TURMEL: #6 Robin Hood Raid on Casino Turmel Trial Transcript

JCT: Since the Project Robin Hood raid on Casino Turmel case was
brought up in the Big Five Marijuana appeals at the Ontario 
Court of Appeal recently arguing against judges imposing new 
criminal sanctions, rather than Parliament, I've decided to to 
publish the transcripts of the trial on the biggest gaming house 
raid in Canadian, probably world, history. 28 tables/155 dealers. 
See: http://www.cyberclass.net/turmel/gambler.htm 

19931111
#93-18193
        ONTARIO COURT (PROVINCIAL DIVISION)               
               HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
                      against
                    JOHN TURMEL
                    **********
   MOTION FOR AUTREFOIS ACQUIT & ISSUE ESTOPPEL
    HELD BEFORE THE HONOURABLE JUDGE P. WRIGHT
     on November 11, 1993 at Ottawa, Ontario.
                    **********
      CHARGE:  S. 201(1) (2 counts), C.C.
               S. 202(1)(e), C.C.
               S. 202(1)(c), C.C.
                    **********
APPEARANCES:
A. Marin, Esq. Crown Counsel
J. Turmel Appearing for Self

[continued]

I included City of Montreal v Rothman Realty Limited there. There 
it is. It's the one that is sideways.

Okay. This one, I believe, is very important. 

1. While each day may constitute a new infraction under the terms 
of the section of the Municipal Charter, such provision could not 
apply where there had been no structural change in the premises 
since the accused had been previously acquitted of any violation 
of the by-law.

2. The proceedings constituted an attempt to revise the judgment 
previously rendered by one municipal judge by proceeding before 
another judge of the same Court without following the prescribed 
remedy of an appeal provided by law."

Now, I believe there is a similar case here because every - if 
they are going to be tried - and, so far, you must understand 
that nobody knows whether or not the Crown is saying Fontana is 
wrong, or whether or not the Crown is saying 'We did Fontana 
wrong.' At this stage, due to other flaws in the process, nobody 
knows.

Now, if they try to allege Fontana is wrong, well, obviously, 
they should've gone by way of appeal and that is why in March of 
this year, when I heard that the police were looking at possibly 
charging me, I basically made an application for an extension of 
time to allow the Crown to appeal the acquittal of the Fontana 
decision and pointed out that if they really were looking to 
challenge it that was the way to go and I was willing to consent 
to let them have an extension of time to have their appeal. And I 
believe that in the Crown evidence later on, one will see that 
that motion was made.

So, they are not supposed to be trying to re-litigate an issue 
once it has been properly decided, and we believe that's what is 
going on.

So, I would like to start in the very first of all, the case is 
an apartment building was charged with being a rooming house and 
was acquitted. A year later, the City charged the apartment 
building with being a rooming house again. The lawyer, deciding 
to be innovative, knowing that in the past autrefois acquit only 
applied to the same time and same place, said, Well, look, since 
time is immaterial, maybe autrefois acquit should still apply. 
So, he made an application for autrefois acquit and at the 
bottom, on the left-hand side, the last paragraph, it says:

"In answer to such argument, the city replies that the complaint 
being for quite a different date and year, the plea of autrefois 
acquit cannot receive any application. And the city quotes in 
favor of this argument...", citing the Charter. The next 
paragraph on page 373: "At first glance, this argument appears 
correct." And autrefois acquit must be the same time and same 
place. "As a matter of fact, when an infraction, such as the 
emitting of dense smoke...is committed, each day constitutes a 
new infraction and in such a case no plea of autrefois acquit can 
be entertained when a different date is alleged, but indeed the 
ruling must be entirely different when an acquittal has been 
obtained on the essential basis of the existence or non-existence 
of a right." Now, in this case, the man had a right to rent out 
his apartments and not be called a rooming house. 

