Re: What is the "Presumption of Innocence"

"jimmy" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Dear Not So Quick...
>
> No, it's a phrase in the English language that has none of the problems
you
> suggest.  Common sense actually tells you this.  See if you can follow:
>
> Presumed innocent until proven guilty... at the end of the trial you are
not
> proven guilty, so the case is dismissed and everyone continues to presume
> your innocence.
>
> Presumed innocent UNLESS proven guilty... at the end of the trial you are
> not proven guilty, so the case is dismissed and everyone continues to
> presume your innocence.
>
> Do you see any difference?  Nothing other than a word linked to time,
rather
> than comparison.  Get it?
>
> jimmy.
>
> P.S. Immoralist, that was a nice posting... however, people like Not So
> Quick can't get past the purely invented semantical problems in her head.
>
>
> "Not so quick" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
> news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> >
> > "Immortalist" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
> > news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > >
> > > "Not so quick" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
> > > news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > >
> > > > Re: Can somebody please say "unless proven guilty"
> > > > instead of "until proven guilty".
> > > > Comment?
> > > >
> > >
> > > No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
> privileges
> > or
> > > immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive
> > any
> > > person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
> deny
> > > to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.
> > >
> > > 14th Ammendment:
> > > http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/constitution/amendment14/index.html
> > >
> > > -------------------------------
> > >
> > > "Better that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer,"
2
> > > says English jurist William Blackstone.  The ratio 10:1 has become
known
> > as
> > > the "Blackstone ratio."
> > >
> > > http://www1.law.ucla.edu/~volokh/guilty.htm
> > >
> > > --------------------------------
> > >
> > > What is the "presumption of innocence?"
> > >
> > > All people accused of a crime are legally presumed to be innocent
until
> > they
> > > are convicted, either in a trial or as a result of pleading guilty.
This
> > > presumption means not only that the prosecutor must convince the jury
of
> > the
> > > defendant's guilt, but also that the defendant need not say or do
> anything
> > > in his own defense. If the prosecutor can't convince the jury that the
> > > defendant is guilty, the defendant goes free.
> > >
> > > The presumption of innocence, coupled with the fact that the
prosecutor
> > must
> > > prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt (see below),
makes
> > it
> > > difficult for the government to put people behind bars.
> > >
> > > Legal FAQ:
> > > http://tinyurl.com/wdqg
> > >
> > > ------------------------------------
> > >
> > > The Presumption of Innocence in a Criminal Trial
> > >
> > > What then is the appropriate role for the presumption of innocence? In
a
> > > criminal trial, the presumption of innocence is an important
> > constitutional
> > > protection for the accused. It means that the jury may only pronounce
> the
> > > defendant guilty if the physical and testimonial evidence presented
> prove
> > > guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Put differently, the jury must say
"not
> > > guilty" even when it believes the defendant is guilty and often, it
> > follows,
> > > even when the defendant in fact is guilty. Until the evidentiary
> threshold
> > > of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is reached, the judge and the
> > > Constitution order the jury to acquit.
> > >
> > > The reason for this rule is that a guilty verdict subjects a person to
> > > incarceration, the deprivation of freedom that we all cherish and that
> is
> > > guaranteed us under normal circumstances. Though the acquittal of a
> > > factually guilty man is unfortunate and costly, it is an inevitable
> > > byproduct of a system designed to reduce to close to zero the odds
that
> a
> > > factually innocent person will be convicted of a crime.
> > >
> > > http://writ.corporate.findlaw.com/colb/20020617.html
> > >
> > > ---------------------------
> > >
> > > How come they treat me as if I am guilty when I am presumed innocent
> until
> > > proven otherwise?
> > >
> > > By reading this page you will know what less then 1 in 1,000 know, and
> > what
> > > many attorneys and Judges only think they know.
> > >
> > > In an argument a presumption is what someone owns. Think of an
argument
> as
> > a
> > > scale. If both sides of the scale are equal the one that owns the
> > > presumption wins. A presumption can be a presumption of debt, a
> > presumption
> > > of title and so on. As a defendant you own the "presumption of
> innocence".
> > >
> > > Many confuse presumption with assumption or assertion. An assumption
is
> a
> > > position that is not proven but because of the circumstances can be
> > > considered correct. An assertion is a claim made justifying the
> > assumption.
> > > If challenged by the owner of the presumption the Burdon of proving
the
> > > assertion is placed upon the party making the assertion. Failure to
> prove
> > > the assertion results in the owner of the presumption prevailing in
the
> > > dispute.
> > >
> > > In an arrest the person making the arrest warrants to the court (makes
a
> > > type of guarantee) that there is a warrant (a link between a claim and
> > > evidence) to prove an assertion. In other words the arresting officer
> when
> > > he fills out your ticket swears to the court that there is sufficient
> > > evidence to to prove his assertion that you were speeding.
> > >
> > > http://www.tipmra.com/presumption_of_innocence.htm
> > >
> > > --------------------------------
> > >
> > > Proof, Burden of Proof, and Presumptions.--The due process clauses of
> the
> > > Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments ''[protect] the accused against
> conviction
> > > except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
> > > constitute the crime with which he is charged.''83 ''The reasonable
> doubt
> > > standard plays a vital role in the American scheme of criminal
> procedure.
