TURMEL: #5 Big Five Appeals Decisions: Hitzig

DGS: Doherty, Goudge, Simmons JJ.A.

DGS: [104] Even apart from these criminal sanctions for non-
compliance, the MMAR constitute significant state 
interference with the human dignity of those who need 
marihuana for medical purposes. 

JCT: Notice how they keep blaming the MMAR "bad permission" 
for the effects of the CDSA "prohibition system." 
Mislabelling the problem has to have a reason. Regardless, 
as long as we can keep clear that it's the prohibition 
system that's violating all these rights, who cares what the 
elderly judges think as long as they can be appealed? 

DGS: To take the medication they require they must apply for 
an ATP, comply with the detailed requirements of that 
process, and then attempt to acquire their medication in the 
very limited ways contemplated by the MMAR. These 
constraints are imposed by the state as part of the justice 
system's control of access to marihuana. 

JCT: The constraints imposed by the CDSA. Seems they just 
can't seem to focus on the CDSA prohibition. 

DGS: As such, they are state actions sufficient to 
constitute a deprivation of the security of the person of 
those who must take marihuana for medical purposes. They are 
state actions within the administration of justice that 
stand between those in medical need and the marihuana they 
require.

JCT: And with all those corpses around, they failed to reach 
the conclusion that the right to life is involved. 

DGS: [105] In summary, we conclude that the MMAR constitute 
a scheme of medical exemption which deprives those who need 
to take marihuana for medical purposes of the rights to 
liberty and security of the person. 

JCT: It's the CDSA that deprives, the MMAR fails to provide. 
Interesting how they just can't accept that it's the CDSA 
prohibition and not the MMAR prohibition that's the problem. 

DGS: This is a threshold violation of s. 7. We are therefore 
required to turn to the question of whether this deprivation 
is in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.

JCT: Remember, so far they are ignoring the corpses and 
they're going to debate whether there was sufficient balance 
against their rights to liberty and security, not life. 

DGS: (c) Stage two: Is the threshold violation inconsistent 
with the principles of fundamental justice?

(1) Introduction

[106] The phrase "the principles of fundamental justice" in 
s. 7 is of necessity general and abstract. 

JCT: Maybe to them but I thought I explained to them rather 
well. I guess they're not only forgetful but also slow 
learners. 

DGS: The court must articulate with as much precision as 
possible the core principles of our legal system engaged by 
the specific state action in issue and the specific alleged 
deprivation of the individual's rights. In articulating the 
operative principles, the court must avoid describing those 
principles at a level of generality that suggests little 
more than a personal assessment of the wisdom of the 
impugned state conduct. The principles of fundamental 
justice are not the constitutional equivalent of equity's 
Chancellor's foot: Rodriguez, supra, at 590-91.

[107] Context is crucial to both the identification of the 
operative principles of fundamental justice and the 
determination of whether any threshold violation of an 
individual's rights under s. 7 is consistent with the 
principles of fundamental justice at play: R. v. White, 
supra, at 436-40. The Hitzig applicants assert the right to 
make a fundamental personal decision concerning how best to 
treat serious symptoms associated with life threatening 
medical problems: R. v. Parker, supra, at 228-29. 

JCT: Oh that's right. So far, they're only dealing with 
Alan Young's weaker Hitzig claim for liberty and security. 
They still have to deal with life when they get to us. But 
like Lederman, they'll probably duck our real issue once 
they've filled this judgment with off-target musings. 

DGS: The Government has recognized since 1999, that for some 
seriously ill individuals, marihuana is a medically useful 
and appropriate medication. The Government has accepted that 
those individuals must be able to obtain and use marihuana 
for medical purposes without fear of criminal prosecution. 
At the same time, however, the Government is obliged to 
protect the public health and safety of all of its citizens 
through the regulation of the medicinal use of substances 
like marihuana. 

JCT: Notice they didn't have the audacity to call marijuana 
a "dangerous substance." Protect public health from 
"substances like marijuana" is silly when we realize that 
there are many other non-toxic, non-fatal substances like 
marijuana. Government has to protect us from other no-toxic 
substances? Of course, they've assume tacitly that the 
substances that are like marijuana are cocaine and heroin. 
Passing on a false premise by tacit mis-labelling. 
 
