Global Consciousness - more than metaphor

I am new to this listserv group.  I have prepared the following draft paper
which I am hoping members of this group may be willing to review and
provide some comments on.  It is in APA style. I have sent it to Dr.
Heylighen's Global Brain group (search "Principia Cybernetica") and am
hoping to post it elsewhere too. Thanks to anyone willing to comment.
_____________________________________________

GLOBAL CONSCIOUSNESS – MORE THAN METAPHOR


Global Consciousness—More than a Metaphor



Hugh A. Trenchard
830 Princess Ave,
Victoria, B.C., Canada
V8T 1K8
(250) 360-0595

[EMAIL PROTECTED]


Abstract
Consciousness is an emergent phenomenon. Still, reductionist studies of
neural activity are necessary for understanding consciousness.
Consciousness is fundamentally describable as a continuum of the complexity
of the interactions of components; varying degrees of consciousness arise
at corresponding degrees of complexity.  Hence consciousness is exhibited
in all systems of dynamically interacting components.  Of a high degree of
complexity are populations of interacting humans, implying a degree of
consciousness emerging from this system, the global consciousness.  Thus
the complexity of human populations may be analysed for analogs of brain
complexity, and vice versa.  Attempts to identify analogs of the neural
correlates of individual consciousness and the socio-economic interactions
of humans may further our understanding of the nature of consciousness.



Consciousness as an Emergent Phenomenon
 One of the prevailing theories of consciousness is that it is an
emergent phenomenon (e.g. Baas and Emmeche, 1997; Trefil, 1997).   Emergent
phenomena are inherently irreducible, and cannot be understood by an
analysis of the individual components of the system in isolation from their
interactions with each other.  Indeed, emergence theory has been regarded
as the opposite of reductionism (Morowitz, 2002).  Thus to understand
consciousness, one cannot simply reduce the characteristics of
consciousness to the activities of individual neurons in the brain—one must
study the complex interactions among neurons and the properties exhibited
by such collective interactions; that understanding is achieved by a
holistic appreciation of those interactions (Baas and Emmeche, 1997; Capra
1996; Holland, 1998 et al).
 This is distinguished from strictly functionalist approaches which
say that consciousness is a function of computational complexity, implying
that the computational complexity may be simulated by computers (Block,
2002).  It may be argued that although the self-organizing properties of
life and consciousness may be simulable by computer algorithm, simulations
of sufficient complexity have not yet been achieved for any conclusions to
be derived as to whether consciousness emerges (cf. Emmeche, Koppe,
Stjernfeldt,1997).  Further discussion of whether consciousness may be
simulated by computer, is however, beyond the scope of this paper, for it
is argued here that there is at least one other non-brain, non-computer,
system of interacting components from which consciousness emerges, and
which is eminently amenable to formal and empirical study.
 Despite the inherent non-reducibility of consciousness, presumably
some degree of reductionism is essential for brain studies (cf. Churchland,
1996).  That is to say that individual neurons, or collections of them must
be analyzed for their reactions to stimuli, internal or external.  Of
course many studies have been carried out over the decades from Golgi
stains to electrophysiological recordings to neurochemical analysis to
topological brain maps (Shepherd, G. ed, 1998; Hurdal, Kurtz, Banks, 2001)
resulting in an understanding of neuron function and of specific areas of
the brain.  Even so, aside from the problems  with the reducibility of
consciousness (cf. Searle, 1997), there are practical and ethical
limitations to more detailed study of synaptic interactivity: such detailed
study necessarily involves a live functioning brain with its concommitant
obvious ethical limitations (cf. Crick, 1994).
 Significant advances have been made to isolate and reduce specific
functions or properties of consciousness, such as the visual system and the
relatively small number of neurons involved there (e.g. Crick and Koch).
As well, there are regions or organs of the brain whose functions are well
documented, the function of which can be definitely identified as being the
source of certain behaviours or processes (e.g. the amygdala, cerbellum,
Broca’s area, etc.).  Nevertheless, consciousness of the whole brain,
though not necessarily a product of a complete brain (indeed split brains,
or small portions of the brain arguably still exhibit consciousness
(Puccetti, 1993)), can be understood more fully only by mapping the
function and interactions of individual neurons, groups of neurons, groups
of groups of neurons, and the intergration of the collective whole (cf.
Edelman, 1992).
 Thus if consciousness emerges as a novel property of the
interactions of neurons, then there must be some critical threshold of
complexity of interactivity upon which it does so. (cf. Edelman and Tononi,
2000).
Physical Pre-requsites for Consciousness
 With this view in mind, leaving aside for the moment the threshold
of complexity necessary for consciousness to emerge,  it is important to
ask whether there are specific physical constructs necessary among a system
of interacting components for consciousness to emerge.