> > It
> > > is a prime instrument for reducing the risk of convictions resting on
> > > factual error. The standard provides concrete substance for the
> > presumption
> > > of innocence--that bedrock 'axiomatic and elementary' principle whose
> > > 'enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our
> criminal
> > > law.'''84 In many past cases, this standard was assumed to be the
> required
> > > one,85 but because it was so widely accepted only recently has the
Court
> > had
> > > the opportunity to pronounce it guaranteed by due process.86 The
> > presumption
> > > of inno cence is valuable in assuring defendants a fair trial,87 and
it
> > > operates to ensure that the jury considers the case solely on the
> > > evidence.88
> > >
> > > The Court has long held it would set aside under the due process
clause
> > > convictions that are supported by no evidence at all,89 but Winship
> > > necessitated a reconsideration of whether it should in reviewing state
> > cases
> > > weigh the sufficiency of the evidence. Thus, in Jackson v. Virginia,90
> it
> > > held that federal courts, on direct appeal of federal convictions or
> > > collateral review of state convictions, must satisfy themselves
whether
> > the
> > > record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a
> > > reasonable doubt. The question the reviewing court is to ask itself is
> not
> > > whether it believes the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond
a
> > > reasonable doubt, but whether, after viewing the evidence in the light
> > most
> > > favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have
> found
> > > the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.91
> > >
> > > Inasmuch as due process requires the prosecution to prove beyond a
> > > reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime charged,
> the
> > > Court held in Mullaney v. Wilbur92 that it was a denial of this
> > > constitutional guarantee to require a defendant charged with murder to
> > prove
> > > that he acted ''in the heat of passion on sudden provocation'' in
order
> to
> > > reduce the homicide to manslaughter. The Court indicated that a
> balancing
> > of
> > > interests test was to be employed to determine when the due process
> clause
> > > re quired the prosecution to carry the burden and when some part of
the
> > > burden might be shifted to the defendant, but the decision called into
> > > question the practice in many States under which some burdens of
> > persuasion
> > > were borne by the defense, and raised the prospect that the
prosecution
> > must
> > > bear all burdens of persuasion, a significant and weighty task given
the
> > > large numbers of affirmative defenses.
> > >
> > > But the Court soon summarily rejected the argument that Mullaney means
> > that
> > > the prosecution must negate the insanity defense,93 and in full-scale
> > > consideration upheld a state statute that provided that an intentional
> > > killing is murder but permitted the defendant to assert ''extreme
> > emotional
> > > disturbance'' as an affirmative defense which, if proved by the
defense
> by
> > a
> > > preponderance of the evidence, would reduce the murder offense to
> > > manslaughter.94 According to the Court, the constitutional deficiency
in
> > > Mullaney was that the statute made malice an element of the offense
but
> > > permitted malice to be presumed upon proof of the other elements and
> > > required the defendant to prove the absence of malice. In Patterson
the
> > > statute obligated the State to prove each element of the offense (the
> > death,
> > > the intent to kill, and the causation) beyond a reasonable doubt, but
> > > allowed the defendant to present an affirmative defense that would
> reduce
> > > the degree of the offense, and as to which the defendant bears the
> burden
> > of
> > > persuasion by a preponderance of the evidence. The decisive issue,
then,
> > was
> > > whether the statute required the state to prove beyond a reasonable
> doubt
> > > each element of the offense. So defined, the distinction and the
> > > constitutional mandate are formalistic, and the legislature can shift
> > > burdens of persuasion between prosecution and defense easily through
the
> > > statutory definitions of the offenses.95 Also formalistic is the
> > distinction
> > > between elements of the crime and sentencing factors; a state may
treat
> as
> > a
> > > sentencing consideration provable by a preponderance of the evidence
the
> > > fact that the defendant ''visibly possessed a firearm'' during
> commission
> > of
> > > the offense.96
> > >
> > > Quite closely related is the issue of statutory presumptions; these
> > > generally provide for the proof of the presumed fact, an element of a
> > crime,
> > > by the establishment of another fact, the basic fact.97 In Tot v.
United
> > > States,98 the Court held that a statutory presumption was valid under
> the
> > > due process clause if it met a ''rational connection'' test. ''Under
our
> > > decisions, a statutory presumption cannot be sustained if there be no
> > > rational connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact
> > presumed,
> > > if the inference of the one from the proof of the other is arbitrary
> > because
> > > of lack of connection between the two in common experience.'' In Leary
> v.
> > > United States,99 however, the due process test was stiffened to
require
> > that
> > > for such a ''rational connection'' to exist, it must ''at least be
said
> > with
> > > substantial assurance that the presumed fact is more likely than not
to
> > flow
> > > from the proved fact on which it is made to depend.'' Thus, a
provision
> > > which permitted a jury to infer from defendant's possession of
marijuana
> > his
> > > knowledge of its illegal importation was voided. A lengthy canvass of
> > > factual materials established to the Court's satisfaction that while
the
> > > greater part of marijuana consumed here is of foreign origin there was
> > still
> > > a good amount produced domestically and there was thus no way to
assure
> > that
> > > the majority of those possessing marijuana have any reason to know
their
> > > marijuana is imported.100 The Court left open the question whether a
> > > presumption which survived the ''rational connection'' test ''must
also
> > > satisfy the criminal 'reasonable doubt' standard if proof of the crime
> > > charged or an essential element thereof depends upon its use.''101
> > >
> > > In its most recent case, a closely divided Court drew a distinction
> > between
> > > mandatory presumptions, which a jury must accept, and permissive
> > > presumptions, which may be presented to the jury as part of all the
> > evidence
> > > to be considered. With respect to mandatory presumptions, ''since the
> > > prosecution bears the burden of establishing guilt, it may not rest
its
> > case
> > > entirely on a presumption, unless the fact proved is sufficient to
> support
> > > the inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.'' But, with respect
to
> > > permissive presumptions, ''the prosecution may rely on all of the
> evidence
> > > in the record to meet the reasonable doubt standard. There is no more
> > reason
> > > to require a permissive statutory presumption to meet a
reasonable-doubt
> > > standard before it may be permitted to play any part in a trial than
> there
> > > is to require that degree of probative force for other relevant
evidence
> > > before it may be admitted.''102 Thus, because the jury was told it had
> to
> > > believe in defendants' guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and that it
could
> > > consider the inference, due process was not violated by the
application
> of
> > > the statutory presumption that the presence of a firearm in an
> automobile
> > is
> > > presumptive evidence of its illegal possession by all persons then
> > occupying
> > > the vehicle.103
> > >
> > > The division of the Court in these cases and in the Mullaney v. Wilbur
> > line
> > > of cases clearly shows the unsettled doctrinal nature of the issues.
