Re: the science of psychology and the psychology of science 2 of 2

>"Mr Michael Bibby" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message news:<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>...
>> >"Mr Michael Bibby" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message news:<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>...
>
>>>I guess the difference between the constructivist approach and my
>own
>>>is that, while I also take account of Kuhn's ideas, and the problems
>>>inherent in the subjectivity of paradigms (what you might call
>>>"particular ways of constructing"), I seek not to "do away with" the
>>>"ideology of truth," but to comprehend the workings of a human,
>>>subjective mind within an ontologically real universe, where our own
>>>subjective minds are a part of that ontologically real universe.
>>
>>
>>So, to paraphrase, you seem to agree with me that the cognitive
>organism is
>>'operationally closed', which is simply to say that only I can know
>'what its
>>like' for me, and that I cannot transcend this 'first-person
>perspective', that
>>is, I am necessarily 'subjective'.  You also have it that both the
>organism, and
>>the environment in which the organism is embedded (and the medium in
>which it is
>>constituted), are 'real' in the ontic sense. 
>
>Yes.  That is an accurate paraphrase of my views.

O.k., lets give flesh to this bear bone framework. So, in *our* view, the
cognitive orgnanism is 'informationally closed', that is, a 'frame' of reference
is necessarily a subjective construction built upon a matrix of axioms
(metaphysical assumptions). As far as the cognitive orgnanism is concerned, its
only access to its environemnt is through what it thinks and does, that is,
through the lens of its subjective constructions, schemas, or 'frames'. This, I
argue, is where the problem of subjectivity arises. The cognitive organism has
no way of checking to see whether its hypothetical constructions are anything
like the things they are supposed to represent, that is, such constructions are,
and will forever remain, purely 'hypothetical': it may never compare them with
the 'real' mechanisms themselves, nor can it even understand the meaning of such
a comparison. That is, in anthropocentric terms, we cannot transcend the
interface of our expeirences and see what is or is not prior to it being
expeirenced: we can never see beyond our seeing. So on the one hand you
acknowledge that the cognitive organism is necessarily subjective,
'informationally closed', and yet you seek to abridge the impass this
subjectivity gives rise to and argue that such subjective construction are in
some way or another 'informed' by the outside world... I fail to see how such an
intellectual project could have any hope of success when it is doomed to fail
from the outset; that is, as I love to say, how can you reconcile your existence
with the preconditions of your existence? The distinction between 'the
appearances of things' and 'things-in-themselves' opens up the great schism
between what is and is not comprehensible, giving rise to the possibility of an
impossiblity, a question that cannot possibliy be answered without inviting
incontrovertible scepticism of the most pervasive kind vis-a-via the
episemological problem: how do you know that you know? You cannot step outside
of your system-relative system of representations and see how the world really
is independent of your representations of it. Of course subjectivity will be a
problem in this view. Dont get me wrong, a cognitive system can model itself,
its environment, and the relationship between the two, but only by placing them
external to itself and modeling the relations that hold between them. It cannot,
however, step outside of its system of representations and represent the actual
relations that hold between itself and its environment, or, to put it another
way, it cannot extricate itself from the circumstances within which it finds
itself, that is, it cannot step outside of the flow of its experiences, it is
necessarily caught up in the perpetual flow of its own activity. 


Mickeyd