TURMEL: #5 Robin Hood Raid on Casino Turmel Trial Transcript

JCT: Since the Project Robin Hood raid on Casino Turmel case was
brought up in the Big Five Marijuana appeals at the Ontario 
Court of Appeal recently arguing against judges imposing new 
criminal sanctions, rather than Parliament, I've decided to to 
publish the transcripts of the trial on the biggest gaming house 
raid in Canadian, probably world, history. 28 tables/155 dealers. 
See: http://www.cyberclass.net/turmel/gambler.htm 

19931115
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN TURMEL

[continued]

INJUSTICE ANALOGY:

Wayne's Wonder Wiener Wagon case, direct congruity,
A man whose Wonder Wieners captured market solidly. 
One day the mayor's indigestion rises from his dogs,
He'd wolfed down three of Wayne's most spicy Wonder Wiener logs.
Wayne's Wonder Wiener Wagon was impounded, corner lost, 
With zero income while he waited, all he had it cost.

In court the mayor's allegation "Indigestion meant,
The Wonder Wieners held more fat than fifty two percent."
At trial he had an affidavit, butcher in the know, 
"Those links I made with meat aplenty. My receipts will show."
The final proof his recipe fell well within the line,
The tests at Corporate Affairs showed Wonder Wieners "fine."
Wayne's Wonder Wieners were acquitted of their fatty rap,
But getting back into the business wasn't quite a snap. 
Yet once his wagon opened after much financial pain, 
The mayor got an indigestion. Pressed the charge again.
Again they seized his Wonder Wiener Wagon. To the mat, 
He'd go broke well before he'd answered charge his dogs were fat.
Should jurisprudence not provide the innocent to say,
"I've been acquitted once before. Abort unjust delay."

PROBLEM:

I face the same predicament that's making Wayne so blue,
It was the method that I used and not my person who,
The judge acquitted when he ruled my game was fair and square.
Can it be said what's fair and square depends on when and where?
Has not a new class been created, crimes of enterprise?
Should novel use of autrefois acquit not too arise?
Most crimes of enterprise are independent of the place,
Our recipes acquitted should prevail in every case.

SUFFICIENCY:

At motion to the Judge Nadelle that charges quashed should be,
The lawyer made the case for what I thought was plain to see,
The BINGO case on gaming house says standard to be met,
"Specifically, which of the five descriptions he should get.
The same lack of precision is within their charge anew,
But WIS and BINGO say particulars should never do."

The Crown said "BILLON-REY applies and makes the BINGO fail,
Since MILBERG says that BINGO's wrong, there'll be no more detail."
The Defence stressed that MILBERG dealt was sex, not game offence,
And pointed out that BILLON-REY had missed the difference.
Yet Judge Nadelle ruled BILLON-REY said BINGO can't apply,
So that "Like MILBERG's bawdy-house, no need to specify."

Though ruling "To the charge of business of betting will,
Apply the WILSON ruling that no info needed still,"
But where the WILSON court quashed "keeping" charge as not complete,
My judge told me that "Still the keeping charge you'll have to beat."

If this is so, the Code must have a lot of lawyers fooled,
Not knowing BINGO WILSON are by MILBERG overruled.
It seems that only in Quebec, Ontario we find,
Decisions misinterpreting the MILBERG state of mind.

ARRAIGNMENT IRREGULARITIES:

But worst of all catastrophes was still to me befall,
The Crown found callous way the trial successfully to stall.
With courtroom booked and magistrate found free to give his say,
The Crown announced the prosecutors off on holiday.

So though a hundred expectations pinned on justice swift,
The Crown announced "We still have evidence though which to sift.
We've only had three weeks and look at mountain that we face:
Ten boxes of materials pertaining to the case."
You'd think that after eighteen months investigating fact,
A hundred wouldn't suffer cause together ain't their act.
Denial of swift justice must result from trial's delay,
When only reason given is "The Crown's on holiday."