> > >
> > > http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/constitution/amendment14/16.html
> > >
> > > ------------------------------
> > >
> > > The History of the Presumption of Innocence
> > >
> > > It is better than 5, 10, 20, or 100 guilty men go free than for one
> > innocent
> > > man to be put to death. This prinicple is embodied in the presumption
of
> > > innocence. In 1895, the U.S. Supreme Court, in a decision in the case
> > Coffin
> > > v. United States, 156 U.S. 432; 15 S. Ct. 394, traced the presumption
of
> > > innocence, past England, Ancient Greece and Ancient Rome, and, at
least
> > > according to Greenleaf, to Deuteronomy. [also, Alexander Volokh wrote
a
> > law
> > > review article on the issue, available free here.]
> > >
> > > The Coffin case stands for the proposition that at the request of a
> > > defendant, a court must not only instruct on the prosecution's burden
of
> > > proof--that a defendant cannot be convicted unless the government has
> > proven
> > > his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt--but also must instruct on the
> > > presumption of innocence--by informing the jury that a defendant is
> > presumed
> > > innocent. The Court stated,
> > >
> > > The principle that there is a presumption of innocence in favor of the
> > > accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its
> > enforcement
> > > lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.
> > >
> > > In tracing the presumption of innocence, the Court goes on to state:
> > >
> > > It is stated as unquestioned in the text-books, and has been referred
to
> > as
> > > a matter of course in the decisions of this court and in the courts of
> the
> > > several States. See Taylor on Evidence, vol. 1, c. 5, 126, 127; Wills
on
> > > Circumstantial Evidence, c. 5, 91; Best on Presumptions, part 2, c. 1,
> 63,
> > > 64; c. 3, 31-58; Greenleaf on Evidence, part 5, § § 29, &c.; 11
Criminal
> > Law
> > > Magazine, 3; Wharton on Evidence, § 1244; Phillips on Evidence, Cowen
&
> > > Hill's Notes, vol. 2, p. 289; Lilienthal v. United States, 97 U.S.
237;
> > Hopt
> > > v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430; Commonwealth v. Webster, 5 Cush. 295, 320;
State
> v.
> > > Bartlett, 43 N.H. 224; Alexander v. People, 96 Illinois, 96; People v.
> > > Fairchild, 48 Michigan, 31; People v. Millard, 53 Michigan, 63;
> > Commonwealth
> > > v. Whittaker, 131 Mass. 224; Blake v. State, 3 Tex. App. 581; Wharton
v.
> > > State, 73 Alabama, 366; State v. Tibbetts, 35 Maine, 81; Moorer v.
> State,
> > 44
> > > Alabama, 15.
> > >
> > > Greenleaf traces this presumption to Deuteronomy, and quotes Mascardus
> De
> > > Probationibus to show that it was substantially embodied in the laws
of
> > > Sparta and Athens. Greenl. Ev. part 5, section 29, note. Whether
> Greenleaf
> > > is correct or not in this view, there can be no question that the
Roman
> > law
> > > was pervaded with the results of this maxim of criminal
administration,
> as
> > > the following extracts show:
> > >
> > > "Let all accusers understand that they are not to prefer charges
unless
> > they
> > > can be proven by proper witnesses or by conclusive documents, or by
> > > circumstantial evidence which amounts to indubitable proof and is
> clearer
> > > than day." Code, L. IV, T. XX, 1, 1. 25.
> > >
> > > The noble (bivus) Trajan wrote to Julius Frontonus that no man should
be
> > > condemned on a criminal charge in his absence, because it was better
to
> > let
> > > the crime of a guilty person go unpunished than to condemn the
> innocent."
> > > Dig. L. XLVIII, Tit. 19, 1. 5. "In all cases of doubt, the most
merciful
> > > construction of facts should be preferred." Dig. L. L, Tit. XVII, 1.
56.
> > "In
> > > criminal cases the milder construction shall always be preserved."
Dig.
> L.
> > > L, Tit. XVII, 1. 155, s. 2. "In cases of doubt it is no less just than
> it
> > is
> > > safe to adopt the milder construction." Dig. L. L, Tit. XVII, 1. 192,
s.
> > 1.
> > >
> > > Ammianus Marcellinus relates an anecdote of the Emperor Julian which
> > > illustrates the enforcement of this principle in the Roman law.