 At a basic level of brain function, we know that action potentials,
mediated by electro-chemical neurotransmitters leap across synaptic clefts,
and that billions of these transmissions occur constantly in the working
brain (e.g. Rose, 1982).  Is this specifiic synaptic activity, the exchange
of neurotransmitters, therefore a necessary pre-requisite of consciousness,
or is there something more fundamental involved?  To answer the question,
it seems that we must examine the essential nature of neural exchanges.  At
its most basic level, when a synapse fires in response to the receipt of an
electro-chemcal impulse, the synapse itself undergoes a temporary physical
alteration; i.e. its physical condition and location in space are altered.
In other words, the electro-chemical impulse has influenced the synapse to
be altered in some physical way.  The electro-chemical impulse therefore
represents an information exchange which causes the receiving neuron to
alter its physical properties. At its most fundamental level, therefore, it
may be concluded that the actual synaptic activity and existence of
neurotransmitters are not necessarily essential properties of
consciousness, rather that the fundamental feature is the information
exchange and the influence exacted to alter the physical properties of
other neurons.
 Are there other physical properties necessary for consciousness?
Is there something in the very shape and constitution of neurons essential
for consciousness?  Sir Roger Penrose and Stuart Hameroff propose that axon
microtubules bear essential features for quantum effects necessary for
consciousness (Penrose, 1994; Hameroff, 2003).  The theory expounded here
is that whatever the properties of microtubules or other neural components
are, they can yet be described more fundamentally in terms of information
exchanges, and the rules that govern those exchanges; that there is nothing
in the inherent physical structure of microtubules which is a necessary pre-
requisite for consciousness because equivalent degrees of complex
information exchanges should result in similar degrees of consciousness.
 Nonetheless, while the view taken here is that the essential
feature is information exchange and interactivity and the relative
complexity thereof, the possibility that certain physical structures are
essential for consciousness is not denied.  However, if special physical
structures are not essential and that the complexity of the information
exchange and interacting components is the underlying feature of
consciousness, then testable hypotheses can be derived from this which,
based upon the success of such studies, may serve either to disprove
altogether the necessity of specific physical architecture, or in the
absence of contrary evidence, serve to support such a necessity.  In other
words, other non-neuronal physical systems—biological, chemical, or other
artificially constructed systems may be studied for properties consistent
with consciousness.

The Continuum of Consciousness
 The central argument of this paper is that consciousness may be
studied in other physical systems, be they artificial or naturally
occurring.  Indeed, it is argued here that for a proper theory of
consciousness, it is essential that other systems be studied and tested for
properties consistent with consciousness.  Underlying this is the notion
that consciousness does not emerge out of just any set of interacting
components or degree of interactivity, but that it emerges only at a
critical threshold of complexity (cf. Edelman and Tononi, 2000; Greenfield,
1995).
 Then what systems of interacting components may exhibit the
critical threshold of consciousness?  For example, does a colony of ants
exhibit the necessary threshold?  Douglas Hofstadter (1979) writes in a
Lewis Carollian literary “fugue”, of an anteater which converses with a
colony of ants, which Hofstadter suggests in his fictional account, as a
whole exhibits consciousness.  It is, however, counterintutive that a
colony of ants, while exhibiting identifiable emergent properties,  meets
the necessary threshold of interactive complexity for the emergence of the
kind of consciousness humans or other higher organisms exhibit.
 While ant interactivity may not meet the critical threshold of
complexity for consciousness, there may well be other systems of
interacting components which do meet this critical threshold, particularly
that of interacting human beings.  This does not preclude other biological
systems from meeting the necessary threshold of complexity for
consciousness to emerge, but intuitively one suspects that human
interactions are yet vastly more complex than most other systems, even ones
which might consist of higher numbers of interacting agents, such as
schools of ocean krill or bacterial colonies.
 Thus the principle espoused here is that consciousness is not an
all or nothing proposition; that it exists by degree, may be mapped on a
broad continuum, and that what is required is an understanding of the
relative complexity of the interacting components of any given physical
system – in the case of the human brain, its neurons.  In all physical
systems, formal descriptions of the complexity among groups of interacting
components may be derived and plotted on a complexity continuum, and in the
case of the human brain the unique properties associated with consciousness
may be established as existing far to the right of the continuum (cf.
Greenfield,1995).   So, as the argument goes, along this continuum may also
be plotted a variety of systems composed of any number of interacting
components from two to billions.  Obviously two interacting components
gives rise to a low degree of complexity of interactivity, while billions
of interacting components potentially gives rise to a very high degree of
complexity, although, as noted, the criteria for complexity is not strictly
high numbers of interacting components, but the rules which govern the
interactivity (cf. Wolfram, 2002).  Thus, along this continuum may be
described the interactions between sub-atomic particles, through to the
interactions among groups of human beings, the electrical circuitry of a
computer chip, or the interactions of celestial bodies.
