Re: Consciousness and language

----- Original Message -----
From: "Mike Lyvers" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Monday, December 01, 2003 12:50 PM
Subject: Re: Consciousness and language


> Robert Stonjek wrote
>
> > We could ask if 'self awareness' extended to these other animals.
> > But other animals need not have a feeling of "me" as we consciously
> > experience it. Their distinction between self and others can be entirely
> > reflexive in nature (at best, appearing only in the presence of the
stimulus that
> > requires a self-other distinction and only until the issue of self-
> > other is resolved).
>
Mike Lyvers:
> The same could be said for human self-awareness, ie, that it is "purely
reflexive in nature" - the result of physiological interactions of neurons
that have been shaped by genetic and environmental influences and governed
by physical laws. All we can perceive of others is their behavior, not their
consciousness (or lack thereof). Thus I could claim that Robert's self-other
behavioral distinction "at best, appears only in the presence of the
stimulus that requires a self-other distinction"  and conclude that Robert
lacks a sense of "me" as I experience it.
> >
RKS:
As mentioned, "other animals *need* not have a feeling of 'me'.  Obviously
it is up to me to show why humans do need to have a 'feeling' of me.  If
this can not be shown, then as Mike says, our 'apparent' sense of self could
be entirely reflexive (where 'reflexive' means that a responses are based
entirely on conditioned responses of the Skinnerian flavour).

Note that a "feeling" of me is not required of we are only considering the
physical body.  The body is continuously present and does not need to be
separately modelled.  If, however, the *sensation* of the body were
intermittent, then an emulated body would be required for those times when
sensation of the physical body is absent but boundaries need to be known.

If an animal identifies self with territory, status among kin etc along with
the physical, then an emulated self can fill in for when boundaries or
pecking order is not directly sensed.  It is this emulation, in its most
sophisticated form (composite of intellectual+emotion+physical) that humans
experience.  Rats may experience some of this composite.

In the piece that Mike is responding to, I went on to outline why I conclude
that humans do need a sense of self.

Of course any process involving the brain can be thought of as ultimately
reflexive.  The line is generally drawn where a response loop occurs without
the involvement of conscious level processing.  A reflexive loop for we
humans is where you respond automatically to some stimuli without "thinking"
about it or where you respond before you have thought about it.  So quite a
bit of what we attribute to our own will (conscious decision making) is
indeed reflexive.

> > 'Phenomenal consciousness', as generally understood, is the personal
> > experience of self."
>
> As I understand it, phenomenal consciousness is experience, per se.
Experiencing the sight of a tree does not require a simultaneous
self-awareness. Indeed, "losing oneself" in one's experience is often very
pleasant and does not entail a loss of phenomenal consciousness. To be
absorbed in the beauty of a sunset is a common example.

RKS:
Quite right.  I was responding to a note on 'self consciousness' and
thinking of the definition of Block and others where consciousness is
divided into either 'phenomenal' or 'access' consciousness.  In this case,
self consciousness is phenomenal (I feel it).  I suppose if one took an
observational view, one might observe that physical boundaries and other
kinds of boundaries are universally accessible ie to all senses and
effectors, so they fall into 'access' consciousness.

Thanks for the correction.

Note that one can not "lose yourself" with out a sense of self present to
contrast the loss against.  You can't note the darkness without recalling
light.

>
>  " The feature of this (self) experience is that it
> > persists beyond immediate sensory stimulation."
>
> As Damasio points out, our brains continuously receive sensory feedback
from the body, so strictly speaking this just isn't true.
>
Consciousness includes a limited selection of all possible sensory
information.  I've read estimates of 15% of all sensory information arrives
at locations thought to be involved in consciousness.  A persistent
experience can easily be mediated by the imagination or short term memory.

The stimulation I was referring to relates to the self-other distinction.
For a territorial animal that detects its scent markers in certain locations
around the boundary of its territory, the "this is my territory" feeling
will persist or at least be accessible when the animal is between one
boundary marker and another.  That the animal does not detect a boundary
marker when it moves away from its own scent marker does not mean that it
also feels like it is out of its own territory.

> >In other words, the
> > rat knows what is
> > part of the self and what is not only when the issue of self and
> > other is
> > raised, say when detecting a scent or when recognising its own
> > droppings or
> > its own offspring etc. It is unlikely that it has a persistent
> > feeling of
> > 'self' when not stimulated to do so.
>
> Like Robert and me, the rat, too, continously receives feedback signals
from its body that presumably give it a core sense of self (I'm borrowing
from Damasio again here) that is at least potentially available at all times
during waking consciousness.