DGS: The Government contends that public health and safety 
concerns include potential health risks from long-term use, 
the Government's need to comply with stringent international 
controls on the use and distribution of marihuana, and the 
Government's obligation to combat the criminal drug trade, 
which includes the illicit distribution of marihuana for 
non-medical purposes.

JCT: Notice the word "potential." No proof after 80 years 
and still worrying about "potential" harms is laughable to 
any real scientist. 

DGS: [108] The nature of the individual right asserted and 
the purpose animating the Government action are important 
contextual considerations at the second stage of the s. 7 
analysis. The actual effect of the state action is an 
equally important contextual consideration. State action 
that may on its face be benign or even promote individual 
interests may, in its actual operation, be inconsistent with 
the principles of fundamental justice: R. v. Morgentaler, 
supra. The Hitzig applicants stress the effects of the 
scheme implemented by the MMAR in asserting a violation of 
their s. 7 rights both in respect of the supply issue and 
the eligibility issue.

(2) The supply issue and the principles of fundamental 
justice

[109] It is undeniable that the effect of the MMAR is to 
force individuals entitled to possess and use marihuana for 
medical purposes to purchase that medicine from the black 
market. 

JCT: It is undeniable that the effect of the CDSA is to 
force them there. The effect of the MMAR is to not allow 
them out. They keep mislabelling the bad law. This has to 
have a reason. 

DGS: As Lederman J. put it at para. 159: 

"As a result, the regulatory system set in place by the MMAR 
to allow people with a demonstrated medical need to obtain 
marijuana simply cannot work without relying on criminal 
conduct and lax law enforcement." 

[110] Lederman J. found that the absence of a legal supply 
of marihuana for people entitled to possess and use it under 
the MMAR resulted in a breach of s. 7, holding at para. 160:

"To my mind, this aspect of the scheme offends the basic 
tenets of our legal system. It is inconsistent with the 
principles of fundamental justice to deny a legal source of 
marijuana to people who have been granted ATPs and licences 
to produce. Quite simply, it does not lie in the 
government's mouth to ask people to consort with criminals 
to access their constitutional rights."

[111] We agree with the conclusion reached by Lederman J. He 
does not, however, expressly identify the principle or 
principles of fundamental justice which he finds are 
violated by the failure to provide for a legal source of 
supply. In attempting to identify that principle or 
principles, we begin with the words of Lamer J. (as he then 
was) in the seminal case of Reference re s. 94(2) of the 
Motor Vehicle Act (British Columbia), [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486 at 
503, 512: 

"In other words, the principles of fundamental justice are 
to be found in the basic tenets of our legal system. They do 
not lie in the realm of general public policy, but in the 
inherent domain of the judiciary as guardian of the justice 
system."

[T]hey [the principles of fundamental justice] represent 
principles which have been recognized by common law, the 
international conventions, and by the very fact of 
entrenchment in the Charter, as essential elements of a 
system for the administration of justice which is founded 
upon a belief in the dignity of the human person and the 
rule of law. 

[112] The rule of law, identified by Lamer J. as a bulwark 
of our administration of justice, has been described as "the 
root of our system of government" and a "highly textured 
expression, importing many things": Reference re Secession 
of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 at 257. Several principles of 
fundamental justice, including some which are entrenched in 
the Charter, trace their roots to various components of the 
rule of law (e.g., s. 9, s. 11(g), s. 11(h)). At its most 
general level, the rule of law refers to the regulation of 
the relationship between the state and individuals by pre-
established and knowable laws. The state, no less than the 
individuals it governs, must be subject to and obey the law: 
Reference Re Manitoba Language Rights, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 730 
at 748-51; Reference Re Amendment of the Constitution of 
Canada, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753 at 805-06; and R. v. Campbell; 
R. v. Shirose, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 565 at 582-83. 

[113] The state's obligation to obey the law is central to 
the very existence of the rule of law. Without this 
obligation, there would be no enforceable limit on the 
state's power over individuals. Human dignity, the second 
essential component of the administration of justice 
identified by Lamer J. in Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor 
Vehicle Act8 supra, could not long survive a system where 
the Government was free to do as it saw fit without regard 
to established laws.

