TURMEL: #21 Robin Hood Raid on Casino Turmel Trial Transcript

JCT: Since the Project Robin Hood raid on Casino Turmel case was
brought up in the Big Five Marijuana appeals at the Ontario 
Court of Appeal recently arguing against judges imposing new 
criminal sanctions, rather than Parliament, I've decided to to 
publish the transcripts of the trial on the biggest gaming house 
raid in Canadian, probably world, history. 28 tables/155 dealers. 
See: http://www.cyberclass.net/turmel/gambler.htm 

#93-18193
             ONTARIO COURT (PROVINCIAL DIVISION)               
                    HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
                           against
                         JOHN TURMEL
                         **********
                         T R I A L 
         HELD BEFORE THE HONOURABLE JUDGE P. WRIGHT
    on Thursday, February 24th, 1994, at Ottawa, Ontario.
           CHARGE:  S. 201(1)
                         **********

MR. TURMEL: Now, that's exactly the question we have here. 
My place was kept for the purpose of playing games, and the
question is, "Was it kept for gain?"

And if one turns to the next page, page 14, or
200 of their numbering, at the top it says,

"It was an adjunct to his usual business
of a cigar dealer.  The profits of that
business were increased by the sale of the
goods in which he dealt.  The question of
what is keeping it for gain ought not to
be embarrassed by the amount.  The
question for the jury is whether he keeps
the place for gain, and they may properly
be told that the increased profits of the
business derive from the sale of the
Defendant's goods to the persons who
resort to his room for the purpose of play
is some evidence of keeping it for gain."

And you'll notice he's doing no playing here,
running no games; just simply selling cigars to which the
gamblers resort.

So that's the James one.  Now, if we'll go over
to page 17 of my numbering, we have the case of Karam (?) Karen
(?).  And this was a case where the owner was charged, again
under Section A, for operating a refreshment stand, and I don't
want to go in this one because he was acquitted and I don't
understand it.  All I know is that refreshments was the charge. 
I usually don't like bringing up cases I don't agree with, even
if it helps, but in this case, I simply want to point out that
it was a sale on my page 19 where they raised the issue,

"It was licensed to carry the business of
a public hall and sell refreshments and cigarettes."

So again we see that Section A deals with sales
to the gamblers, gain from the operation of a place rather than
gain from the operation of a game.
Now, if we go on to page - and there are only 40
pages, so it's not going to be long - on to page 21.  There we
have the case of O'Meara, and this is the proprietor of a cigar
store again.  And of course they're complaining about the sale
of cigars once more.  And if we go to page 24 of my numbering,
the O'Meara case, at the top, it says,

"The only profits came from the sale of
gum and, it being proved that the profit
was made from the gum, the machine was kept for gain."
                
So again we're dealing with profit.  Now, of
course, every one of these activities I've listed all, today, in
this day and age, bear GST.  These are all GST-able
transactions, such that if you buy cigars or if you buy
refreshments or you purchase any such things, today, under the
recent laws, they must all bear GST.  And so to have filed GST
in my case would've been a reason to plead guilty, but since
there has been no evidence of any GST-able transactions - and
I'm saying that A deals with GST-able transactions - we can now
step on to page 25, which is the case of Riley.

Again, that's a case where they form a pool from
the money staked to expend for refreshments.  So again it's the
keeper who is selling the refreshments to the gamblers.  At the
bottom of page 25, it says,

"The real question involved in the
submission therefore turns on whether or
not the receipt by the club of monies for
refreshments shown in the manner above set
out proves the keeping of the club
premises for gain."

Not a word about gambling.  It's always the sales to the
gamblers that are treated under Section A.

Now, of course, my purpose in adding these nine
cases to the eight or nine Mr. Sagle has already developed is,
I believe, to show that the score is going to be 18 to zero when
we're through, because I don't believe the Crown's going to have
any case law where Section A is outlined and it doesn't deal
with refreshment, with some sort of sales.
Now, if we move on to page 27 - things are
moving quickly now - you'll notice at the bottom of my page 27,

"While playing of cards was going on, yet
meals were served..."

And at the end, he was convicted of running a
gaming house because meals were sold to the gamblers.  So there
is another case.

On page 29, we have the case of R. v. Tatty
(ph), and again the underlined portion shows that the accused
sold sandwiches.  And down at the bottom it says that the sale
of refreshments constituted a keeping of the premises for gain. 
Now, it didn't say the game of blackjack or playing poker, or
any other activity, constituted keeping the premises for gain,
but that sales constitutes keeping the premises for gain.