RKS:
This only applies to the physical self ie my body.  Physical self is not a
major player in self consciousness as understood by humans.  As our primary
sense is vision, self-boundary cues come from what is perceived visually.
If we broaden the sense of self to include all information sources, then
intellectual sources (via language) are stronger than visual cues for the
human sense of self.

But here we are referring not to the physical or territorial boundary, but
to the actual sense of self that humans experience ie the individual's place
in society, the individual's place in beliefs and knowledge of all manner of
things etc (see my other note in this thread for an account of various types
of self consciousness).

> >
> > "Human's need to distinguish between self and other for reasons
> > that extend
> > way beyond other animals.  Humans developed tool making and tool
> > ownership.To own something, you must include it as part of
> > yourself, like a fingernail
> > or your hair (that can not be 'felt' but belongs to you anyway)
> > and yet
> > there must be a finer distinction of self.  Thus we have degrees
> > of "me" ie
> > Me+possessions, Me only, Me+kin, Me+ allies etc."
>
> Many animals strive daily to distinguish their territory or their pack
from those of others. There's no fundamental difference there.

RKS:
Of course they do.  My other note in this thread focuses on exactly what
level of self consciousness is likely to be exclusive to humans.

> >
> > Humans have been replacing claws with knives, hair with clothes, long
> > cumbersome intestinal tracts with cooking of meat etc for some
> > time.  With
> > the extra degrees of freedom that a multi-leveled understanding of
> > self can
> > bring, humans have been able to extend their existence from
> > digging sticks
> > (as used by chimps) to space shuttles.
>
> This has to do with our multi-level understanding of the external world,
not the self.

RKS:
The multi-level understanding extends to self consciousness.  We don't think
of the 'self' as only the physical boundaries ie the body.  If we were to
make that distinction ie that 'self' refers to an individual's physical
body, then that would make the debate much simpler.

But in humans a feeling of self only vaguely recalls the body.  The multiple
use of the word with out specification does cause confusion if specific
understanding is required.  But simply eliminating everything above the
level of the body is to hijack a word that has been in the dictionary since
before the 13th century.  The extract from Merriam-Webster dictionary
illustrates this nicely:-

Main Entry:self
Function:noun
Inflected Form:plural selves  \*selvz, Southern also *sevz\
Date:13th century

1 a : the entire person of an individual  b : the realization or embodiment
of an abstraction
2 a (1) : an individual's typical character or behavior *her true self was
revealed* (2) : an individual's temporary behavior or character *his better
self*  b : a person in prime condition *feel like my old self today*
3 : the union of elements (as body, emotions, thoughts, and sensations) that
constitute the individuality and identity of a person
4 : personal interest or advantage
5 : material that is part of an individual organism *ability of the immune
system to distinguish self from nonself*

When we contrast the phrases "self-awareness" with "self consciousness", the
first is more likely to refer to the physical self and the second will refer
to non-physical aspects.

> >
> > Another degree of freedom is required for cognitive functions that
> > are the exclusive preserve of ones own brain to be extended to the
ability
> > known to humans.  We can extend such abilities as perception, action,
> > calculation and all forms of information processing to other
> > people.  We do this via language.
>
> Not just verbal communication, but nonverbal communication too, such as
gestures, body language, intonation and facial expression. And as Darwin
pointed out long ago, we share these nonverbal communication abilities with
many animals.

RKS:
Non-verbal language is immediate (you must be present with the communicator)
and conveys mainly emotional issues.  My other note in this thread address
this issue.

> >
> > My view, illustrated above, shows that human experience at this
> > level is unique to animals that can extend their cognitive processes via
> > language.
>
> Presumably only humans have a human-like consciousness, only rats have a
rat-like consciousness and so on.
>

RKS:
Awareness of the physical self can extend to all animals, but the
territorial or emotional self is limited to far fewer, intellectual self is
limited to humans.  Whilst there is, of course, uniqueness, as you point
out, there are also general forms which can be identified (such as awareness
of the physical body, awareness of the body as an abstract concept eg as
revealed by the mirror test) and arranged from the physical to abstract.
I've done this in another note.

This discussion shows up the importance of very careful specification of
concepts in crossdisciplinary discussions.  If we are discussing only the
awareness of the physical self then I think we are in accord on most points.

Kind Regards,
Robert Karl Stonjek.