[114] The state's obligation to obey its own laws not only 
serves as an invaluable brake on the exercise of state power 
against the individual, it also makes the state a role model 
for its citizens. By adhering to the law, the state 
encourages its citizenry to do likewise: Rodriguez, supra, 
at 608. Because it obeys and honours the law, the state can 
assume the moral high ground, which justifies state 
prosecution and punishment of individuals who break the law. 
As the entrapment jurisprudence demonstrates, loss of that 
moral high ground, through for example, active solicitation 
of criminal conduct, will foreclose prosecution by the 
state: R. v. Mack, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 903.

[115] The state's obligation to obey the law is fundamental 
to our system of justice. No one would argue that it does 
not have general acceptance among reasonable people: 
Rodriguez, supra, at 607. The state's obligation to obey the 
law is well established at common law through the process of 
judicial review, is implicitly recognized in the preamble to 
the Constitution Act, 1867, (U.K.), 30 and 31 Vict., c. 3, 
is expressly recognized in the preamble to the Constitution 
Act, 1982, and is further recognized in s. 52 of the 
Constitution Act, 1982. We have no hesitation in concluding 
that the state's obligation to obey the law is a principle 
of fundamental justice.

[116] The MMAR do not require the state to violate the law. 
They do, however, create an alliance between the Government 
and the black market whereby the Government authorizes 
possession of marihuana for medical purposes and the black 
market supplies the necessary product. The MMAR provide a 
viable medical exemption to the prohibition against 
possession of marihuana only as long as there are 
individuals who are prepared to commit a crime by supplying 
the necessary medical marihuana to the individuals that the 
Government has determined are entitled to use the drug. At 
the same time, the MMAR force seriously ill individuals who 
have been found to be in need of medical marihuana to 
consort with criminals to fill that medical need. 

JCT: Notice the mislabelling again. It's not the MMAR 
permission system that forces them to the black market, it's 
the CDSA prohibition system. The MMAR just fails to let them 
out of the black market. They keep mislabelling the bad law 
and I'll keep correcting them. 

DGS: Forcing sick people to go to the black market to get 
their medicine can only discourage respect for the law and 
at the same time signal that the medical needs of these 
people are somehow not worthy of the same kind of 
consideration as other medical needs. 

[117] A Government scheme that depends on the criminal 
element to deliver the medically necessary product, and that 
drives those in need of that product to the black market 
strikes at the same values that underlie the state's 
obligation to obey the law. The MMAR, far from placing the 
Government in the position of a positive role model or on 
the moral high ground, are calculated to bring the law into 
disrepute and devalue the worth and dignity of those 
individuals to whom the MMAR are applied. The Government's 
obligation to obey the law must include an obligation to 
promote compliance with and respect for the law. 

[118] The inevitable consequences of the absence of a legal 
source of marihuana for those who have been determined to be 
in medical need of the drug are inconsistent with the 
fundamental principle that the state must obey and promote 
compliance with the law. In our view, the absence of a legal 
source of supply renders the MMAR inconsistent with the 
principles of fundamental justice. 

[119] There is an alternative approach to the second stage 
of the s. 7 inquiry which also leads to the conclusion that 
the provisions in the MMAR are inconsistent with the 
principles of fundamental justice. This alternative approach 
begins by recognizing that it is a principle of fundamental 
justice within our legal system that the individual rights 
identified in s. 7 may be subordinated, at least to some 
extent, to substantial and compelling collective interests: 
Godbout v. Longueuil (City), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 844 at 898-900, 
per La Forest J.; and R. v. Pan (1999), 134 C.C.C. (3d) 1 at 
61-62 (Ont. C.A.), aff'd [2001] 2 S.C.R. 344 at 386-89. 

[120] The application of this approach to the principles of 
fundamental justice requires that the court determine 
whether there is a substantial and compelling state interest 
served by the impugned state action which has resulted in 
the threshold violation of the individual rights identified 
in s. 7. 

JCT: There has to be a different standard for the state's 
interest that deprives someone of their liberty or security 
versus when it deprives someone of their life. Not being 
specific allows the court keep looking at the Young's weaker 
straw rights and ignore Parker's power right to life. Of 
course, it's easier for them to then comply with the weaker 
rights and claim the MMAR now works. Remember, now that PPS 
mails to doctors, they say that hurdle is met. 