 While this may be an unconventional approach to defining
consciousness, it obviates a number of philosophical conundrums, such as
whether consciousness exists only where there is subjective awareness;
whether an ant is conscious, a rat, a pig or a dolphin; whether language is
necessary for consciousness; whether individual humans may be able to
attain “higher” states of consciousness.  If complexity of interactivity is
the fundamental characteristic of consciousness, then static things are not
in and of themselves conscious, while many systems exhibit very low degrees
of consciousness, while at a certain critical threshold of complexity
degrees of consciousness such as human consciousness emerge.  By extension,
if a system of components other than a collection of neurons housed in a
hard skeletal shell exhibit similar degrees of complexity, then it must be
similarly conscious.
 This should be distinguished from Chalmers’ (1996) panpsychist
approach in which any material, object or system containing information
exhibits conscious experience. At the risk of redundancy, while Chalmer’s
approach is similar in concept, the underlying principle here is that of
the relative complexity of the system of interacting components; that while
there is a continuum of consciousness, only at a certain threshold of
complexity does consciousness in the sense of self-awareness arise,
although presumably “conscious experience” may be exhibited at lower
degrees of complexity, while static objects exhibit no consciousness. And
even static objects consist of atoms which in turn contain interacting sub-
atomic particles.  That being so, individual atoms exhibit a low degree of
consciousness, while a stone exhibits virtually none because the atoms
themselves do not sufficiently interact to give rise to any significant
degree of consciousness except perhaps in liquid or gaseous form (cf. Bohm,
1980 and the concept of implicate order).
 The key then is to identify the degrees of complexity giving rise
to certain mental states, and the questions become: what is the degree of
complexity of interacting neurons at which subjective awareness arises?
What is the degree of complexity at which properties of visual images are
bound or unified? What is the degree of complexity giving rise to REM
sleep, to non-REM sleep, to being in a coma?  This list goes on.
 If the complexity of interactivities is the fundamental description
of consciousness, then we can shift analysis to systems other than the
brain.  In particular this paper is concerned with the dynamic
interactivity among  human beings within their highly complex and
integrated world-wide economy and communications network: the global
consciousness. This leads to the hypothesis that equivalent degrees of
complexity across different systems of interacting components (i.e. neurons
to humans), give rise to similar degrees or states of consciousness.
 The Measure of Complexity
 Turning for the moment strictly to consciousness in the sense of
self-awareness – call it  “SA” consciousness – as a point, or region, along
the continuum of consciousness.  If SA consciousness emerges at some
critical threshold of complexity of interactivity among neurons, have we
any idea what that critical threshold is?
 It is argued here that the degree of complexity of the whole brain
is presently considerably higher than the minimum threshold for SA
consciousness to emerge.  This can be demonstrated by patients having lost
function of large portions of their brains while retaining basic
characteristics of consciousness  (Puccetti, 1993).  Similarly, though the
subject of some dispute, it is argued by some that split brain phenomenon
indicates that each half of a divided brain exhibits independent
consciousness (Puccetti, 1993; Penrose 1995 check).   Daniel Dennett (1993)
denies that the split brain results in two independent consciousnesses,
primarily on the basis that the language function lies in the left
hemisphere, which in turn is crucial for self-awareness (Puccetti, 1993).
Without delving into the nuances of the issues and argument surrounding
split brains and consciousness, there appear at least to be circumstances
when less than completely functioning brains remain SA conscious (e.g.
Alzheimers, aphasia, stroke victims, etc).
 The point here is that we can begin by narrowing the degree of
complexity of neural interactivity toward the critical threshold necessary
for consciousness—sliding to the left somewhat on the continuum of
complexity/consciousness.  How far we can go is difficult to determine, but
continued analysis of neural complexity over the next several years may
allow us to arrive at an arbitrary level of complexity at which we can
define SA consciousness as emerging.  Arguably such an arbitrary level
would entail a significant margin of error, but in principle we are
defining consciousness according to a mathematical description rather than
according to a vast panoply of competing assumptions and arguments about
what consciousness is and what it is not.
The Fractal Nature of Global and Human Consciousness
 It is important to distinguish between “global” consciousness
and “human” consciousness.  Here “global consciousness” refers to a literal
consciousness which arises as an emergent phenomenon from the collective
interactivity of human beings.   “Human consciousness” is the individual
consciousness we all know to exist in each of us.

 While much has been said about the fractal nature of human
consciousness (Satinover, 2001;Capra, 1996 et al.), little or none has been
said regarding the possibility that the complexity of neural interactivity
giving rise to human consciousness may be in form a fractal of the
complexity of interactivity arising in other systems.
 As indicated in preceding paragraphs, one prediction presented here
is that we will find self-similarity in complexity of interactions on
several scales of physical size and area of interactivity; i.e. The brain
and all its myriad synaptic interactions are confined to a space the size
of the average human head, while on a scale much larger, global
consciousness arises in the space the surface area of the planet earth
among interacting humans spread out over that surface.   The implication of
such a fractal theory of consciousness is that consciousness may emerge on
much larger scales, or even smaller scales, assuming each system of
interacting components reaches the critical threshold of complexity.  This
presents us with the possibility of actually measuring the physical
exchanges of information over differing scales, asuming that “information”
exchange is fundamental to the conscious process.