We believe that we won the right to play symmetric Turmel-style 
blackjack in that 1989 case. The Judge continues: "Applying this 
above rule to the case, if it is true that no permit for a 
rooming house is required for the operation of the building in 
question, the date mentioned in any future complaint is 
irrelevant...". Now, you would think that would apply with Judge 
Fontana's decision, if not selling anything, not taking a fee, 
not taking a rake-off, not excluding and not having any unfair 
edges - he says it is not a gaming house - well, one would think 
that that would be the essential basis of the existence of a 
right to play this game. So, he says applying the date mentioned, 
it's irrelevant, and it would render a plea of autrefois acquit 
absolutely useless. So, in other words, the special plea of 
autrefois acquit would be rendered useless in the situation where 
they insist on the time being the same, though time is 
irrelevant, like the case of this rooming house. "...and the 
defendant company would never know any peace before the Municipal 
Court..." s I haven't known much peace - "...and could be tried 
every day in the year and be placed in jeopardy for the identical 
offence whose merit had been judicially adjudged." Now, his 
rooming house was acquitted, my gaming house was acquitted, and 
whether or not it's being done at a different time, if the 
structure hasn't changed of the rules of my gaming house or of 
his rooming house, one would think the analogies are pretty good. 
So, continuing: "It appears from the above stated considerations 
that the rules laid down for a plea of autrefois acquit are far 
from applying entirely in a case of infringement of a by-law of 
the City of Montreal. As a matter of fact, before our Municipal 
Court, many cases on by-law infringement, besides their penal 
aspect, present a marked civil outlook and call it autrefois 
acquit or res judicata, and it would be illegal and against the 
public order to attempt to revise the judgment rendered by one 
municipal judge before another judge of the same Court, thus 
making an appeal without following the prescribed remedy set by 
law."

Now, I believe that's what has gone on here. I believe we have 
the Crown, who are trying to re-try the same issue. Frankly, it 
will be shown it is the same issue because there was a statement 
of agreed facts in 1989 and even though such a statement hasn't 
been determined in these cases yet - you know hen we look at 
everything the Crown has in their ten boxes of evidence and their 
hundred witnesses, you are going to see that it's all been agreed 
to already in 1989 without any need for all this work, and, 
basically, that the cases are analogous. This is a question of 
whether the rules of a game are in violation of the law and where 
that game is being held and when that game is being held is 
totally immaterial to the rules.

So, the last paragraph - second-last, the Judge says: 
"Notwithstanding the fact that a judgment which has finally 
decided the issue when the basis of the existence or non-
existence of a right has been pleaded as an exception..." as we 
are doing - "...the city is still allowed to meet such a plea by 
proving that subsequent modifications or changes have created a 
new status preventing the judgment so alleged from receiving 
application."

Now, I would say if the Crown has some sort of modifications they 
allege we've done, some sort of modifications that do push this 
into the realm of a gaming house, they should have brought it 
out. And especially in the case of Mr. Lo, who is sitting here 
knowing that all he did was play the same set of rules in both 
places, and he is on trial again. Now, had the Crown made some 
sort of allegation or some sort of specification about what the 
structural changes had been, maybe it wouldn't apply, autrefois 
acquit, for Mr. Lo at this stage. But, since the rules of the 
game, the structure were identical and there doesn't seem to be 
any issue that they were not identical, I believe that the 
autrefois acquit, if it applied in City of Montreal v Rothman 
Realty Limited, should apply to us. So, in the last sentence, the 
Judge says:

"In the present case it was admitted that no structural changes 
had occurred since the last judgment and consequently the Court 
upholds the plea of autrefois acquit...".

So, at this stage - you know - if - when the Crown gets up, if 
they wish to allege that there have been structural changes, it 
will be a whole new ballgame. Then I would probably grant 
autrefois acquit may not apply. But, considering that after four 
months we have an absolute dearth of information about what 
structural changes had been alleged to have been different, we're 
now faced with what I believe is a perfect analogy of why 
autrefois acquit should apply and I only have to throw in my last 
perfect example, because every time I have spoken to lawyers and 
I've said - and they've all said, 'No, you shouldn't try 
autrefois acquit', I've always given them the example of Wayne's 
Weiners, which is an example of a man who has a little weiner 
stand, Wayne's Wonderful Weiners, doing a great business. One day 
the Mayor comes along, buys a couple, gets indigestion and busts 
him for having too much fat in his weiners. Now, he waits six 
months, he goes broke, his wagon is impounded, he finally gets to 
trial, he's got an affidavit from his butcher saying, hey, only 
48 per cent fat and he's got an okay from Consumer and Corporate 
Affairs saying, hey, it was only 48 per cent fat and his receipt 
is acquitted. So, after a while, he gets back in business, he's 
going again. The Mayor comes by again, has a couple of dogs, gets 
indigestion and busts him again. Now, I've asked every lawyer 
I've ever met, I said, "What type of legal recourse are you going 
to tell me that Wayne can use to abort these charges, when he 
knows he's going to win because the essence of the issue has 
already been solved?" 