At my arraignment did irregularities unfold,
When "I am taking over my defence" the court was told. 
They were to ask me how I pleaded, guilty or a fight,
If I pled guilty, I'd be sent to court that sentence might.
If I pled innocent, they'd pick to have a trial a date,
But pre-plea motions must be heard before I must so state.

Yet Justice of the Peace informed me that "A date is set,
So that next month before Judge Lennox pre-trial will you get.
When Crown heard Lennox who'd acquitted me was to be judge,
The date they'd chosen as acceptable they had to budge.
I said I have a motion first before I make a plea, 
Please send it to a judge to hear my "autrefois acquit."
He said "You can present your motion on the pre-trial date,
There's nothing else that I can do so you will have to wait."

I asked the Crown what happened in the backrooms of the court,
I got no notice of their application to report.
When I objected that I hadn't had the chance to make,
The plea of guilty and my punishment by court to take.
He said "That's wrong. You've had your chance to make a guilty plea,
You've been inscribed as having pled "not guilty," as you see."

"That is impossible," I said, "My "autrefois acquit,"
Is to be heard before I have my choice of guilty plea.
So having booked ex-parte pre-trial means you've stripped away,
My chance for special pleas, in order to prolong delay.
That Crown's assumed I've pled "not guilty" indicates a flaw,
They've skipped some steps and closed some options for me in the law.
I don't see how a pre-trial on assumption can be set,
When chance to even make a plea, I never yet did get!
  
CHARTER:

We find within the charter of our new Canadian Rights,
A list of things we may all do, a simple list of "mights."
We might associate, we might assemble peaceably,
We might pursue our livelihood employed all gainfully.
We might not suffer being searched or seized unreasonably,
We might not be detained, imprisoned arbitrarily.
We might be told, if once arrested and without delay,
Specifics of the charges that our actions caused that day.
We might not twice be tried for an identical offence,
This charter right for all acquitted as a recompense.
We might not suffer cruel or unusual abuse,
We might be treated equally. The Crown has no excuse.
These rights have been denied me and the strongest for my case,
I've been acquitted once before and nothing new took place.

This case at bar is clear injustice covering the blame, 
Due to a government not qualified to run the game.
I've demonstrated that the small casinos need not wait, 
And we Canadians for work need no more hesitate.

As I understand my options:
!
!Pre-plea quash   Yes    {Michael Edelson presented this motion

! No         

!Autrefois acquit   Yes

!No

!Guilty?  Yes

! No  

!Pre-trial   Yes

! No

TRIAL


               AFFIDAVIT OF FOUND-IN GENE LO

1.1 On Feb. 23, 1988, I and Dave Booth were charged with being 
found-in a gaming house and found-in a betting house for playing 
Turmel-style Blackjack at the Bayshore Hotel in Ottawa with John 
Turmel or one of his agents. No definition of gaming house was 
specified.

1.2 On April 3, 1989, after evidence that Turmel had given me a 
fair game which resulted in no unlawful gain other than legal 
winnings for Mr. Turmel, Provincial Court Judge Fontana acquitted 
us on both charges after ruling Turmel-style Blackjack rules did 
not constitute any of the five definitions of gaming house or a 
betting house.

1.3 I played Turmel-style Blackjack at "John's Place" in John 
Turmel's home. It was investigated by the OPP and I was not 
charged.

1.4 I played Turmel-style Blackjack at "Turmel's Games Room" on 
Baxter Rd. in Ottawa. It was investigated by the OPP and I was 
not charged.

1.5 I played Turmel-style Blackjack at "Casino Turmel" at the 
Topaz Plaza on St. Laurent Blvd. It was investigated by the OPP 
and I was not charged. After a fourth investigation, "Casino 
Turmel" was charged with being a common gaming house.

1.7 I played Turmel-style Blackjack at Dave's Club Junction at 
1485 Laperriere Ave. in Ottawa with Mr. David Booth or one of his 
agents. On Oct. 21, 1993, I was charged with being found-in a 
gaming house for playing Turmel-style Blackjack there. Dave Booth 
and I were both just playing what we had been acquitted of 
playing before because in Turmel-style Blackjack, everybody gets 
to be the bank. In this case, instead of both of us playing with 
Turmel, we were playing with each other.