 There are undoubtedly many problems to a proper quantification of
the complexity involved at the various scales, perhaps the first of which
is to define the proper boundaries of the systems to be studied.  In the
case of the human brain it is simple to confine the complexity of the brain
to the interacting components within one brain itself.  In the case of
humankind, we may be able to confine the system to that of all humans on
earth; i.e the system may be “operationally closed” in the sense of an
autopoietic system (Maturana and Varela, 1980; Heylighen, 2003).  However,
if for example one attempts to correlate the complexity of synchronous
behaviour within crowds of people to the synchronous firings of specific
sets of neurons in the brain, which crowds do we correlate to which sets of
neurons?  This paper does not propose an answer to the question; the
intention is identify a category of study and hypothesis which may be ripe
for more rigorous analysis.
 The proposition here, therefore, is that corroborating evidence of
a global consciousness may be revealed if the complexity of human
interactivity occurs on fractal scales to other systems such as the brain
or other physical systems.  There are inherent problems in such analysis,
particularly in isolating comparable systems, but the intent of this paper
is to present possible avenues for further formal and empirical
investigation.
Distinguishing Between Theories of Global Consciousness
 It is important to distinguish the theory that global consciousness
is an emergent phenomenon arising from the interactions among humans, from
the notion of global consciousness as a form of cumulative consciousness as
espoused by Teilhard de Chardin or “collective unconscious” proposed by
Jung.
 While de Chardin (1955) posited the notion that the relative
complexity of a system was an inherent feature of consciousness, his notion
of an evolution in consciousness through greater harmonization of
collective thought diverges substantially from the theory espoused here.
Indeed, the concept espoused here entails the notion that any kind of
complex interactivity among humans forms the basis for the emergence of the
novel properties of consciousness – such interactivity may include military
planning and action and all of its consequences; morally “good” or
harmonious interactions have no bearing on the existence of global
consciousness.
 Jung’s concept of the collective unconscious is not grounded in the
concept of complexity (cf. Campbell, J., 1971).  Furthermore, it is the
position of this paper that the actions of the nodes (people, in the case
of global consciousness) determine the nature of the “thoughts” of the
global consciousness, and not vice versa (see subsequent discussion), as is
perhaps implied in the concept of a collective unconscious and the
archetypes which Jung theorized to arise universally.
 Too, a strong case has been made that human and other organic
networks comprise a global brain (Russell, 1995; Meyer-Kress, 1995; Capra,
1996; Bloom, 2000; et al.).  However, much of the analysis has been largely
confined to biological networks as   analogs of anatomical aspects of the
human brain, while the question of whether such analogous brains are
conscious appears not to have been rigorously addressed, although it is an
obvious implication of the proposition. Nor do such analyses appear to
address rigorously the question of whether systems other than biological
ones may be conscious.
Implications of Quantum Consciousness
 If relative complexity is the measure of consciousness, then is
this reconcilable with the  Penrose and Hameroff (1994) proposition that
quantum processes are involved in the leap from unconscious neural activity
to SA conscious neural activity?  Arguably the answer is yes, because the
various quantum formulations themselves are in fact descriptions of
complexity.  These descriptions reveal a degree of complexity far higher
than that exhibited by non-conscious entities, since we move from not only
classical complexity involving neural interactivity, but to a combination
of classical and quantum complexity.
 It is argued here, however, that if relative complexity of neural
processes lies at the heart of conscious processes, then a combination of
classical and quantum complexity does not preclude the possibility of
equivalent complex processes.  A simple example is that there are a variety
of routes one can take between Paris and Zurich, some longer than others.
But the destination is the same in spite of a range of possible steps taken
to achieve that result.  A more intersting example is that Newtonian
mathematics and Einstein's general relativity may be applied equivalently
to describe accurately certain physical processes (at relatively low
speeds) even though the mathematics involved are entirely different, and
though the actual number of steps in arriving at the solution to our
hypothetical problem may differ—the end result is the essentially the same
(e.g. Hawking, 1983).   A similar illustration is of two speakers of
different languages, say English and Greek: in order to describe the
setting of the sun each speaker uses different syntax and grammar and
obviously different words to convey essentially the same image.   The
illustration is also useful since Benjamin Ojemann (1983) showed that
different languages engage different neural processes though presumably
similar ideas may be communicated. Thus, while the interactions of people
giving rise to a theoretical global consciousness may not involve quantum
processes, the degree of the complexity of interactivity may be equivalent
to the complexity exhibited in human consciousness.