DGS: If the action is in furtherance of a substantial and 
compelling interest, then the question becomes whether the 
state action imposes an undue burden on the individual's 
rights: R. v. Beare, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 387 at 401-04. 
Determining when the balance struck by the state can be said 
to effect a fair balance between state interests and 
individual rights can be a very difficult question which 
pushes the court to the brink of the forbidden world of 
policy-driven decision making.

JCT: Especially if you want to keep letting 10 epileptics a  
day die for nothing like these judges seem to think is 
necessary.

DGS: [121] In this case, however, the Government's attempt 
to rely on the assertion that the MMAR serve a substantial 
and compelling collective interest justifying the absence of 
any legal source of medical marihuana fails at its most 
basic level. The substantial and compelling interest 
advanced by the Government is the need to preserve and 
promote public health and safety. We accept that this can be 
a substantial and compelling collective interest for the 
purposes of s. 7 of the Charter. However, a scheme which 
depends on the criminal black market and which forces 
individuals to go to the black market to obtain necessary 
medical treatment cannot possibly further public health and 
safety. In fact, it has the opposite effect. By failing to 
provide for a lawful source of medical marihuana, the MMAR 
not only compromise individual rights, but undermine the 
very collective interests which the Government contends are 
promoted by these regulations. Lederman J. made this point 
at paras. 161, 163: 

"That the Government relies on the criminal underworld in 
this manner is rather surprising when it has declared that 
the goals of the MMAR and its interlocking regulatory scheme 
include controlling the illicit drug trade and upholding 
Canada's international narcotics control obligations." 
As a result, production licences offer the applicants an 
illusory remedy which can only be accessed through reliance 
on black market distributors. Despite ostensibly being 
concerned with avoiding diversion and illegal use of 
marihuana, to say nothing of conforming with international 
drug conventions, the MMAR force medical marihuana users 
into the arms of suppliers whom the state has deemed 
criminal drug dealers. This position is untenable, and is 
certainly not consistent with the principles of fundamental 
justice." 

[122] Our conclusion that a scheme which does not provide 
for lawful access to medical marihuana is inconsistent with 
s. 7 of the Charter should not surprise anyone who has read 
this court's decision in R. v. Parker, supra, or the 
decision of the Alberta Court of Queen's Bench in R. v. 
Krieger (2000), 225 D.L.R. (4th) 164, aff'd (2003), 225 
D.L.R. (4th) 183 (C.A.), leave to appeal sought by Canada: 
[2003] S.C.C.A. No. 114 (QL). Although neither case dealt 
with the MMAR, both made it clear that any medical exception 
to the criminal prohibition against possession of marihuana 
would have to address not just possession, but also the 
means of obtaining the drug needed for the medical purpose. 

JCT: That's my "possession for the purpose of trafficking in 
something medically necessary." 

DGS: In determining that the prohibition against cultivation 
of marihuana in the former Narcotic Control Act was 
unconstitutional absent an adequate medical exception, 
Rosenberg J.A. said in Parker, at 249-50: To conclude, the 
deprivation of Parker's right to liberty and security of the 
person because of the complete prohibition on the possession 
of cultivation of marihuana in the former Narcotics Control 
Act does little or nothing to enhance the state interest. In 
my view, Parker established that his rights under s. 7 were 
violated by the absolute prohibition of cultivation of 
marihuana in the Narcotics Control Act. Parker has no 
practical means of obtaining the drug for his medical needs. 
I did not understand the Crown to suggest that we should 
distinguish between the possession and cultivation for 
medical use, for the purpose of the s. 7 analysis.

[123] Rosenberg JA reached the same conclusion with respect 
to the cultivation prohibition in the CDSA, saying, at 262-
63: 
However, it is apparent from these reasons and the reasons 
dealing with the cultivation offence under the Narcotics 
Control Act that if the cultivation prohibition had been 
before this court, I would hold that it too infringes 
Parker's s. 7 rights. Since there is no legal source of 
supply of marihuana, Parker's only practical way of 
obtaining marihuana for his medical needs is to cultivate 
it. In this way, he avoids having to interact with the 
illicit market and can provide some quality control. 
[Emphasis added.]

JCT: Shouldn't this be a defence to all trafficking charges? 
Even if I did possess for the purpose of trafficking, as 
long as it's medicine, what's the beef? 