So that was the sale of sandwiches.  Now, on 35,
page 35, my page 35, down in the middle where it's underlined,
it says,

"The revenue from the fees charged the
members to join, as well as revenue from
the sale of refreshments and from the
billiard table and cards, constitute a
keeping of the premises for gain within
the definition laid out in R. v. James."

So again we have the revenue from sales and from
rentals.  So that is something that the house can do independent
of whether there are card players there.  
On page 37 of the same decision, the underlined
portion,

"The question for the jury is whether he
keeps the place for gain, and they may be
properly told that the increased profits
of the business derived from the sale of
the Defendant's goods to the persons who
resort to his room for the purpose of play
is some evidence of keeping it for gain."
So again, sales once more has been deemed
evidence of an A Section gain.

And finally, the very, very last page, a short
little one, R. v. Wong, if you look down the little notation
that's been underlined, this was the proprietor of a tobacco
shop.  That's the very last page of the kit, the Wong case.  And
the proprietor of a tobacco shop sold tobacco and consequently
was presumed to have kept the place for gaming because of the
profit from the sales.  

Now, those are the extra ones which I've raised
now.  I could probably cite off very quickly the names of the
other cases that have been picked and which Mr. Sagle had
prepared for his A Section argument.  I point out that R. v.
Saunders is another one that dealt with sales.  The King v. Sawa
(ph), another one that dealt with sales.

(OFF-RECORD DISCUSSION)

MR. TURMEL: Okay, refreshments were there. Lemaire,
refreshments again.  Karavasilis (ph), one of the famous ones. 
Again, that's another refreshments.  And Irwin is another one. 
You know, they held a blackjack table in a tavern, and, of
course, the keepers of a tavern were with an A gain because they
were selling to the gamblers on the premises.  Not charged with
any Bs.

At any rate, Your Honour, I think that the
historical interpretation of how a premises are kept for gain
has been well established.  I would be very surprised if the
Crown has any other conviction under A which did not deal with
such refreshments.  And on the basis that the Crown has not
produced one single cited A Section gain in yesterday's
testimony - I believe everything had to do with B possible
allegations, everything always from the gain - and I'd like to
point out a clear distinction between the B Sections and the A
in that, if you'll notice, all the B Section allegations are
basically transacted and are dealt with chips.  So one might say
that they are gains out of operations of the game with chips. 
Having the bank excluded gives you an advantage where you will
win more chips; taking a rake-off, chips; charging a fee, chips;
and of course, having an advantage the others don't, chips.  But
sales of cigarettes, hotel rooms, cigars, you know, sundries,
other things, restaurant food, drinks, all GST-able, all done
with cash as a prime requisite with a cash register.

Now, none of the transactions that took place in
my game dealt with a cash register, and it's been admitted by
the Crown in pre-trial that I was not called upon to collect or
remit any GST on any transaction, and, on that basis, that we do
know that no evidence was presented.  Certainly no ten instances
of different gains were even alleged, despite the fact those
undertakings were there and the Crown was prodded on numerous
occasions to produce those ten different identifications. We've
now ended up with the Crown's case closed and not one such
identification.  Even the one alleged at pre-trial has been even
mentioned.  So, other than trying to point out that had Officer
Cleary, the investigating officer, been on the stand, his notes
and his report were the only ones that determined that the
cigarette machine was owned by an outside source.  And, as that
would seem to be the only logical inference of a Section A gain,
the sale of cigarettes, from Officer Fotia yesterday, it seemed
a little disconcerting that the chief investigator wasn't on the
stand with his report, pointing out that that wasn't so, that I
was not involved with the cigarettes.  And if this does go to
defence, Mr. Cleary will be our first witness on that point. 
But other than that one minor mention that Officer Fotia went
and bought some cigarettes, which carry GST, out of a machine
which was owned by an outside company that I had no stake in,
nor any gain in, I don't believe that there were any inferences
whatsoever of any GST-able cash-versus-chip-style actions going
on.  And on that basis, I believe - oh, well, my final point
now, to bring in, is the fact that to be acquitted, to have a
directed verdict of acquittal, in the case of my friend, Dave
Booth, who ran a similar Turmel-style game and was raided, I
could understand that as being equitable, and in the case of
Dennis Mazerolle from Toronto, who was running a similar game and
was raided, I would consider a directed verdict equitable there. 
But in my case, I have the Lennox decision and I have the
Fontana decision; therefore, a mere directed verdict of
acquittal just doesn't seem to be enough.  I mean, them, they
might be said to be acquitted, but in my case, I'm being
acquitted again, and it's the "again" part of it that brings in
the possibility of abuse of process and all these other issues: 
res judicata, issue estoppel.