 One obvious counter argument is that quantum processes are physical
processes and not emergent properties, thus distinguishing the quantum
physical processes from the complexity of interactivity of neurons at the
classical level.  But even if quantum processes are involved in
consciousness, it is the combination of these processes with the classical
neural processes which give rise to consciousness, and the position that
the quantum processes simply add to the physical complexity of the system
is sustainable: consciousness is an emergent phenomenon of the combination
of quantum processes and classical neural processes.  Described in terms of
complexity, this combination may be orders of magnitude higher than that
achievable by human interaction or computer computational processes.   This
paper, however is premised on the argument that human interactivity at
least has resulted in an equivalent degree of interactivity to neural
processes.
The Problem of Medium and the Multiple Subconscious Hypothesis
 Human beings of course perceive information from the outside world
through various sense organs, and project information externally through
gestures and vocalizations.  If global consciousness is real, then how
would it perceive external information or project it externally?  There is
obviously no evidence of any such organs of perception or any capacity for
exhibiting information externally, but the view taken here is that such
perceptions or capacity for communication are not necessary precursors or
corollories of consciousness, especially if consciousness exists to varying
degrees: an ant colony, albeit relatively far down the continuum of
consciousness, as a whole does not possess any such organs of perception or
communication; farther to the right of the continuum, a person subject to
sensory deprivation remains conscious while unable to perceive or
communicate, albeit temporarily (cf. Freedman, Grunebaum, Greenblatt,
1961).
 It is argued here that where a system of interacting components has
significantly surpassed the minimum threshold for SA consciousness,
communication occurs internally among a number of “sub-consciousnesses”
within that system.  The proposition here is that subsets of interacting
components within a broader system can in themselves  reach the critical
threshold for SA consciousness (or perhaps some degree of consciousness
slightly lower), and thereby communicate among one another through
dynamically shifting subsets of interacting components.  So in the brain,
where the threshold for consciousness has been far surpassed,  there is
continual communication occurring among shifting subsets of neurons which
subsets in themselves have reached the minimum level for SA consciousness,
or a level of consciousness perhaps marginally below SA consciousness.
 This is not a new theory. Greenfield (1999) speculates that
multiple consciousnesses may exist, but that only one of which becomes the
focus of awareness at any given moment; Edelman and Tononi (1998) speak of
a dynamic core, constantly shifting throughout the cerebral cortex. Semir
Zeki (1999) hypothesizes micro-consciousnesses arising primarily in the
visual centres. Here it is suggested that these dynamically shifting sets
of neurons are not necessarily unitary in time in the sense of only one
being realized at given time, as proposed by Greenfield (1999), but are
continually communicating with one another in a variety of combinations
throughout the brain and engage in communication even when the focus of
overall conscious attention may be elsewhere or even seemingly non-
existant, as in non-dreaming sleep.
 If each sub-consciousness is independently conscious, the question
arises as to what it means to be conscious.  According to conventional
definitions, the hypothesized subconsciousnesses cannot all be conscious at
once because each does not represent a single focus of attention.  For all
subconsciousnesses to be individually conscious contradicts Greenfield’s
argument (1999) which says that while consciousness may shift throughout
the brain, there can only be one state of attentional consciousness at any
one time.  However, no contradiction arises if we apply the theory that
consciousness exists on a continuum and corresponds to the complexity of a
given system’s interacting components: any subset of neurons of sufficient
complexity and whose neurons interact is itself conscious.
 Moreover, the hypothesis here is that many of such neuron subsets
are not simply situated somewhere along the continuum of consciousness, but
in fact involve sufficient complexity in and of themselves to reach SA
consciousness.  With respect to the focus of attention, it suggested here
that the combination of the subconsciousnesses in the brain gives rise to
an overall consciousness which is more complex than the indivdual ones,
thus serving to dominate the focus of attention.  During the waking state,
this combination of subconsciousness usually consists largely of the
various perception related neural assemblies, but even this shifts
considerably, as we all know by constant changes in our focus of
attention.
 One assumption arising from this hypothesis is that
the “communicating” neuronal groups are not necessarily all of the same
size or of equivalent complexity.  This may be evidenced by continually
varying wavelengths of brain electrical activity, among other things.  Such
shifting patterns in EEG activity are indeed seen (cf. Sabbatini, R., 2003
et al.), and the argument here that brainwave frequencies reflect in part
communication between entire sub-consciousnesses is by no means an
exclusive explanation, but an alternative or corollary explanation to
current theories for the observed brainwave activity.
 Regardless of the function of such sub-consciousnesses, it is the
limitations in the study and identification of this shifting core that this
paper is concerned with.  If one primary feature of consciousness is the
dynamic nature of integrated and differentiated groups of neurons (Edelman
and Tononi, 2000), then some of the deficiencies in our current ability to
study, identify, and quantify the precise nature of this dynamic core may
be overcome by a study  of analogous situations observed in human affairs.
This is the central argument of this paper: a literal global consciousness
emerges from the interactions of human kind and if regarded as a bona fide
sphere of study, the study of individual human consciousness is
complemented and supported by a study of the global consciousness, and vice
versa.