He's going to walk in with the butcher's affidavit again, 
Consumer and Corporate Affairs registration of his formula and 
he's going to be acquitted again. So, I say, "How can the man 
abort this thing without having to wait for another useless eight 
month delay?" And all I get from every lawyer is, "There's no 
way." So, I say, well, maybe this lawyer in Montreal wasn't so 
dumb to think autrefois acquit should be extended to cover those 
cases where nothing can help. And, so, I say the analogy with 
Wayne's Weiners is identical to ours. You know, between us, we 
have 150 employees out of work, who had jobs, who were paying 
taxes, who were a credible alternative to what the government 
proposes, to what the government is going to go bankrupt on, and 
after a year and a half of quiet operation, I think we quite 
proved that this is the way it's going to have to go, if you want 
it to be run cleanly in small towns. And, so, on that basis, we 
want to throw in the argument that autrefois acquit happens to be 
the only special plea which can eliminate - it's the only special 
plea, okay. We don't want to have to wait eight ruinous months of 
delay and therefore, the only plea, which is a special plea, 
which can be made before trials and Pre-Trials is autrefois 
acquit and on the basis that Rothmans found that when time is 
immaterial, autrefois acquit can still apply. And on the basis of 
Carrier when he found that not only would the time and the place 
and even the victim be different, since they are immaterial to 
the essence of the question, the validity of the pamphlet, 
similarly the validity of the formula, the recipe, similarly the 
validity of the rules structure of our game, autrefois acquit has 
to be the absolute perfect answer to solve our problems, and it's 
our only answer. There is no other way for Wayne not to suffer 
another ruinous eight months wait before he gets his weiner wagon 
back and he wins. And I'm saying on the basis that the Crown has 
not alleged, has not indicated and has not written down any 
structural changes which have been alleged to have been 
infractions against the Code, on that basis, we would make the 
argument that in Mr. Lo's case, autrefois acquit should certainly 
apply. He was already acquitted of playing this game and he has 
now been charged with playing exactly the same game.

In the case of myself, I've already been acquitted of giving Mr. 
Lo this fair game and I've now been again charged with giving 
others this fair game, even though he wasn't charged. It just so 
happens in 1989, Judge Fontana could look at it from the found-
in's point of view and conclude, everybody got a fair game, 
therefore, Lennox had to conclude therefore, John Turmel didn't 
run a unfair game. At the Topaz raid, they didn't charge any 
found-ins. Now, they're going to be able to allege John Turmel 
made money without my being able to say, 'Yeah, but a Judge said 
all the found-ins got a fair game.' They've eliminated the proof 
that I had available to me in 1989 by not charging any found-ins, 
but, fortunately, good luck, they went and charged another 
perfect clone of the Turmel-style rules with a found-in now, who 
happened to be in 1989, a perfect autrefois acquit. So, I believe 
that it is an absolute injustice that Mr. Lo should be in this 
courtroom. Mr. Lo is a professional, has a degree in science, a 
druggist, and I think him being dragged through the courts like 
this is quite a shame, especially when it happens to be on 
exactly the same charges on exactly the same games. 

So, now, that, I believe, are the submissions with respect to the 
plea of autrefois acquit made by Mr. Lo and myself. Mr. Booth 
can't use autrefois acquit because he was formally acquitted of 
found-in. Now, he has been charged with keeper, but, for myself 
and Mr. Lo, we would contend that autrefois acquit is the most 
just way, unless, of course, the Crown wishes to allege a 
structural change in the rules of the game. Though, the rules 
posted on the walls didn't change. Would we be so stupid as to 
take rules that Judge Fontana had already accorded legal status 
to and change them? So, on that basis, those are the arguments 
for Mr. Lo and myself on the autrefois acquit. Now, I'm just 
wondering, before we get onto the question of issue estoppel or 
finding the prosecutorial abuse of process, would we - would the 
Crown - should the Crown respond now on autrefois acquit, or, 
should I just throw everything in and he handle everything after? 
Okay. 

COURT: You're on a roll. 