> Numerius,
> > > the governor of Narbonensis, was on trial before the Emperor, and,
> > contrary
> > > to the usage in criminal cases, the trial was public. Numerius
contented
> > > himself with denying his guilt, and there was not sufficient proof
> against
> > > him. His adversary, Delphidius, "a passionate man," seeing that the
> > failure
> > > of the accusation was inevitable, could not restrain himself, and
> > exclaimed,
> > > "Oh, illustrious Caesar! if it is sufficient to deny, what hereafter
> will
> > > become of the guilty?" to which Julian replied, "If it suffices to
> accuse,
> > > what will become of the innocent?" Rerum Gestarum, L. XVIII, c. 1. The
> > rule
> > > thus found in the Roman law was, along with many other fundamental and
> > > humane maxims of that system, preserved for mankind by the canon law.
> > > Decretum Gratiani de Presumptionibus, L. II, T. XXIII, c. 14, A.D.
1198;
> > > [***492] Corpus Juris Canonici Hispani et Indici, R.P. Murillo
Velarde,
> > Tom.
> > > 1, L. II, n. 140. Exactly when this presumption was in precise words
> > stated
> > > to be a part of the common law is involved in doubt. The writer of an
> able
> > > article in the North American Review, January, 1851, tracing the
genesis
> > of
> > > the principle, says that no express mention of the presumption of
> > innocence
> > > can be found in the books of the common law earlier than the date of
> > > McNally's Evidence (1802). Whether this statement is correct is a
matter
> > of
> > > no moment, for there can be no doubt that, if the principle had not
> found
> > > formal expression in the common law writers at an earlier date, yet
the
> > > practice which flowed from it has existed in the common law from the
> > > earliest time.
> > >
> > > Fortescue says: "Who, then, in England can be put to death unjustly
for
> > any
> > > crime? since he is allowed so many pleas and privileges in favor of
> life;
> > > none but his neighbors, men of honest and good repute, against whom he
> can
> > > have no probable cause of exception, can find the person accused
guilty.
> > > Indeed, one would much rather that twenty guilty persons should escape
> the
> > > punishment of death than that one innocent person should be condemned
> and
> > > suffer capitally." De Laudibus Legum Angliae, Amos' translation,
> > Cambridge,
> > > 1825.
> > >
> > > [*456] Lord Hale (1678) says: "In some cases presumptive evidence goes
> far
> > > to prove a person guilty, though there be no express proof of the fact
> to
> > be
> > > committed by him, but then it must be very warily pressed, for it is
> > better
> > > five guilty persons should escape unpunished than one innocent person
> > should
> > > die." 2 Hale P.C. 290. He further observes: "And thus the reasons
stand
> on
> > > both sides, and though these seem to be stronger than the former, yet
in
> a
> > > case of this moment it is safest to hold that in practice, which hath
> > least
> > > doubt and danger, quod dubitas, ne faceris." 1 Hale P.C. 24.
> > >
> > > Blackstone (1753-1765) maintains that "the law holds that it is better
> > that
> > > ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer." 2 Bl. Com.
c.
> > 27,
> > > margin page 358, ad finem. How fully the presumption of innocence had
> been
> > > evolved as a principle and applied at common law is shown in
McKinley's
> > case
> > > (1817), 33 St. Tr. 275, 506, where Lord Gillies says: "It is
impossible
> to
> > > look at it [a treasonable oath which it was alleged that [**404]
> McKinley
> > > had taken] without suspecting, and thinking it probable, it imports an
> > > obligation to commit a capital crime. That has been and is my
> impression.
> > > But the presumption in favor of innocence is not to be reargued by
mere
> > > suspicion. I am sorry to see, in this information, that the public
> > > prosecutor treats this too lightly; he seems to think that the law
> > > entertains no such presumption of innocence. I cannot listen to this.
I
> > > conceive that this presumption is to be found in every code of law
which
> > has
> > > reason, and religion, and humanity, for a foundation. It is a maxim
> which
> > > ought to be inscribed in indelible characters in the heart of every
> judge
> > > and juryman; and I was happy to hear from Lord Hermand he is inclined
to
> > > give full effect to it. To overturn this, there must be legal evidence
> of
> > > guilt, carrying home a decree of conviction short only absolute
> > certainty."
> > >
> > > The Coffin case was later overruled on other grounds, having nothing
to
> do
> > > with these principles.
> > >
> > > http://www.talkleft.com/archives/001907.html
> > >
> > > --------------------------------
> > >
> > > INTERNATIONAL LAW PRESUMPTIONS
> > >
> > > 1. The presumption of innocence: an integral part of international
human
> > > rights law
> > >
> > > Chapter 1: The presumption of innocence: an integral part of
> international
> > > human rights law
> > > The principle that anyone who is accused of a penal offence shall be
> > > considered innocent until proven guilty is, as stated above, a
> fundamental
> > > principle in any state with a just legal system. It is also an
important
> > > part of universal human rights law, and is laid down in Article 11 of
> the
> > > United Nations Universal Declaration on Human Rights (December 10,
> 1948):
> > >
> > > "Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed
> > innocent
> > > until proven guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has
> had
> > > all the guarantees necessary for his defence."
> > >
> > > This principle is also established in Article 6 (2) of the Council of
> > > Europe's European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
> > > Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) :
> > >
> > > "Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent
> until
> > > proven guilty according to law."
> > >
> > > The wording of Article 14 (2) of the United Nations International
> > Convention
> > > on Civil and Political Rights (December 14, 1966) is almost identical:
> > >
> > > "Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be
> > > presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law."