DGS: [124] We read Rosenberg JA as requiring "a practical 
way of obtaining" the necessary medical marihuana as an 
integral part of any legitimate medical exemption. We also 
read him as clearly eliminating the black market as a 
suitable means of obtaining the necessary medical 
marihuana.[10]
([10] We see no inconsistency between the holding in Parker 
and this court's refusal in the subsequent case of Wakeford 
v. Canada (2002), 58 OR (3d) 65 (C.A.) to make an order 
compelling the Government to supply marihuana to the holder 
of a medical exemption. Nothing said in Parker, or in this 
case, compels the Government to supply marihuana to anyone.)

JCT: Of course, that's not our straw horse. We're not asking 
that they supply, we're asking that they stop impeding 
supply. I know it sounds the same but they're not and the 
judges never seem to have grasped the difference.  
 
DGS: (Furthermore, the refusal to make the order in Wakeford 
was based on specific findings of fact, including the fact 
that the Government did not have access to a safe supply of 
marihuana. Those facts were supported by the evidence 
adduced in Wakeford, but some of them are inconsistent with 
the evidence heard in this case.)

JCT: How about Terry being able to qualify as an integral 
part of the exemption, which means doctor participation as 
an integral part of the exemption. As long as the doctor can 
refuse, and is advised to refuse, then it impedes someone's 
rights somewhere. No doctors, no workable MMAR. Period. 

DGS: [125] The trial judge in R. v. Krieger, supra, 
concluded that the cultivation prohibition in the CDSA was 
unconstitutional, opining at 178-79: 

"Obtaining a s. 56 exemption from the Minister of Health 
triggers the absurdity that an individual who has been 
granted an exemption has the legal right to produce, possess 
and use cannabis marihuana. However, in order to obtain the 
product, the individual is required to participate in an 
illegal act, since whoever sells the exempted person either 
the raw cannabis marihuana or the seeds to grow their own 
does so in breach of s. 5(2) of the CDSA."

I am not satisfied that the absurdity that I mentioned above 
has been properly addressed. In my view, when a minister has 
the discretion to allow someone an exemption to produce and 
use a substance for proper medical purposes, that substance 
must be something that is available to the individual by 
legal means at the time exemption is granted. As a s. 56 
exemption has no practical purpose without a legal source 
for cannabis marihuana, s. 56 cannot serve to delineate the 
boundaries of the Applicant's s. 7 rights or to justify 
violation of those boundaries. [Emphasis added.]

[126] In affirming the trial decision, the Alberta Court of 
Appeal said, at para. 5: 

"We agree with the trial judge that s. 56 [CDSA] creates an 
absurdity because there was no legal source of marihuana. 
That absurdity is not removed by the fact that the 
respondent had a personal supply at the time the charge was 
laid. There is no evidence as to how long the supply would 
last nor as to the duration of the potential s. 56 
exemption."

[127] The previous appellate decisions dealing with the 
constitutionality of medical exemptions to the prohibition 
against marihuana possession point directly at the result 
reached by Lederman J. on the supply issue. 

[128] Thus, we conclude that in setting up a scheme of 
medical exemption which depends on an illicit source of 
supply, the MMAR do not accord with the principles of 
fundamental justice.

(3) The eligibility issue and the principles of fundamental 
justice 

JCT: Here's where the Parker issue is raised and where the 
Hitzig lawyers got permission to argue our case for us too. 

[129] Before Lederman J., the Hitzig applicants argued that 
in depriving those who need to use marihuana of their rights 
to liberty and security of the person, the MMAR do not 
accord with the principles of fundamental justice because 
they throw up so many barriers to eligibility for a medical 
exemption  a crock. They may satisfy judicial 
performance standards but certainly not engineering 
standards. Imagine, engineers getting off for their bridges 
falling down because a few don't! It's like Alice in 
Justiceland. You can never tell when bad performance will 
pass and when ideal performance will get rejected. 

DGS: [131] On their cross-appeal, the Hitzig applicants seek 
to reverse that finding in this court. In addressing the 
eligibility issue, they raised a number of aspects of the 
MMAR in their written material: the daily dosage limits 
imposed by the scheme; the reliance on physicians to 
determine if marihuana is needed by the individual; and the 
requirement for support from specialists to qualify, unless 
the individual is terminally ill. In argument, the focus was 
very much on the last of these. 
 