TURMEL: I'm glad you think so. Okay. Now, on the case of issue 
estoppel now, I would like to go into the Jewitt case, which 
should be - oh, I did include the Judge Bonin decision which was 
the decision out of Quebec where I was acquitted of running a 
betting house. That will be coming up later, though. I think I 
have one more, the Wriqht case. It's the last one. So, after the 
- there is a sideways judgment with some french stuff, right 
after that. Right after this, is the next one. The french stuff 
is Judge Bonin and staying away from French can only help us. 
They only have one word for "win" and "gain" in french, "gain". 
So, it was very difficult for the Judge to distinguish between 
the two. And that would account for his reasons. 

There was one other one, just before Jewitt. The one just before 
Jewitt is called Wright. This one here. Okay. You yellowed in the 
same paragraph I did. It must've worried you. Okay. It says: 

"Apart from the special pleas of autrefois acquit and autrefois 
convict in which cases the Crown looks only at the offences 
charged in the compared counts.." - so, there is no evidence 
here - "...the defence of res judicata, or issue estoppel, 
applies in criminal cases and when that defence is being 
considered the area of exploration is greater and an accused may 
show that the same element was decided in his favor in previous 
criminal proceedings which is in issue on a subsequent trial by 
reference to the course of the previous proceedings..." 

Now, down - continue just before the cases are set out at the 
bottom of that page: "In light of the course of the previous 
conspiracy trials, and the facts either admitted or established 
by evidence at such trials, the combined effect of the acquittal 
in one case and the conviction in the other created an estoppel 
again the Crown with respect to the charges for the substantive 
offences...", And the use the word "substantive", again. 

So, they are talking substantial stuff. If you turn the page, 
page 338, one, say, two paragraphs where it says, "The doctrine 
is different...".... "The doctrine is different from the Pleas of 
autrefois acquit and autrefois convict. Autrefois acquit applies 
where there accused has been previously acquitted of the same 
offence of which the accused is subsequently charged. Whether it 
applies where the offence charged is not the same but the crime 
committed is essentially the same, is not so clear..." to this 
Judge. And, finally, on page 341, if you can turn over to page 
341 - okay - actually, 340, second-last paragraph, four lines in, 
one, two, three, four lines in. It says: "...that if the evidence 
adduced in the trials is the se substantially, then it is the 
duty of the Judge to tell the jury that they should not find the 
accused guilty.

"The Courts should abhor inconsistent verdicts." Up at the top of 
the next page, 341, in the same text: "As a general rule a judge 
should stay an indictment...", and, of course, we're asking for 
that in the last section of our motion, "...when he is satisfied 
that the charges therein are founded on the same facts as the 
charges in the previous indictment on which the accused has been 
tried, or form or are a part of a series of offences...", and, 
this is the only time we hear about part of a series, "...of the 
same or a similar character as the offences charged in the 
previous indictment." Now, we shoot down to the next paragraph: 
"From these authorities, it is evidence that apart from the pleas 
of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict, the principle of res 
judicata and the doctrine of issue estoppel apply in a criminal 
case where there are inconsistent verdicts or where...", skip a 
line, "...the same point was determined in favor of a prisoner in 
a previous criminal trial which is brought in issue on a second 
criminal trial...". Now, that is what is so frustrating about 
these indictments here. We don't know what the Crown is alleging 
we did wrong. And that also allows us now to come before you on 
an autrefois acquit and say, 'Hey, had they said in 1989 that you 
were charged with section (b)(4) of the game and definitions and 
this year, section (a) or (b)(1), we couldn't come in and say 
they are identical charges.' But, because they chose to be 
imprecise, we can come in and say they are identical charges. 
They're mere imprecision makes them identical. So, this thing, 
whether or not the game we were playing was a gaming house, was 
previously determined and, therefore, to avoid that contradictory 
decision, is the reason autrefois acquit should apply. Now, we 
skip over to the next one, which is the Jewitt case. All right. 
And if you look at the bottom of the first column where it says, 
"Held. The appeal should be allowed." It says: "In a criminal 
case, a trial court judge has residual discretion to stay 
proceedings where compelling an accused to stand trial would 
violate those fundamental principles of justice which underlie 
the community's sense of fair play and decency and to prevent the 
abuse of a court's process through oppressive or vexatious 
proceedings. Such power, however, can be exercised only in the 
clearest of cases."