Now, to date, we haven't yet referred to Judge
Fontana's decision, short of mentioning that he said "kept for
gain" dealt with refreshment sales, like the rest of history,
but yet, at this stage, I would like to open the possibility to
you that I deserve more than a simple directed verdict of
acquittal.  I deserve one of these esoteric specialty pleas,
which do apply, because I do have a previous acquittal on an
identical situation of no evidence.  And even though the Crown's
allegation or misinterpretation that Judge Fontana had not dealt
with Section A, and therefore Judge Lennox, in paraphrasing his
decision, also didn't deal with Section A, and you yourself
pointed out that they had.  I believe that all the constituent
elements necessary for one of the special pleas is there.  My
heart is most set on res - or on - and the reason is this:  If
I get an ordinary acquittal, I can be back in Court tomorrow and
they could do the same process to me again, and it would be
another six-month, eight-month, a year's delay until perhaps
another acquittal.  I'm not here for acquittal, Your Honour, I'm
here for protection, and I think the only way I can get
protection from this kind of abuse again is one of the specialty
pleas, taking into account that this is not the first time I've
faced this burden.  It's the second.  And both times there was
no evidence.  Though, again, I think other people in my boat do
deserve directed verdicts of acquittal, I think that in my case
one of the special pleas - you know, autrefois acquit would be
the one that would really make my heart content, to think that,
independent of time and place, a former acquittal, which gives
on a right to do certain things, continues to give me that
right, which will allow me to prevent the Crown from being able
to move in and charge me again and keep me in the courts until
a trial date.  So on the grounds that the Crown did not identify
those ten sections of gains, which did abort my autrefois acquit
argument at the time, which you put off, I would simply move
that one of these pre-plea motions - issue estoppel, autrefois
acquit - and, if I have to, after the plea defence, which would
be my res judicata - I would hope that the charges could be in
some way ended on one of those more esoteric motions, and, on
that note, Your Honour, I think I've finished my pitch on
Section A, and I hope that Mr. Sagle doesn't have to go into
greater depth on it for a directed verdict of acquittal argument
if you agree that there is no evidence of any Section A gain. 
And of course, that would be best determined if the Crown could
tell us the difference between a B gain and an A gain.  And at
this stage of the game, I don't think it's ever been discussed. 
And why the Crown thinks that gambling gains fit under A would
be an interesting explanation for us all to have.  Right now, I
could only say that historically that's not true.  If Mr. Marin
were correct and any gain is a Section A gain, and why do you
have the B sections, at all, permitting certain games.... 