[132] We will deal with each of these in turn, but in the 
end we differ with Lederman J.'s. conclusion in only one 
respect. In our view, only the requirement for a second 
specialist for individuals in category 3 has been shown by 
these applicants not to accord with the principles of 
fundamental justice.

JCT: An unnecessary extra 2 doctors is bad but an 
unnecessary 1 doctor isn't? 

DGS: [133] The legal context for this analysis is best 
provided by the balancing approach to the principles of 
fundamental justice that we already have described. Here, it 
is useful to begin with the words of McLachlin J. (as she 
then was) in Cunningham v. Canada, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 143 at 
151-52: 

"The principles of fundamental justice are concerned not 
only with the interest of the person who claims his liberty 
has been limited, but with the protection of society. 
Fundamental justice requires that a fair balance be struck 
between these interests, both substantively and 
procedurally." [Emphasis added.]

JCT: And that's why it's so important that they keep the 
evidence on life, or taking of it, out of the discussion. 
10,000 dead epileptics since the Parker Court made their 
first genocidal mistake in 2000 by suspending a right to 
life for a year is a hard issue to delve into. 

DGS: [134] This approach is elaborated in Godbout, supra, at 
899-900, where La Forest J. said this on behalf of the three 
judges who dealt with s. 7 in that case: 

"But just as this Court has relied on specific principles or 
policies to guide its analysis in particular cases, it has 
also acknowledged that looking to "the principles of 
fundamental justice" often involves the more general 
endeavour of balancing the constitutional right of the 
individual claimant against the countervailing interests of 
the state. In other words, deciding whether the principles of 
fundamental justice have been respected in a particular case 
has been understood not only as requiring that the 
infringement at issue be evaluated in light of a specific 
principle pertinent to the case, but also as permitting a 
broader inquiry into whether the right of life, liberty or 
security of the person asserted by the individual can, in 
the circumstances, justifiably be violated given the 
interests or purposes sought to be advanced in doing so." 

JCT: So can all those epileptics's lives be justifiably 
violated to protect society from a non-toxic herb? No. 

"To my mind, performing this balancing test in considering 
the fundamental justice aspect of s. 7 is both eminently 
sensible and perfectly consistent with the aim and import of 
that provision, since the notion that individual rights may, 
in some circumstances, be subordinated to substantial and 
compelling collective interests is itself a basic tenet of 
our legal system lying at or very near the core of our most 
deeply rooted juridical convictions. We need look no further 
than the Charter itself to be satisfied of this. Expressed 
in the language of s. 7, the notion of balancing individual 
rights against collective interests itself reflects what may 
rightfully be termed a "principle of fundamental justice" 
which, if respected, can serve as the basis for justifying 
the state's infringement of an otherwise sacrosanct 
constitutional right."

[135] Related to this principle is the concept described by 
Sopinka J. in Rodriguez, supra, where he said that if the 
state action which causes the deprivation does little or 
nothing to enhance the state's interest, it can properly be 
seen as arbitrary and not in accordance with fundamental 
justice. In such circumstances there cannot possibly be a 
fair balance between the individual's rights and the 
collective interests. Sopinka J. put it this way, at 594: 

"Where the deprivation of the right in question does little 
or nothing to enhance the state's interest (whatever it may 
be), it seems to me that a breach of fundamental justice 
will be made out, as the individual's rights will have been 
deprived for no valid purpose. This is, to my mind, 
essentially the type of analysis which E. Colvin advocates 
in his article "Section Seven of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms" (1989), 68 Can. Bar Rev. 560, and which 
was carried out in Morgentaler. That is, both Dickson C.J. 
and Beetz J. were of the view that at least some of the 
restrictions placed upon access to abortion had no relevance 
to the state objective of protecting the foetus while 
protecting the life and health of the mother. In that regard 
the restrictions were arbitrary or unfair."
--
Abolitionist Slave Leader John C."The Banking Systems Engineer" Turmel
for UNILETS interest-free time-based currency in U.N. resolution C6
to Governments in the http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration.htm 
http://www.cyberclass.net/turmel 519-756-1325 USENET: can.politics