 Humanity consists of  groups of all sizes, connected and
communicating over a broad range of degrees; small groups exist in the form
of clubs or social networks; larger groups consist of communities and
cities; still larger are nations—each to a large degree autonomous, but all
of which comprise “wheels within wheels”, all within the overall world-wide
human community, all of which engage in communication with one another to
varying degrees and at varying levels.
 Just as in the human brain, some of these working sub-groups may be
sufficiently complex in and of themselves to exhibit consciousness, while
others will not.  What is proposed here is an interdisciplinary approach to
the study of consciousness; that is to say that studies of individual human
consciousness ought to include a study of the complexity of human affairs.
We stand to learn much about the nature of consciousness generally by
comparative analysis: rather like Monica Hurdal’s flat brain topology
(2002), the global brain is spread before us, easily accessible for
observation and experimentation whereas the neurons of the brain in their
living state are not.
 What then are some of the analogous processes amenable to study?
The following discussion is not intended to constitute a comprehensive
analysis, but rather to present the kinds of analyses and hypotheses which
may be pursued and to provoke more rigorous investigations on the subject.
Implications of Libet/Kornhuber
 Although the subject of controversy, Benjamin Libet's experiments
apparently demonstrate that neural activity precedes awareness of the
wilful desire to manifest physically the activity (Klein, 2002).
Additionally, awareness of physical stimulus is delayed.  If these
situations are examined as analagous activity in the global consciousness,
they suggest that 1) the interactions among people (analagous to neurons)
are driven by individual conscious will and compose the emergent thought in
the global brain, and not the other way around, 2) external stimuli in
whatever form they may take to the global consciousness result in a delayed
response in the activities of people.  Of these two statements, the latter
is intuitive, while the first not necessarily so, because intuition might
suggest that somehow a conscious thought is first formed at the “meta”
level of consciousness, and subsequently manifested in a response among the
activities of neurons or people, as the analogy goes.
 This is significant in the context of global consciousness because
it supports the idea that the activities of people may be entered into of
their own free will, which, when combined, create the emergence of a
thought at the global level; that people aren't somehow governed by the
overriding global consciousness, if it exists. If the situation was
reversed – that is, if global consciousness was such that volition to act
or manifest a thought came first in time followed by  a neuronal response
to that thought, this would be immediately problematic to any theory of
global consciousness: it would suggest that the actions of people (as the
neurons in the global consciousness) are governed by the will of the
overriding global consciousness.   Such a concept may support
predestination or fatalistic theologies, but would be substantially less
convincing in any scientific sense.
 Similarly, the Libet experiment in particular suggests that neurons
in the brain somehow possess some form or degree of free will of their own
which governs the actions of the body, and not vice versa.  We become aware
of actions our neurons have already “decided” to engage in, and while we
may think the action results from our own free will, the act has already
been decided upon by the neurons before we become aware of them.  Put
simplistically, our neurons are smarter than we are.  Likewise, in the
context of the global brain, our activities, decided upon by us, allow for
the emergence of thought at the global level.
Implications of Synchronous Firings as in Visual Systems
 It is important to distinguish the perceptions of individual humans
from any broad perception of sensory information by the global brain as a
whole.  Using visual perception as an example, the light received through
one’s eyes onto retinal cells and through to the oscillations of
thalamacortical neurons (Edelman & Tononi, 2000) serve to affect that
person’s actions only.  Many individuals may thus interact, but arguably
there isn’t a case where an external stimulus engages groups of humans
whose function it is to “bind” the information received into a conscious
experience within the global consciousness.
 As discussed in the foregoing, if global consciousness exists as a
closed system of interacting humans, it is apparent that it does not
naturally receive or perceive external stimuli analogous to the perceptual
stimuli received through the sense organs of an individual human being.
 For example, one subject of considerable attention among
neuroscientists (c.f. Chalmers 2003) is synchronous neuronal firings
between the thalamus and the cerebral cortex are currently thought to be a
critical neural correlate to visual perceptions (e.g. Crick and Koch, 1990;
Edelman and Tononi, 2000).  These synchronous firings offer an explanation
to the “binding problem”, or unification into a single conscious
experience  different visual features such as color and shape which trigger
firings in disparate regions of the brain (e.g. Crick, 1990).
 Being well-studied, this presumably would be an area ripe for
investigations into analagous human activity. Yet arguably because there is
no analogous visual organ in the global brain, the binding problem and
indeed all aspects of perceptual consciousness are either excluded from the
proposed comparative analysis and/or support arguments rebutting the very
proposition of global consciousness.