And finally, I would make the argument that the
winnings I made are under the protection of Judge Fontana's and
Judge Lennox's rulings, which ruled that the way I won those
monies was not a violation of the Criminal Code, and if they do
not have any Section A gains to show, then I would contend that
Judge Fontana and Judge Lennox's rulings, that the way I won my
winnings were not construed as gains or illegal gains under the
Code; I would ask therefore that whichever most applicable
special plea applies be granted and the charges either quashed,
dismissed or whatever the expression be, given whatever plea
that I entered apply.  Thank you.
THE COURT:   Thank you, Mr. Turmel.  Do I understand that Mr.
Sagle's going to be advancing an argument?
MR. TURMEL:   No, Mr. Sagle, I don't think, wanted to comment on
the long shots, which he...
MR. SAGLE:   Your Honour, I support what he's saying, but
actually, the arguments with respect to the "kept for gain,"
which he mentioned, indicated I would be going into longer if we
have to do the directed verdict motion, or if we have to go
beyond that, even, which I'll certainly be going into, but very
much along the same lines, I'll also be reviewing the statute,
the interpretation of the statute and case law in other areas as
well, but I don't think that's necessary, quite frankly, to
support Mr. Turmel's motion.  I think he's done everything that
could be done on that.
THE COURT:   All right, I have a couple of questions which I'll
throw out before hearing from the Crown.  The first question is: 
Was the argument raised before Judge Fontana of gain, or did the
matter proceed under B?  I'm aware that, in his decision, Judge
Fontana made reference to the other sections being not
applicable, but it may be significant whether the issue was
raised before him or not.
MR. TURMEL:   It was.  There was a demand for particulars and
Judge Fontana ruled that, given the found-in was not a keeper
and it was a much more simple - and we have the decision, by the
way - and that it was a much more simple case for a found-in,
that particulars were not necessary, so that the found-ins faced
the whole gamut of charges, and it's for that reason that Judge
Fontana dealt with all five, because no particulars had been
picked.  It was only in my case, for the keeper, did the Crown
pick Section B(1) and B(4), and therein lies their confusion. 
It was my case where the judge restricted himself to B(1) and
B(4), not the found-in's case, where the judge had an open field
of all five, which he dealt with.  
THE COURT:   Which is Booth.
MR. TURMEL:   Which is Booth, yes.
MR. MARIN:   Just on that point, Your Honour, I have a
submission, just on that point, because certainly Mr. Turmel
doesn't speak for the Crown on that issue. 
                Just on the issue of what exactly happened with
Judge Fontana, Your Honour, a motion of autrefois acquit, I
didn't expect to have to face that this morning, so I don't have
my case book, but the law, as I remember it, is that the Defence
has to produce a record of exactly the evidence that was
presented, the arguments made.  Otherwise, how could he have
been autrefois acquitted of this charge?  It's impossible to
tell, except Mr. Turmel's interpretation of the record.

If one looks at page seven of Judge Fontana's
decision, I suggest to you that from the decision of the case,
it is obvious, or one could infer that it was not founded on A,
and not only that, but that the judge did not direct his
attention, his mind, to the A section. If one looks carefully at 

page seven, the second paragraph starting, "On the evidence," 

Your Honour.  Do you have that?
THE COURT:   Yes.
MR. MARIN:   Okay,

"On the evidence alleged by the Crown and
accepting the testimony presented on
behalf of the Crown by Mr. Turmel, the
operation in this occasion..."

And I note "in this occasion,"

"...clearly does not fall into the first four categories."

Perhaps we could just pause here.  Let's go to
the section, Section 197, Your Honour...
THE COURT:   Which includes A.
MR. MARIN:   Yes, but if one looks at Section 197, Your Honour,
there is not four categories, but there are five categories, A
being one.  So the way Judge Fontana reads it, he obviously -
because it wasn't specifically argued, I would suggest, Your
Honour, is that he sort of lumps it together and he reads the
"or" between the A and the B as being an end, as being
conjunctive as opposed to disjunctive, and if one looks at the
next line, he says, after saying it doesn't fit within the first
four categories, he says,

"A place kept for gain or for playing of
games where the bank is kept by one or
more but not all of the players..."

So the implication seems to be that the Crown
has to prove that it's a place kept for gain or for playing of
games where the bank is kept by one or more but not all of the
players.  There seems to be an interpretation that A has to be
read in as a precondition to the B applying.

Then he continues,

"Clearly, none of those first four
criteria apply.  If the operation on this
occasion is to be caught, it must be
caught with respect for, which I quote..."

So again he's referring here to four.  And then
he reads the B(4), which obviously the issue in that particular
trial.  

"...kept or used for purpose of playing
games in which the chances of winning are
not equally favourable to all persons who
play the game, including the person, if
any, who conducts the game."

So that is the law as Judge Fontana sees it
argued before him.  Everything revolves around the four.  The
"kept for gain" portion of the section is overlooked as being
distinct, disjunctive way to make out the offence.  The A is a
definition of one way that can stand on its own to make out the
offence.  And it's very important that there's an "or" there. 
And so, short of having the record, Your Honour, I can't accept
Mr. Turmel's testimony on what happened at the trial because,
quite clearly, the decision speaks for itself.  

I would suggest - and again, I wasn't at the
trial, Your Honour, but by the substance of the decision, Judge
Fontana does not refer to gains.  The issue here wasn't the
definition of what "gains" meant; the issue here was whether Mr.
Turmel's rules of operation of the game circumvented, in a way,
the B(4) in such a way as to lead to an acquittal or dismissal
or directed verdict -  I'm not sure what was the result of that
decision - but in the release of Mr. Turmel.

