Re: Global Consciousness - more than metaphor

Thanks Bill.  You've noted the futility of defining consciousness.
Brighter minds than mine have proposed ways out of this futility,
obviously without complete success.  However, that doesn't stop
me from flogging my own proposition!

It seems to me we can objectify "consciousness" by saying that it is a
process that
occurs on a continuum as I've suggested in my draft paper (as have others).
Margaret does not agree that consciousness can exist by degree.
This begs the age old question, where is the cut-off then?
Is a monkey conscious? A bird, an ant?  Are we conscious we sleep?
I think many would say we are not conscious when we sleep, implying
consciousnesss is a function of perceptual awareness.  Obviously, these
questions
have been discussed over and over, and my point here is
that if we look at the root processes which somehow (obviously we're
not yet sure how) give rise to consciousness (which we're not even
sure what it is), then we see that these processes involve the interaction
of neurons.  That much, I think, most non-dualists can agree on.  But if
we look further at what is happening with these interactions we see that
they can be described by rules and mathematics.  The rules may be very
simple,
giving rise to complex processes.  The point I made in my paper is
that if we look at the rules themselves we may find they apply to
other systems of interacting components.  The problem with the human
brain (if I might put it that way) is that it is so complex, that it is easy
to
think there is something special about it that distinguishes it from other
systems.
Well, there is something special about it, and that is that it is a closed
system
of extraordinarily complex interactivity -- but not all that special,
because
this only separates it from other systems of interacting components by
degree, not in principle.

Hence, to finish up for the moment, it is not athropomorphising at all to
say that other
systems can and ought to be analysed at the level of their "rules" or the
description
of their component's interactivity.  If we view systems this way, we
objectify
consciousness as a broad process, and we acknowledge that human
consciousness is not somehow exclusive, it is just farther to the right of
the continuum of the overall complexity of interactions which underly it.


----- Original Message -----
From: "Bill Hibbard" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Wednesday, November 12, 2003 5:23 AM
Subject: Re: Global Consciousness - more than metaphor


> Nice to hear from you, Margeret.
>
> > I do not, however, concurr with your statement, Bill, that
> > informational complexity is an important measure of complexity.
> > I do feel that making "consciousness" dependent on this is
> > misleading. One cannot have degrees of consciousness. It either
> > is or is not.
> >
> > However, one might have degrees of intelligence, or if you so
> > wish, ability/capability to take opportunistic actions in the
> > world (whatever this world might be), and of course, to "solve
> > problems".
>
> This is really a matter of semantics. Hugh's analysis was
> that informational complexity is an important measure of
> consciousness, and I think he is right. The general usage
> of the word "consciousness" undoubtedly includes a lower
> level of complexity below which an information process is
> not said to be conscious. But minds differ in the complexity
> of their simulation models of the world and this is a useful
> measure. Earlier discussions on this list show a diversity
> of opinions about the definition of the word "consciousness",
> so a debate over the precise definition is probably futile.
>
> > Bill: In my view a mind is an information process that senses the
> > world and acts in the world, driven by some set of values
> > (typically including its own survival and propagation).
> >
> > In this explanation, Bill, it seems (if I understand correctly)
> > that values are cyberneitc goals, if you like, and a mind could
> > be anything, as long is it is able to "process information
> > through porcesses that sense and act in the world". This world
> > then could be anything, and the senses could be of any kind. my
> > question is- why does this have to be "conscious" at all?
>
> That is the big question, isn't it. But as a practical
> matter, consciousness is equated with a sufficiently
> skilled verbal report of consciousness. If the pursuit of
> its values motivates a mind to learn to verbally communicate
> with humans, and if it reports conscious experience
> skillfully, then I'd call it conscious. If someone else
> denies that it is conscious, I'd leave it to the mind itself
> to debate the issue with them.
>
> Here we can interpret verbal report broadly to include
> any form of communication that can carry the semantics of
> human lanuage.
>
> Clearly most people think they would still be conscious,
> with an inner mental life, even if they lost all means to
> communicate with others. But when you ask me to answer whether
> some other mind is conscious, all I can base it on is
> communication with that mind.
>
> My view that consciousnes starts with the ability of brains
> to process experiences that are not currently occurring in
> order to solve the CAP is just a hypothesis. But since it is
> hard to imagine consciousness without the ability to process
> experiences that are not occurring, and since a solution to
> the CAP is a necessity in the evolution of brains that learn,
> it is plausible to me.
>
> > In my interpretation, a robot could easily be able to act on its
> > internal informational states and generate states of informational
> > pattern for which there are no `matches" to the "world out there".
> > Would be say that this robot has consciousness? or would we say
> > that it can (merely) "Think for itself"?
>
> Same answer as above. It all depends on its ability to
> verbally report consciousness.
>
> By the way, if you can please turn on word wrap in your
> emailer.
>
> Cheers,
> Bill
> ----------------------------------------------------------
> Bill Hibbard, SSEC, 1225 W. Dayton St., Madison, WI  53706
> [EMAIL PROTECTED]  608-263-4427  fax: 608-263-6738
> http://www.ssec.wisc.edu/~billh/vis.html