> > >
> > > The former Soviet Union/Russia signed and ratified both the Universal
> > > Declaration of Human Rights and the International Convention on Civil
> and
> > > Political Rights, and when Russia became a member of the Council of
> Europe
> > > in February, 1996, the governing authorities declared that the country
> > would
> > > fulfil all of the requirements of the ECHR so as to sign the
convention
> > and
> > > its accompanying protocol within a year. Russia also agreed to ratify
> the
> > > Convention within three years (opinion 193/1996). Furthermore, the
> Russian
> > > Constitution of 1993 states that the country is a democratic judicial
> > > society (Article 1) and a number of provisions have been made in which
> it
> > is
> > > stated that international human rights are binding for Russian
> > authorities.
> > > Subsequently, Article 14, Section 4 of the Russian Constitution states
> > that
> > > "recognised principles and rules of international law make up a part
of
> > the
> > > internal law;" it also establishes that in the event of a conflict,
> > > international law takes precedence over national law. Furthermore, the
> > > Russian Constitution guarantees human rights in accordance with
> recognised
> > > principles and norms of international law (Article 17) and establishes
> > that
> > > human rights have immediate effect in national law (Article 18).[2]
> Hence
> > on
> > > these grounds Russian authorities are bound both politically and
legally
> > by
> > > the international principles of law that anyone accused of a penal
> offence
> > > shall be presumed innocent until proven guilty. It is also inherent in
> > this
> > > that any reasonable doubt in a criminal case must be applied in favour
> of
> > > the accused. The presumption of innocence applies to individuals who
are
> > > suspected of or accused of having committed a crime, and it grants
> > citizens
> > > general protection from being singled out by the authorities as
> criminals
> > > before their guilt has been established in a court of law. Thus it may
> be
> > > considered a breach of the presumption of innocence when the police
and
> > the
> > > public prosecution issue statements and pronouncements that may form a
> > basis
> > > for drawing conclusions about the guilt of the accused person. The
same
> is
> > > true if a representative for the state publicly asserts that a person
is
> > > guilty of a crime before the person's guilt has been established by a
> > court,
> > > cf. the statement from the Human Rights Commission of the Council of
> > Europe
> > > in the case "Petra Krause vs. Switzerland" (1979) which addressed
> certain
> > > statements made by the Swiss Justice Minister during a television
> > broadcast.
> > >
> > > In most instances, the eventual trial of a penal case in court
> sufficient
> > to
> > > "repair" those violations to the individual's rights which, seen in
> > > isolation, pronouncements of guilt issuing from the police, the
> > prosecution,
> > > or other representatives of the state may represent. Yet in the
Nikitin
> > > case, there appear to have been so many isolated instances whereby the
> > > presumption of innocence has been ignored that it is uncertain whether
> > > acquittal in court will, of itself, be sufficient to offset the
damage.
> In
> > > any case, developments in the case so far give the impression that the
> > FSB,
> > > along with actors in the prosecution and in the local courts who have
> thus
> > > far handled the case has already decided that Nikitin is guilty.
> > >
> > > It remains an indisputable fact that a number of different
> representatives
> > > for the federal security police and prosecuting authorities have held
up
> > > Nikitin as guilty of having committed serious criminal offences even
> > before
> > > the investigation of the case had been concluded and before the
> > defendant's
> > > case has been tried and his guilt established by an independent court.
> > Their
> > > pronouncements have appeared partly in the form of interviews on the
> > > television and in newspapers, and partly in the form of official
letters
> > to
> > > persons or groups who have spoken critically about or who have
requested
> > > further information about the basis for the charges against Nikitin.
> Other
> > > authorities too have come forward with statements in which there is
> raised
> > > little doubt about Nikitin's guilt. In Section 3, a chronological
> overview
> > > of a number of these pronouncements is presented along with
accompanying
> > > commentaries.
> > >
> > > Over the entire course of the case against Nikitin, the FSB has also
> stood
> > > behind a number of "planted" newspaper articles in which the reader is
> > left
> > > in little doubt as to the question of guilt, and in which Nikitin and
> his
> > > defence counsel are discussed in quite negative terms. Such newspaper
> > > articles do not often have great impact with respect to the
presumption
> of
> > > innocence in a case in that they normally do not influence the court's
> > > consideration of the case. However, in Russia the effect may be
> different,
> > > in part because the country's judicial branch hardly enjoys the same
> > > independence with respect to other bodies of state as would be true of
a
> > > Western system of justice. Furthermore, in Russia the security police
> has
> > > traditionally held an extremely strong position with respect to other
> > bodies
> > > of state. Hence it may be of some relevance to evaluate some of the
> > various
> > > "planted" FSB articles on the Nikitin case with respect to the
> presumption
> > > of innocence. However, an examination of such extent is beyond the
scope
> > of
> > > this note; subsequently articles of this type are not addressed in the
> > > ensuing discussion.
> > >
> > > http://tinyurl.com/wdro
> > >
> > >
> > > XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
> > > XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
> > > WHATISLYNCHMOB
> > > XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
> > >
> > > The sheriff listens to Little Hawk, who tries to convince him of his
> > > innocence: He only wanted to lead the horses to better pastures. By
now
> > the
> > > pursuer is questioned by his boss: Why didn't he kill the Indian- he
had
> > > been ordered to cause Indian trouble in the area.  He tried, but
Little
> > Hawk
> > > was too quick. And he tells his boss that the Padre has seen Little
Hawk
> > > steal the mission ponies, while Little Hawk was thinking he took a
nap.
> > Now
> > > they plan a lynch mob to cause trouble with the Indians. When the
editor
> > > sees the mob coming, he quickly warns the sheriff. Sheriff Hollister
> knows
> > > that they do not have much of a chance against all and takes Little
Hawk
> > to
> > > the mission through the back door, riding with two other cowboys and
> asks
> > > the editor: "Do you think you can hold them up until we are gone?"