Now, in 1989, there were six of us in the room. So, it's not as 
if the community were very upset or the sense of fair play were 
very besmirched, when they really weren't aware of what was going 
on in our little drama, but, I mean at Topaz, you had almost 
5,000 people come through the doors. And you have 5,000 people 
out there who know they all got a chance to be the bank, who know 
there were no sales, who know there was no fee, no exclusion, no 
rake-off and they had the same chance as we did. So, I think 
considering there are, at least, 5,000 people, not counting the 
hundreds of thousands who read the newspaper articles, big front 
page newspaper articles about how we were doing it. I mean, if 
you read these newspapers, many people could learn about gambling 
and how the gambling laws worked, but, I would say at this stage, 
many people out there think that there's been a pressure of 
prosecution here. 

Most people were aware when we were found not guilty and they 
were also aware of why. So, that this is a case where I believe 
that community sense of fair play has been flouted and I would 
suggest that many people out there think this is an abuse of 
process. This is a  vexatious prosecution. What this boils down 
to is the fact that the Judge has the power to do a stay.

Now, if you turn to page 138 in the very last paragraph, first 
column, where it says, "Kerwin, C.J. stated..." and you go down 
one, two, three, four, five lines of that page, 138, of that 
decision and it says: "...it was not a judgment on procedural 
grounds owing to a defect in the indictment and therefore if the 
accused were charged subsequently...they could plead autrefois 
acquit. It was a decision on a question of law alone and being a 
judgment or verdict of committal was appealable...".

Now, in our case, because Judge Fontana found a total absence of 
evidence, that was judged to be a question of law, the acquittal. 
The acquittal was not a question of fact whatsoever. He judged - 
sorry - Fontana judged it was a total lack of absence of evidence 
which made it a question of law.

So, again, this is another question of law and we have here, what 
I believe, is an objection to a question of law and that is why 
the Crown should have gone by way of appeal. Now, if you go to 
the next case, that's the Boross case and that's on page 484, the 
next in line. Page 484, second-last paragraph, where it says: "On 
appeal wide challenges to the conviction were raised. As well as 
the question of whether Boross's recantation extinguished any 
prior intent to mislead, it was urged that the prosecution should 
now be judicially stayed as an abuse of the court's processes; 
that the issue prosecuted was answerable by the defence of issue 
estoppel, and lastly, that the conviction contravened section 
11... dealing with repetitive prosecutions." Now, I believe 
that's what we have here, is these repetitive prosecutions. If we 
turn the page now, to page 487, where it says, "Issue Estoppel", 
in the middle of the page about, down a little: "It would seem 
that a plea...", Now, these are all tied together. We're arguing 
abuse of process. We think that when this is over, someone should 
be doing time, a couple of days anyway, on a hard - an issue a 
process, issue estoppel, autrefois acquit are all inter-
connected. They have their roots in each other basically. It says 
here:

"It would seem that a plea of abuse of process in response to a 
criminal prosecution will be more viable - at least will receive 
better audience..." - I hope - "...- when grafted to some other 
legally advanceable defence or answer. In Amato, supra, it was 
joined to entrapment; in Tracey and R. v. Gordon, [1980] 3 W.W.R 
655, it was advanced in conjunction with res judicata."

Well, that's what we're doing. We're going to be advancing abuse 
of process in conjunction with autrefois acquit. I mean, 
obviously, if we shouldn't have been charged and they have 
nothing new, there has been an abuse of the process that went on 
here. A hundred and fifty people did have their rights to 
employment violated and something should be done.

And that's the Boross case where it basically does point out that 
there is a connection between abuse of process being linked and 
I'm just pointing out they did mention one of the things it could 
be linked to is what we are, in particular, pushing.

If we go on to the next case, now, which is Grdic a little small 
text, onto the second page, third column, third paragraph, where 
it says, "The First Limitation". "If to prove the allegation the 
Crown is merely tendering the same evidence as that tendered 
previously, then issue estoppel will survive the attack because 
the Crown's allegation is, in disguise, but a re-litigation of 
the issue as litigated previously, or, to use the words of DeGrey 
C.J., an attempt "to impeach from within". Indeed another judge, 
or conceivably the same judge, hearing the subsequent perjury 
charge is invited to reconsider the same evidence and conclude 
differently. This can only be done through the appeal process 
finding reversible error resulting in the ordering of a new trial 
before a different judge." So, again, there's another argument 
that these things should not be done here with a new process, but 
should have been appealed and should've been appealed late if it 
was that important to the Crown, especially when I consented to 
it. 