So it's my submission, Your Honour, that's it's
apples and oranges both in terms of law and in terms of the
evidence just by reading the decision of Judge Fontana, framed
on the law as he saw it.
MR. SAGLE:   Your Honour, may I just say one thing?  I almost
feel this is unnecessary to say, but I guess it is because of
what we've just heard.  I find that to be an incredible reading
of the words on that page.  I find to say that basically he's
only referring to the four categories when he names four and
then refers to the fifth right at the bottom.  I mean, it's
almost as if we can't read.  The question as to whether he keeps
it disjunctively or not - he clearly says that it clearly does
not fall into the first four categories.  There are only five. 

THE COURT:   The question I'm concerned with is not so much the
grammar...
MR. SAGLE:   M'hm?
THE COURT:   ...but whether or not the issue of the A was raised
as an issue at the trial.
MR. SAGLE:   Well, perhaps there might be something I could find
on that.  We may even have some of the transcripts here.
MR. TURMEL:   I do have the transcript where he does - excuse me
- we do have the transcript here where Judge Fontana does
dismiss an argument for particulars and then goes on to deal
with all five by delineating the evidence.  No sales, no rake-
off, no fee, no other one.  And next step, with his decision,
he...
THE COURT:   Was there evidence before the Court of the sort of
evidence which is before the Court today?
MR. TURMEL:   Exactly.  The point is that the policeman got on
the stand and said there was no evidence of any sales for
refreshments.
THE COURT:   But Mr....
MR. MARIN:   That's not the evidence.
THE COURT:   ...Mr. Marin is proceeding on the A,  and he's
arguing - or I anticipate he will argue - that the gain with
which he seeks to bring himself within the definition under A is
the gain from gambling.
MR. TURMEL:   That's right, I know.  And why would you bother
having B sections if that's true?  If any gain at all was
illegal under A, why bother with the Bs?
THE COURT:   But that's what we're...
MR. TURMEL:   That's what he's alleging, I understand.
THE COURT:   That's what the ultimate issue is going...
MR. TURMEL:   But Judge Fontana said it seems very clear:  "No
refreshment sales; did not keep for gain."  I mean, step one,
you look at the evidence.  No refreshments, no rake-off, no fee,
in order.  Then he went, decision, clearly not kept for gain, no
rake-off, no fees.
THE COURT:   I've read Judge Fontana's decision and what I'm
concerned about is whether the conclusion by my brother judge is
something which is based upon his findings with respect to the
evidence or findings with respect to a lack of evidence.  If
there was no evidence on that point...
MR. TURMEL:   That's right.
THE COURT:   ...then, with respect, it would be my understanding
that my brother judge would not have turned his mind or
addressed the specific issue that we're talking about today.
MR. TURMEL:   Well, had there been such evidence, I'd have been
convicted.  So the fact that there was no evidence of a Section
A crime then can't sort of preclude us from looking at his
decision.  He referred Section A to the sale of refreshments. 
That can be clearly argued, where he goes over the four things
that he does have as facts.  No refreshments, no rake-off, no
fee.  Then he gives his decision.  Not kept for gain, no rake-
off, no fee.  So it's simple enough to match the evidence he
looked at - no sale of refreshments - to the conclusion he came
to, no gain out of the premises.  It seems very clear, and,
given the fact that there were no particulars in that case and
he specifically -you can't get much clearer to say he did not
keep the place for gain, even though he knew I was winning
money.  He even went and said in his decision, "It is not
illegal to win money."  Hence, I think Judge Fontana did a very
good analysis of the issues and, to him, it was clear.  If
there's no sales or gain out of the operation of the premises,
it seemed clear to him that Section A didn't apply.  And I argue
and submit that every other judge in every other case we've
submitted here, that's the same thing.  I would say that I would
be taken aback and consider this a dilemma or a difficulty to
overcome if the Crown could show one other instance in Canadian
history when a non-commercial gain was charged under the A
Sections.  Or even where what is normally considered a B Section
gain.  Because it's illegal for me to profit indirectly out of
the proceeds of a game, and if they're now saying that your
proceeds out of that game are now A, well, why didn't you use
the B?  Because they couldn't.  They said Fontana was right on
the B.