> "Well,
> > I
> > > think so, they are not mad at me ... yet." He answers.
> > >
> > > http://www.ponilla.org/Nimoy/TVFilms_Tombstone.htm
> > >
> > > ---------------------------------
> > >
> > > The actions of the authorities so angered the people, that on the
night
> of
> > > August 9th, a group of them, wearing masks and cloaks, broke into the
> > jail,
> > > bound up the jailer and proceeded to drag the prisoner from his cell.
> They
> > > tied a rope around his neck and looped the end of it around the bars
of
> > the
> > > jailhouse door. Pulling up on the rope, they drew him hard up to the
> door
> > > until he died of strangulation. In this manner, William Otis Hall
became
> > the
> > > first known victim of a lynch mob in the central coast region.
> > >
> > > A flurry of such activities was quick to follow, including, in 1856,
the
> > > hanging of three Indians who were suspects in the murders of Francois
> > Picart
> > > and A. Mellon in the Carmel Valley. Also in 1856, two brothers, Juan
and
> > > Jose Alvitre, both hard cases who had served time at San Quentin, died
> at
> > > the hands of the vigilance committee in Monterey. The following year,
> the
> > > infamous Anastacio Garcia was found hanging from the beams in the same
> > cell
> > > where Otis Hall had met his fate five years earlier. The lynchings
> > continued
> > > on into the next decade with the executions of Carmel Indian Gregoria,
> who
> > > admitted shooting John Martin in the valley on January 6, 1864, and
Juan
> > > Valenzuela for the murder of Natividad store keeper Frank Johnson
during
> > the
> > > month of September, 1866.
> > >
> > > http://www.santacruzpl.org/history/crime/pajaro2.shtml
> > >
> > > --------------------------------
> > >
> > > Their arraignment took place on June 6, 1986, in the Nazareth office
of
> > > District Justice Elmo Frey Jr. The unprovoked bank murders aroused
> > > law-abiding citizens of Allentown as no earlier crime had done. A
lynch
> > mob
> > > formed, and state troopers were brought in to protect the killers. "It
> was
> > > scary," said Appel.
> > >
> > > The following morning someone spray-painted "Hang 'Em High" on the
side
> of
> > > Appel's trailer.
> > >
> > > http://www.cybersleuths.com/billkelly/bkchap3.htm
> > >
> > > -------------------------------
> > >
> > > Only once in its history has the United States Supreme Court conducted
a
> > > criminal trial.  The trial, taking place in both Tennessee and the
> > District
> > > of Columbia in 1907 and 1908, resulted in the conviction of a sheriff,
a
> > > deputy sheriff, and four members of a Chattanooga lynch mob.  Outraged
> > > justices ordered the trial on criminal contempt charges after an
almost
> > > certainly innocent black man, having been convicted of raping a white
> > woman,
> > > was lynched less than a day after word reached Chattanooga that his
> > > scheduled execution had been stayed by the U. S. Supreme Court...
> > >
> > > ...Word of Johnson's arrest spread quickly. That evening a large
> > crowd--many
> > > carrying guns--gathered in front of the Hamilton County Jail.  Bullets
> > were
> > > fired into the sky.  Nevada Taylor's younger brother adds fuel to the
> fire
> > > in a brief speech he delivers to the mob:  "The time for justice and
> > > punishment has come.  We want the Negro.  He must be punished for what
> he
> > > did to my sister."  Soon one member of the mob stepped forward to tell
> > > Captain George Brown, second in command at the jail, that he would
allow
> > > five minutes for someone to turn over the keys or he would lead a
> violent
> > > assault on the jail.  No keys were delivered. Leaders of the mob
grabbed
> a
> > > steel post and began ramming it against the front door.  Others in the
> mob
> > > took over the electric plant, throwing the jail into darkness.  Men
> stole
> > > sledgehammers from a nearby blacksmith shop and started working on
> hinges
> > of
> > > the heavy door.
> > >
> > > The jail sustained heavy damage from the attack, but there was to be
no
> > > lynching of Ed Johnson--at least not yet.  Deputies and members of
Troop
> B
> > > of the National Guard--ordered to the scene by Governor Cox--arrived
at
> > the
> > > jail.  A group of deputies succeeded in grabbing away the
sledgehammers.
> > > Minutes later, Judge Samuel McReynolds showed up.  "The jury is in,
> Judge,
> > > we find him guilty and sentence him to hang by the neck until dead,"
one
> > man
> > > in the crowd announces.  McReynolds replied, "Go home."  Then the
judge
> > told
> > > the crowd that the man they were looking for was not in the jail, that
> he
> > > had been sent to Knoxville a few hours earlier.  (In fact, Johnson had
> > been
> > > sent to Nashville.)  McReynolds offered to let five men from the
> > > disbelieving crowd inspect the jail: "See for yourself he is not
there."
> > > After a cell-by-cell search, the five chosen men told the crowd that
the
> > > judge was right: Johnson was gone.
> > >
> > > http://tinyurl.com/wduk
> > >
> > > ----------------------------
> > >
> > > LYNCHING. Lynching is the illegal killing of a person under the
pretext
> of
> > > service to justice, race, or tradition. Though it often refers to
> hanging,
> > > the word became a generic term for any form of execution without due
> > process
> > > of law. Though it is hard to estimate the frequency of lynchings
before
> > the
> > > 1880s, it seems that they occurred only sporadically before 1865, and
> were
> > > likely to be the result of "frontier justice" dispensed in areas where
> > > formal legal systems did not exist.