 Nonetheless, situations analogous to perceptions of external
stimuli do exist at the collective human level, although not necessarily
naturally so.  Humankind has artificially created the function of sensory
perceptions by designing large telescopes, radar, spectroscopes and a
variety of other perceptual instruments requiring the coordination of
hundreds and perhaps thousands to interpret and disseminate the information
throughout the global population.  There seems no reason why such
artificially constructed perceptual instruments ought to be excluded from
comparative analysis, since such instruments are a result of the very
complexity among human interactions from which global consciousness
emerges; sufficient complexity begets further complexity, as is evident
from our own brain’s capacity to learn continuously.
 Thus it may hypothesized that there are measurable synchronous
oscillations occurring between groups who operate the sensory instruments
(e.g. astronomers, engineers, computer technicians etc.), those receive and
interpret the data (e.g. astronomers, physicists, etc), and those who
disseminate the information publicly (e.g. also the astronomers and
physics, but also journalists, public relations personnel etc.).
 One means of testing the hypothesis that something equivalent to 40
hertz oscillations occur in human activity is by careful observation of the
interactions between the actual groups involved.  Another, perhaps simpler
means, is by computer simulations of actions resulting from the discussed
receipt of external stimuli.  As an example, designating the Hubble
telescope as the source of external stimuli and the hundreds of
astronomers, engineers and technicians involved (Chiasson, 1994) as the
group receiving and interpreting the data; the administrators, public
relations officers, and press as the information disseminators, rules may
be gleaned as to the relationship between the technicians analyzing the
data and those disseminating the data, from which a computer algorithm
might be designed.
 Applying the proposition that simple rules result in complex
behaviour (Holland, 1999; Wolfram, 2002 et al.), presumably the rules could
be relatively coarse-grained and complex behaviour and/or specific patterns
would be observed without the need to model the minutiae of interactivity
between groups.  It may be borne in mind that the scale of interactions is
different temporally and spatially from that occurring among neurons in the
brain, so some oscillation frequency other than 40 hertz may be predicted.
As hypothesized above, the scales may be fractal in nature both temporally
and spatially, and predictions may be made on that basis.
 The actual transmission of information is perhaps roughly equal,
given that in the brain the processes are electro-chemical, while in the
world information transmission occurs almost as rapidly.  But if
transmission in both cases are roughly equal, the speed of information
processing is not, which occurs more rapidly in the brain.  In the case of
human information processing, in many circumstances it takes significant
amounts of time for decisions to be made on the basis of information
received.  Thus, in determining whether certain human information exchange
oscillates at frequencies equivalent to certain brain processes, one factor
among many, no doubt, to consider is the rate of information processing.
 While, as stated earlier, a detailed discussion of computer
simulations is outside the scope of this paper, certain computer
simulations may be useful in corroborating or identifying properties of
human interactivity which may be analagous to neural architectures.   As
one example among many, Lago-Fernandez and colleagues (2000) found that
simulations incorporating small worlds topology yielded results closely
replicating the 20 hertz oscillations in a locust’s olfactory neural
system.   Small worlds architecture exists in human interctivity (cf.
Buchanan, 2000; Watts and Strogatz, 1998), and it may be that scaled or
similar oscillations await to be identified in human interactivity.
The Problem of Language
 It has been argued that the capacity for language is an essential
feature of higher consciousness (Edelman, 1992 et al).  Dennett (1992) says
that consciousness does not exist without it.  However, it is argued here
that language is unncessary for SA consciousness, a view supported by many
(Churchland, P.S., 1996).  But the principle problem posed here is that
similar to the limitations a global consciousness might have in terms of
perceiving external physical stimulus, so does a global consciousness have
no physical organ of expression in the way that vocal chords or body
signals provide this medium in humans and other organisms.
 The absence of a global consciousness’ capacity either to respond
to external stimulus or express itself may be fuel to the camp who would
ask what it means to be conscious if there are no mechanisms for perceiving
the world or for communicating with it.  Neither of these are necessary if
the continuum approach to consciousness is taken.  Moreover, to repeat, the
position taken here is that communication occurs internally to the global
consciousness between and among the disparate and shifting groups
sufficient in themselve to constitute sub-conscious entities.  The view
that the holisting human experience consists largely of brain states
independent of and not necessarily caused by external stimuli is one
gaining acceptance.  Churchland, P.S. (1996) refers to the concept
as “endogenesis” (cf. Merzenich and deCharms, 1996).
Non-perception Related Consciousness
 It may be argued that consciousness does not exist without
awareness or perception of external sensory stimuli, or that if there are
identifiable aspects to consciousness other than that which corresponds to
perception of the environment, then any such other aspects of consciousness
only arose as a result of millions of years of brain evolution which
started with simple stimulus/response levels of awareness; that
consciousness cannot have arisen without sensory stimulus to begin with.
 However, here again it is argued that such organs of perception and
the neural correlates of  perception are not essential components of
consciousness if consciousness is viewed as arising where ever sufficiently
complex interactions occur.  The human brain may have evolved to its
current level of complexity through millions of years of sensory input, but
this does not preclude the possibility that equivalent degrees of
complexity may arise through very different processes.  Thus human
societies and/or other complex systems have developed equivalent degrees of
complexity through processes quite distinct from evolution through
continuous perceptual stimuli.