So, another Judge is being asked to conclude differently on the 
same structured house rules and I would hope that the chances of 
him concluding differently are zero, when I consider Judge 
Fontana's ruling to be very clear and enlightening. Okay. The 
next case is the Keyowski case, another abuse of process over 
multiplicity of proceedings. This just establishes that the stay 
of proceedings is a remedy for abuse of process. It just 
basically points out it was established in Jewitt that you have 
the power to stay the proceedings if you find they are in an 
abuse of process. 

Now, the next one is the Lennox case where he says, clear enough: 

"COURT: Well, if you were to adopt the submissions made on the 
previous trial..." his is to the Crown- "...I would adopt the 
Reasons of Judge Fontana...". Another paragraph downwards, it 
says:

"COURT: No. I'm being somewhat facetious. I would have 
difficulty, as I indicated earlier, disagreeing with Judge 
Fontana, simply on the basis of comedy and I can appreciate you 
may wish to preserve certain rights, but, you would have to be 
very persuasive to convince me that I should decide otherwise." 
If we now turn to page three, bottom, last two lines:

"MR. WARD: If I understand the decision, if the finding on the 
found-ins trial was that there was no gaming house, then there 
cannot be any keepers either, as I see it.

"COURT: I would have difficulty, because of that finding, in 
rendering what would essentially be a contradictory verdict on 
Miss Cote, there is no material difference in the facts which I 
heard...? "MS. COTE: I don't believe so, Your Honour."

So, he said he proposes to follow the ruling of Judge Fontana. 
Page five, at the bottom there, it does point out the betting 
house charge was dismissed by Fontana, fourth line up. And if you 
turn to page six, now, two, four, six lines down - five lines 
down, it says: "I think my friend was intending to withdraw that 
charge."

So, that is when the Crown, at that point, withdrew the betting 
house charge against me, but, since I was put in jeopardy, I do 
believe that autrefois acquit should therefore apply. And, 
finally, at the very bottom of page seven, where he says: "I am 
aware of the decision of Judge Fontana and of its result. In my 
view, it would be an error on my part at this point in time to 
consider delivering a contradictory verdict on what amounts to an 
argument at law, that being a complete absence of evidence."

Now, I mean, that's pretty rare, you get the Crown to walk into a 
case with an absolute total absence of evidence, then and now, 
and, so, again, I think that would be another reason for abuse of 
process. If they had had something new - you know - something 
legitimate, well, perhaps, we would consider that as being a 
difference, but, I have yet to be aware of any structural 
differences and they haven't made me aware.

So, now, we want to go over to Rourke, another one that is saying 
that the Court does have the power to stay an abuse:

"Every court having criminal jurisdiction has the power to stay 
proceedings which are an abuse of process or oppressive and 
vexatious."

So, we're just establishing I have a right to do that. it says: 
"So, it is here. In a broad sense, pleas of autrefois convict and 
acquit, and of res judicata and issue estoppel may be said to be 
aspects of abuse of process... First, a general power, taking 
various specific forms, to prevent unfairness to the accused has 
always been a part of the English criminal law and I shall 
illustrate this with special reference to the framing of 
indictments. Secondly, if the power of the prosecutor to spread 
his case over any number of indictments was unrestrained, there 
could be grave injustice to defendants. Thirdly, a controlling 
power of this character is well established in the civil law. His 
conclusion from his examinations of those three matters was 
stated in these words:

The result of this will, I think, be as follows: As a general 
rule a judge should stay an indictment (that is, order that it 
remain on the file not to be proceeded with? when he is satisfied 
that the charges therein are founded on the same facts as the 
charges in a previous indictment on which the accused has been 
tried, or form or a part of a series of offences of the same or a 
similar character as the offences charged in the previous 
indictment."

And, of course, of the same or similar character. So, nowhere out 
there do we have to be talking about it being identical offences 
for the abuse of process to apply. And that's the end of that 
one.

Page 317, in Young; 317, second paragraph, last five lines. It 
says:

"The principles or standards of fairness essential to the 
attainment of fundamental justice are in no sense static, and 
will continue as they have in the past to evolve and develop in 
response to society's changing perception of what is arbitrary, 
unfair or unjust." So, when you consider how many people are 
aware of just what went on at my gaming establishment, I think 
that this applies.

--
Abolitionist Slave Leader John C."The Banking Systems Engineer" Turmel
for UNILETS interest-free time-based currency in U.N. resolution C6
to Governments in the http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration.htm 
http://www.cyberclass.net/turmel 519-756-1325 USENET: can.politics