> > >
> > > In antebellum Texasqv and earlier, vigilantes instigated most
lynchings.
> > > Often acting under the leadership of the local elite, the vigilante
mob
> > > usually handled its victims with considerable formality, imitating
legal
> > > court procedure. The captured offender was "tried" before a vigilante
> > judge
> > > and a jury consisting of either a select group of vigilantes or the
> whole
> > of
> > > the assembled mob. Convictions most often resulted in whipping,
followed
> > by
> > > expulsion from the community, but at least seventeen vigilante
> > organizations
> > > resorted to the noose, claiming some 140 lives. The earliest of these
> > > groups, the Shelby County Regulators of 1840-44, killed at least ten
> > people
> > > during the Regulator-Moderator War.qv The San Saba County lynchers,
the
> > > deadliest of the lot, claimed some twenty-five victims between 1880
and
> > > 1896. Vigilante lynching died out in the 1890s, but other varieties of
> > mobs
> > > continued.
> > >
> > > It is uncertain when the first of the non-vigilante lynch mobs
appeared
> in
> > > Texas, but certainly they increased in frequency with the approach of
> the
> > > Civil War.qv In the five years preceding the war, mobs frequently
sought
> > out
> > > suspected slave rebels and white abolitionists. The most serious
> outbreak
> > of
> > > this sort occurred in North Texas in 1860, when rumors of a slave
> > > insurrection led to the lynching of an estimated thirty to fifty
slaves
> > and
> > > possibly more than twenty whites (see TEXAS TROUBLES, SLAVE
> > INSURRECTIONS).
> > > The stresses of the Civil War, such as racism, regional loyalties,
> > political
> > > factionalism, economic tension, and the growth of the abolition
> movement,
> > > inured people to violence in a way that seemed to make lynching
> > increasingly
> > > easy to contemplate. War-generated tensions produced the greatest mass
> > > lynching in the history of the state, the Great Hanging at
> Gainesville,qv
> > > when vigilantes hanged forty-one suspected Unionists during a
> thirteen-day
> > > period in October 1862.
> > >
> > > The use of organized terror by lynch mobs appeared in Texas during
> > > Reconstruction as the Ku Klux Klanqqv and similar organizations
resorted
> > to
> > > violent methods of restoring white supremacy. The humiliation of
defeat,
> > > increasing idleness and violence, mistrust of all levels of
government,
> > > alteration of the traditional racial order, and fear of violence by
> blacks
> > > all contributed to a great outbreak of lynch-mob activity and
instilled
> in
> > > many whites a belief in a "right to lynch." The Klan declined in Texas
> in
> > > the early 1870s and experienced a brief resurgence in the 1920s.
> > Immediately
> > > after Reconstruction, lynch law evidently declined somewhat, but it
soon
> > > increased again, and began to be characterized by events in which mobs
> > > removed victims from legal custody, sometimes with the cooperation of
> > legal
> > > authorities. In 1885 an estimated twenty-two mobs lynched forty-three
> > > people, including nineteen blacks and twenty-four whites, one of whom
> was
> > > female. After this the number of lynching victims generally decreased,
> > > dropping to five in 1893, but increased again to twenty-six in 1897.
The
> > > number of victims continued to decline (to twenty-three in 1908 and
> > fifteen
> > > in 1909) until 1915, when there were thirty-two. The 1915 figure,
which
> is
> > > probably an underestimate, reflected an increase in racial hostility
> that
> > > accompanied the spread of Jim Crow laws and border troubles growing
out
> of
> > > the Mexican Revolution.qv Six mobs in Cameron, Willacy, and Hidalgo
> > counties
> > > accounted for twenty-six of the victims. In 1922 thirteen mobs claimed
> > > fifteen victims. After this there was a sharp decline; 1925 was the
> first
> > > lynching-free year. The Sherman Riotqv in 1930, however, was a notable
> > > example of racial violence committed by a mob. After 1930 there was
> never
> > > more than one mob a year. Six years without a lynching preceded the
> final
> > > clear-cut case, the lynching of accused rapist William Vinson at
> Texarkana
> > > on July 13, 1942.
> > >
> > > Texas stands third among the states, after Mississippi and Georgia, in
> the
> > > total number of lynching victims. Of the 468 victims in Texas between
> 1885
> > > and 1942, 339 were black, 77 white, 53 Hispanic, and 1 Indian. Half of
> the
> > > white victims died between 1885 and 1889, and 53 percent of the
> Hispanics
> > > died in the 1915 troubles. Between 1889 and 1942 charges of murder or
> > > attempted murder precipitated at least 40 percent of the mobs; rape or
> > > attempted rape accounted for 26 percent. Blacks were more likely to be
> > > lynched for rape than were members of other groups, although even
among
> > > blacks murder-related charges accounted for 40 percent of the
lynchings
> > and
> > > rape for only 32 percent. All but 15 of the 322 lynching incidents
that
> > have
> > > a known locality occurred in the eastern half of the state. The
heaviest
> > > concentration of mob activity was along the Brazos River from Waco to
> the
> > > Gulf of Mexico, where eleven counties accounted for 20 percent of all
> > lynch
> > > mobs. Other concentrations were in Harrison and neighboring counties
on
> > the
> > > Louisiana border, adjacent to Caddo Parish, Louisiana, one of the most
> > > lynching-prone areas in the country, and in Lamar and surrounding
> counties
> > > in Northeast Texas.