So the matching of Fontana's statements about
evidence with his statements on ruling, I think, leaves us no
choice but to conclude that he did examine it in detail and he
came to the conclusion that the issue was so trivial - and when
you consider I've been charged with gaming house eight or nine
times and this is the first time it's ever been actually
particularized as an A Section offence, I think the judge was
absolutely correct in his decision because it was as trivial as
he made it sound.  No refreshments, not kept for gain:  Out the
door.  And I see exactly the same thing happened here today.  No
refreshments, and now the Crown is stuck on the "kept for gain." 
So my point was, the Crown alleged absolutely no gains
whatsoever short of B Section gains, which are winnings, and
Judge Fontana already said the way I've won my money was legal.

Now, if the Crown doesn't have anything
different about the way I made money from the way Judge Fontana
told me I can win money, well, it seems to me we've got a case
where it's already been decided.  These issues have been
settled.  John Turmel winning money at Turmel-style blackjack
and playing poker, winning an odd tournament, or whatever, is
not to be construed as against this section of the Criminal
Code.  So Judge Fontana had it virtually identically the same
evidence.  As a matter of fact, the only statement of true facts
that's really well done is the one from '89, and you'll see
they're all identical facts to this situation here.  

So, on the basis that he did state "not kept for
gain," while at the same time stating that the evidence that was
lacking for such a conviction, I think it's pretty clear that
the question is as clear as Judge Fontana thought it was, and
the Crown is left here with having picked the wrong section. 
And again, the wording of the section is important.  "Kept for
gain to which persons resort for the purpose of gambling."

Now, tell me about a gain made out of a place to
which people do not resort for the purpose of gambling.  Say the
purpose of dancing, or something else.  All those gains are the
ones that were normally convicted under all the case law that's
been produced.  You know, if you sold food, drinks, you had
whatever charges, you know, all these kinds of things would be
technically illegal the moment the game came.  And the moment
the game leaves, they're okay.  So the wording - I mean, I hate
to say it, you know, but this is down to a question of grammar. 
Section A, when you throw in "which is resorted to" and
contemplate what it means by throwing in a "not," you realize
that, whoa, these old judges in the past were correct.  Why
would we have a whole day's worth of testimony on the gambling
when Section A doesn't need to prove it was an illegal game? 
All Section A has to prove is that there was gambling, which I
admitted.

So, in a nutshell, Your Honour, everything that
came on yesterday had absolutely nothing to do with Section A. 
All of it had to do with Section B, the charges I've defended
eight times in the past, and it sort of took me by surprise. 
But nevertheless, my argument is simply that Section A
historically is gains from sales to customers where the price of
the seller to the vendor is great than his costs.  Mr. Sagle has
that in some of his cases.  Much more strong stuff coming.  And
again, I only ask the Crown produce one case, just one - I mean,
it had 18 months, almost two years now, of study to do this -
produce me just one case where A was alleged to come from
gambling.  And I'm not going to say I'd plead guilty - I'd still
put up a fight - but I'd be very impressed, and so far I haven't
been impressed.  

So, on the note that historically A has always
been gains and Judge Fontana - because to him it was trivial -
didn't spend a whole lot of time giving a lecture to the Crown
on why "no sales" means "no gain."  He was still was very
explicit, precise, made statements, covered all sections well. 
Frankly, I was impressed by the judge and his decision, and I
don't see how Mr. Marin can possibly successfully misinterpret
it.  So thank you very much.
THE COURT:   Mr. Turmel or Mr. Sagle, other than the reference
in page seven of the transcript - I understand that you have a
transcript of the proceeding...
MR. SAGLE:   Yes, but it's not actually the evidence given, or
the questions; it's only the motion that was made in advance to
have particulars.  But I'll tell you what I do find - I
understand what you're asking - is there anything else in here
which would indicate that he considered the kind of gains that
we're talking about, or that he's suggesting apply...
THE COURT:   Exactly.
MR. SAGLE:   I say two things to that, Your Honour:  One is that
clearly the Crown did try to present evidence which they thought
would be successful under A, and I notice that on page four,
Judge Fontana does indicate that 

"The evidence from the principal witness was
that refreshments were available but there was
no charge for them."

There was a witness brought, and they were Crown witnesses 
because there were no Defence witnesses, and they did try and 
bring some evidence, and, of course, the judge had no doubt in 
his mind, arguments similar to that made here, that those 
are the kinds of things you have to look for when you're 
looking for a gain.

--
Abolitionist Slave Leader John C."The Banking Systems Engineer" Turmel
for UNILETS interest-free time-based currency in U.N. resolution C6
to Governments in the http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration.htm 
http://www.cyberclass.net/turmel 519-756-1325 USENET: can.politics