Re: A Critical Question

On Sat, 22 Nov 2003 18:46:38 GMT, "OmegaZero2003"
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:

>You used the phrases: essential terms, ultimate terms , mechanical terms,
>and conceptual terms, logical terms and material terms,  below.
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>All referring, ostensibly, to some statement that would explain brain I/O.
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>Yet, each of those phrases *mean* something different.
>
>So what is it that you really want?

I don't consider the various descriptions noted above to be critical
to the issue. I haven't defined many of the many words I used either
and would expect them to be understood in common sense terms. My
purpose was principally to highlight the explanation for differences
as opposed to material combinations in terms of the presence or
absence of an identity or those aspects of A and B common to both.
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>"Lester Zick" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
>news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>>
>>                                        A Critical Question
>>
>>
>> What is the ultimate relation between brain input and brain output?
>>
>> Let me describe what I'm asking in more specific mechanical terms.
>>
>> Suppose in higher level animals we are primarily interested in the
>> significance of the brain as the determinant of behavior and we have a
>> certain external material circumstance A and a certain internal
>> material circumstance B and a certain resultant circumstance C. And we
>> ask what the nature of the relationship is of C to A and B?
>>
>> Now in the most essential terms I consider that there are only two
>> possibilities in conceptual terms. (At least if there are others I
>> would like to know about it.) Either C is the result of some material
>> combination of A and B. Or C is the result of some difference between
>> A and B.
>>
>> Let me be clear that it doesn't matter for the present example what
>> else C might be as the result of A and B. We might specify all kinds
>> of processing in between to manipulate the combination to produce C.
>> The only thing we need to understand at this point is whether whatever
>> subsequent processing might be involved we are looking at C as the
>> material consequent of A and B in combination or the difference.
>>
>> It is my contention that we only have these two possibilities: that C
>> is the result of the material combination of A and B or that it is the
>> result of some differential combination of A and B.
>>
>> However if C is the result of the material combination of A and B what
>> we are looking at to describe brain function as the basic determinant
>> of behavior is material in nature and represents some kind of copy of
>> A and B in combination. And it is also my conviction that this idea
>> lies at the root of copy theory and every form of material determinism
>> or materialism as conceptual doctrines and as the basis of scientific
>> descriptions of brain function.
>>
>> On the other hand if C is not the result of the material combination
>> of A and B it must apparently be the result of the difference between
>> A and B and does not in this regard represent any aspect of A or B in
>> material combination and only represents the difference between them.
>>
>> But what does this imply? The conventional wisdom is that operation of
>> the brain cannot be studied or analyzed scientifically unless its
>> operation can be described in terms of material interactions analogous
>> to those studied by natural science. I suggest otherwise.
>>
>> The interactions describing the operation of the brain are clearly
>> differential in nature. They are strictly mechanical in form despite
>> being the result of differences and can be studied systematically and
>> scientifically in such terms as the determinate result of those
>> differences.
>>
>> Now let me describe what I mean by the terms material combination and
>> material differences in more exact terms. Given the material
>> circumstances A and B we imagine they are of the general form
>>
>> A:     . . . . . XXXXXXXA
>>
>> B:     . . . . . XXXXXXXB
>>
>> where . . . . XXXXXXX represents that material aspect or identity
>> common to both A and B and that the A and B correspond to the material
>> aspect that differs between them.
>>
>> Now we also suppose that A and B represent continuum material
>> properties of more or less indefinite size and scope like all other
>> material properties subject to study by the natural sciences.
>>
>> So the question then becomes whether C respresents some material
>> amalgm of A and B or the difference between them. What stands out in
>> this regard is that any combination of A and B except a difference
>> preserves the identity of each together with whatever form the
>> combination takes. In other words we are never able to distinguish
>> either from the other in terms of identity and C can never be
>> distinguished in any other terms except the whole combination
>> including the material identity involved. Nor would C be
>> distinguishable in terms of any other identity not included in A or B.
>> Thus we could never extrapolate C from one circumstance to any other.
>>
>> However if C instead represents the difference between A and B we lose
>> the identity common between them with the result that we are looking
>> at a portable difference (A - C) that is not caught up with their
>> common identity and is thus is conceivably applicable to other
>> identity contexts. The difference is logical in this sense because it
>> shares no common material identity with its material antecedents.
>>
>> This is what is meant by differences on the one hand and material
>> combinations on the other. A material combination produces results
>> having a material identity in common with its antecedents. A
>> difference does not.
>>
>> Of course without that common material identity we have no definite
>> material frame of reference for the difference and no way to know to
>> what antecedents the difference applies. We only have the difference
>> to work with. And it is only the difference we know and the reason it
>> constitutes information in addition to being a material circumstance
>> in its own right. It is logical in this respect rather than a material
>> combination of its antecedents. And it must be analyzed in logical
>> rather than material terms for this reason.
>>
>>
>> Regards - Lester
>>
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Regards - Lester