as interest me, such as trying to understand particular
>historical events and the behavior patterns that caused them or were
>associated with them, and the patterns of thought which caused the
>behavior or were associated with it.  I asked you about this in my
>last post, and you didn't respond.  Can RC address such questions or
>not?  And if so, what models has it come up with to address them?  In
>other words, assuming RC is a better approach than mine, of what
>practical use would it be to someone like me with an interest in "real
>world" problems?  Or is the "real world" within the RC view of no
>particular concern (since the "real world" doesn't really exist anyway
>within the RC view)?

Foucault once said that Historians, for some reason or another, were unwilling
to face the fact that the past has come to pass; do you honestly think that we
can trace the geneology of specific historical events, the preconditions which
gave rise to them?




>
>[note: this last question was rendered erroneous by your clarification
>on metaphysical agnosticism vs anti-realism]
>
>If you can't think of any particular historical event off the top of
>your head to use as an example, let me give you a couple to choose
>from:  The Russian Revolution of 1917, and subsequent civil war, and
>the rise and fall of Nazi Germany, 1918-45.  In both cases there was a
>significant subjective component on the part of the instigators
>(Bolshevik and Nazi parties), as well as their opponents.  Does/can RC
>address such historical questions as these?

Foucault once said that Historians, for some reason or another, were unwilling
to face the fact that the past has come to pass; do you honestly think that we
can trace the geneology of specific historical events, the preconditions which
gave rise to them? 



>I think the best test of such a methodology is whether it can address
>such everyday questions, 

OF COURSE- I too am a pragmatists, but the example that you gave is not a
'typical' everyday question, I am not concerned with such questions because I
know that whatever answer I might come up with was already decided by the choice
of framework within which the question was asked. If you want to have a look at
some 'workable-solutions' that RC has given rise to perhaps you should check out
the following website, it contains over 250 peer-review (published) papers:
http://www.univie.ac.at/constructivism/paper.html 


which are of concern to large numbers of
>people these days.  Even if SP can't adequately "ground" its models to
>the satisfaction of RC theorists or philosophical skeptics, I think it
>can give us some pretty good approximations of reality, 

You say this on the one hand and yet acknowledge that their is absolutely NO WAY
of comparing the 'representation' with the thing it is supposed to represent-
why have an incommensurable truth value? why not do away with truth altogether?

which would
>improve our current understanding of these events (in a way similar to
>the way that Newtonian physics was an improvement over Aristotellian
>physics, in my view).


You presupposing that their is an event to be understood which exists prior to,
and independently of, our attempts to understand it. Of course Newtonian
Mechanics improved upon the predictive efficiency of Aristotollian mechanics,
but are they really deally with the same sort of phenomena? in other words, are
concepts (theoretical categories) like 'space' and 'gravity' used the same way
in newtonian mechanics as in aristotollian mechanics? in the words of Kuhn "what
were ducks in the scientists world before the revolution [paradigm shift] are
rabbits afterwards." Put simply, the idea of 'improving' our understanding
doesnt need a 'teleology'- the idea that we are approximating closer and closer
towards immutable truth. Sure, Newtonian mechanics 'improves' upon aristotollian
mechanics in terms of predictive efficiencey, but this need not imply that
newtonian mechanics is a 'better approximation' of reality. This is a
non-sequiter. The instrumentality of our theories does not consist in their
agreement with reality but rather is a function of their logic structure- where
they help us to coordinate and manage our experiences, and bring them into some
kind of logical order.  



>
>Maybe RC can do an adequate job of it.  Can it?  If so, try to address
>this question of mine to the best of your ability."
>
>[also note: I understand that the concepts of "real world" questions
>and "approximation of reality" has no meaning in your system, but it
>does within mine, and I'm asking the question from my perspective.  I
>would imagine that RC would allow you to adjust for that]
>
>
>DV
>
>

Mickeyd