 If that is so, then the question arises as to what non-perception
related brain processes are analogs of global consciousness.  As argued
above, consciousness is not an all or nothing proposition; that emerging
from brain processes are numerous sub-consciousnesses, or micro-
consciousnesses (Zeki, 1999).  These sub-consciousnesses are in continual
communication with one another, independently of the focus of
consciousness; i.e. that which holds our immediate attention.  The analog
of these sub-consciousnesses is simply large sub-groups of human
populations.  For example, the population of the United States, numbering
nearly 300 million, is a complete unit unto itself of highly complex
economic and social activity.  The complexity of interactions among this
discreet population unit may itself be sufficiently high so as to comprise
the foundation for an emergent global consciousness.  Similarly with the
populations of China, or Russia, or many others.
 Communication occurs among all of these discreet populations,
together comprising the totality of global consciousness.  These
populations engage in communications with one another in countless
networks, similarly to neural assemblies, and one may imagine a very large
number of such intersecting subsets, rather like a complicated Venn
diagram.
 It is hypothesized here that it may be possible to identifiy
analogous patterns of interactivity among these human populations to theta,
delta, and other non-beta/alpha brain frequencies.  These frequencies in
particular are identified because of the problem of the absence of sensory
organs and perceptual processing associated with the global consciousness
(except for perhaps artificial perceptions), as discussed above.  So, as
this hypothesis goes, attempts to identify global consciousness/individual
brain analogs, should be approached on the premise that perception related
analogs may either not be found or be more difficult to find; that it is
the internal, non-perception related consciousness of the human brain which
is the broad analog for study.
 So, while we may seek analogs to neural processes in human
processes, the converse is also possible: analogs to human processes may be
sought in neural processes, which in turn may provide a deeper
understanding of individual consciousness.  The interdisciplinary study of
global consciousness and individual consciousness may provide a broader
understanding of the nature of consciousness.
Other Analogous Situations – Hypersynchronous Processes
 Edelman and Tononi (2000) suggest that while synchronous
ocsillations of specific populations is a key feature of consciousness,
hypersynchronous neural activity results in  a loss of consciousness. Such
hypersynchronous activity is, they point out, evident during epilectic
seizures, when temporary losses in consciousness are experienced.
Hypersynchronous behaviour of this nature exhibits low integration and
differentiation, and therefore low complexity (as does simple random neural
activity).
 Arguably large human populations engaging in sameness of activity
exhibit similarly low degrees of complex interactivity. So, for example,
low integration and differentiation and hence low complexity occurs in
situations where thousands march in uniform fashion, bow simultaneously
toward Mecca, or sit silently in front of the television.  On the contrary,
where there is dynamic integration between synchronously behaving
populations, as in the binding feature of similar neural processes,
arguably complexity is increased.
 It is emphasized that these analagous situations are presented to
provoke more detailed inquiry and analysis.  Moreover, as outlined by
Chalmers (1998), there are several competing theories as to the neural
correlates of consciousness, and it is argued here that each of these ought
to be investigated for analogs in human global interactivity.
 It is acknowledged that the examples presented here of analags in
human interactivities of the neural correlates of human consciousness may
entail certain logical and empirical problems. But the premise is that if
consciousness is defined as a  broad continuum of the complexity of
interactions, then it is validly argued that global consciousness arises
from the interactions among humans. If so, then the processes giving rise
to global consciousness are likely to be similar to the processes giving
rise to brain consciousness, and valid comparisons may be made as between
the respective systems.
Conclusion
 This paper suggests that a) consciousness exists by degrees
according the complexity of the interactivity of the components of a
physical system, regardless of whether the system is biological or
otherwise; b) the complexity of neural processes and that of other systems
can be mathematically formalized and compared; c) consciousness studies can
therefore be broadened to include an analysis of systems other than the
brains of higher organisms; d) such studies of other physical systems can
be correlated and corroborated with brain consciousness studies, and
testable hypotheses can be derived by which a broader understanding of
consciousness as a universal phenomenon may be achieved; e) that such
studies and tests are best carried out on human populations because of
their amenability to study, and because studies can be carried out on the
premise that the interactivity of human populations has reached the
necessary threshold of complexity for higher consciousness to emerge; f)
finally, that such studies may assist in overcoming the practical and
ethical limitations currently experienced in the study of human
consciousness.
 That the interactions of humans results in a unified conscious
entity may be a difficult conclusion for mainstream science to accept, but
we can avoid the philosophical and theological implications of such a
concept if we found the concept on principles of mathematical complexity.
If rigorous investigations reveal verifiable and sufficient similarities
between the interactions of humans and the interactions of neurons, perhaps
then we may consider the philosophical and theological implications of such
studies.
































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