> > >
> > > Texans also made important contributions to the antilynching movement.
> > Part
> > > of this was unintentional: the gruesome and widely publicized 1893
> > > torture-burning of Henry Smith before an assembly of thousands at
Paris
> > > helped galvanize the infant antilynching movement into action. In a
more
> > > positive vein, Texas native Jessie Daniel Amesqv of Georgetown founded
> and
> > > served as president of the Association of Southern Women for the
> > Prevention
> > > of Lynching,qv the most effective antilynching group in the country.
The
> > > legislature passed an antilynching law in 1897, governors called out
the
> > > Texas Volunteer Guard to help defend prisoners on numerous occasions,
> and
> > > local officers sometimes went to great lengths to protect their
> prisoners.
> > >
> > > BIBLIOGRAPHY: Norman D. Brown, Hood, Bonnet, and Little Brown Jug:
Texas
> > > Politics, 1921-1928 (College Station: Texas A&M University Press,
1984).
> > > David Chapman, Lynching in Texas (M.A. thesis, Texas Tech University,
> > 1973).
> > > Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, Revolt Against Chivalry: Jessie Daniel Ames and
the
> > > Women's Campaign Against Lynching (New York: Columbia University
Press,
> > > 1979). Lawrence D. Rice, The Negro in Texas, 1874-1900 (Baton Rouge:
> > > Louisiana State University Press, 1971). John Ross, At the Bar of
Judge
> > > Lynch: Lynching and Lynch Mobs in America (Ph.D. dissertation, Texas
> Tech
> > > University, 1983). Allen W. Trelease, White Terror: The Ku Klux Klan
> > > Conspiracy and Southern Reconstruction (New York: Harper and Row,
1971).
> > >
> > > John R. Ross
> > > http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook/online/articles/view/LL/jgl1.html
> > >
> > > -----------------------------------
> > >
> > > III.  LAW ON THE ISLAND
> > >
> > > As noted at the outset of this essay, numerous episodes of Gilligan's
> > Island
> > > contain legal references, and many employ legal themes as their
central
> > > storyline. In Episode 7, entitled "The Sound of Quacking," for
example,
> > > Gilligan dreams that he is Marshal Gilligan, a lawman of the Old West.
> > > Despite the demands of a lynch mob (led by the Professor and Mr.
> Howell),
> > he
> > > refuses to surrender the object of the crowd's bloodlust: a duck they
> want
> > > to turn into dinner.
> > >
> > > In Episode 13, entitled "Three Million Dollars More or Less," Gilligan
> > wins
> > > $ 3 million from Mr. Howell in a golf game. When it comes time to pay,
> Mr.
> > > Howell uses a convoluted explanation of the federal tax laws to
convince
> > > Gilligan that receiving stock in a (worthless) oil company is better
> than
> > > getting cash.
> > >
> > > In Episode 16, entitled "Plant You Now, Dig You Later,"
> > >
> > > LEGAL TALES FROM GILLIGAN'S ISLAND
> > > http://www.law.utexas.edu/lpop/etext/jarvis.htm
> > >
> > > ------------------------------------
> > >
> > > In one of the most compelling scenes in the film, as the children
begin
> > > taking a shortcut home, four cars noisily converge on the jail from
the
> > > Meridian Highway. The children hide and watch from the cover of the
> > bushes.
> > > The armed men get out of their cars and surround Atticus - they are a
> > > self-appointed lynch mob that has gathered to take justice into its
own
> > > hands after diverting Sheriff Tate. To get a closer look, the three
kids
> > run
> > > over to the cars. Scout, in particular, who is oblivious to the
danger,
> > > pushes her way through the crowd to glimpse her stern-faced father -
he
> > > immediately fears for their safety. While Jem stands by his father and
> > > stubbornly refuses to leave after his father's command, a stalwart
Scout
> > > faces down the crowd and sees someone she recognizes. She conducts an
> > > innocent, uninhibited exchange with Walter Cunningham Sr., and engages
> him
> > > in a disarming, candid, yet humanized conversation. Scout makes him
> > > uncomfortable in front of the mob:
> > >
> > > I said, 'Hey,' Mr. Cunningham. How's your entailment getting along?
(He
> > > turns and looks away.) Don't you remember me, Mr. Cunningham? I'm Jean
> > > Louise Finch. You brought us some hickory nuts one early morning,
> > remember?
> > > We had a talk. I went and got my daddy to come out and thank you. I go
> to
> > > school with your boy. I go to school with Walter. He's a nice boy.
Tell
> > him
> > > 'hey' for me, won't you? You know something, Mr. Cunningham,
entailments
> > are
> > > bad. Entailments...(She suddenly becomes self-conscious) Atticus, I
was
> > just
> > > saying to Mr. Cunningham that entailments were bad but not to worry.
> Takes
> > a
> > > long time sometimes...(To the men who are staring up at her) What's
the
> > > matter? I sure meant no harm, Mr. Cunningham.
> > >
> > > Scout's words cause him to break up the potential lynching. The
> > embarrassed
> > > crowd disbands.
> > >
> > > To Kill A Mockingbird (1962)
> > > http://www.filmsite.org/toki2.html
> > >
> > > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> >
> > I see that the constitution itself uses the phrase "until proven
guilty",
> > but it still makes sense to say this in the best way, which to me is
> > "unless proven guilty".
> >
> > I wonder if this isn't a case of status quo reigning over common sense.
> >
> >
>
>
>

Thanks for the mildly insulting but unimaginative
comment. : -)