1.8 I have been playing Turmel-style Blackjack for almost 10 
years and submit that not only are Turmel-style Blackjack rules 
the most generous rules in the world but Dave Booth continued to 
give me the same fair game that Judge Fontana ruled Turmel-style 
Blackjack has always given me.

This Affidavit is made in support of a motion for:

1) an Order pursuant to the special plea of "autrefois acquit" 
quashing the indictment on the grounds that the Defendant has 
been formerly acquitted of the same charge; or

2) an Order pursuant to the special plea of "issue estoppel" 
quashing the charge to prevent contradictory judgments; or

3) an Order staying the charges on the grounds of "prosecutorial 
abuse of process" which offends the community's sense of fair 
play.
**********

19931111
#93-18193
        ONTARIO COURT (PROVINCIAL DIVISION)               
               HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
                      against
                    JOHN TURMEL
                    **********
   MOTION FOR AUTREFOIS ACQUIT & ISSUE ESTOPPEL
    HELD BEFORE THE HONOURABLE JUDGE P. WRIGHT
     on November 11, 1993 at Ottawa, Ontario.
                    **********
      CHARGE:  S. 201(1) (2 counts), C.C.
               S. 202(1)(e), C.C.
               S. 202(1)(c), C.C.
                    **********
APPEARANCES:
A. Marin, Esq. Crown Counsel
J. Turmel Appearing for Self


TURMEL: Your Honour, there were two other motions that were 
filed, one in the case of Jean Lo and one in the case of Dave 
Booth and they were also charged with Turmel-style gaming 
offences and I just wonder if they could come up here and if we 
could do this as a team. The issues, I believe, are identical and 
presented from Mr. Lo's point of view, most clear and most 
concise. So, I would prefer if we had a chance to look at Mr. 
Lo's motion before we looked at mine or Mr. Booth's.

COURT: Are those other matters before this Court?

TURMEL: They were booked, sir; yes.  The Gene Lo motion was 
transferred from Number Seven to this court upon the Crown's 
insistence, so, that, yes, Gene Lo was slated for here at the 
Crown's request. The Dave Booth motion which is frankly one-third 
of mine and Mr. Lo's, it's a very short motion, was filed for 
hearing on Friday and since it happens to be connected and inter-
related and since the Crown had earlier indicated that they 
wanted the Lo argument to be presented at the same time, it just 
made sense we file the Booth argument to be heard here too.

COURT: Are the Informations for both those persons before this 
Court? Are Mr. Booth and Mr. Lo here? Mr. Booth? When was your 
matter last before the Court and a when was it adjourned to?

BOOTH: Today.

COURT: In this Court?

BOOTH: Yeah. He said he'd have the file brought down.

COURT: And you're Mr. Lo? 

LO: Yes, sir.

COURT: When were you last in court and were you told to come to 
court today? 

LO: I was in last Wednesday. Come to court at two o'clock today.

COURT: We don't seem to have the Informations for any other 
matters. 

MARIN: No. I was served, Your Honour, on November 8th with the Lo 
application, which adopts three paragraphs from the Turmel 
application, so, I thought it logical to be listed today so we 
can dispose of both matters. They are the same arguments. They 
are the reproduction of some of the first arguments. Concerning 
the Booth case, I haven't seen any documents. If it was presented 
to court on Friday, I certainly have not seen any application by 
this accused, so, I couldn't be of assistance in that respect. 

COURT: So, if the Informations could be located, then, you'd have 
no objection to the matters being dealt with together? 

MARIN: No. No. No objection for the accused, Lo, because it's the 
same thing. For Booth, I would have to see it first. 

I have no difficulty with proceeding on all three matters, Your 
Honour. Mr. Turmel suggested a procedure. I would suggest that 
although there are three different Informations that they all be 
argued at the same time, there is no sense of disposing of one 
and then re-arguing it all for the second one and then if the 
arguments are going to be the same, let's hear them all in one 
shot and I'll respond to them in one shot and you can take it 
from there. 

TURMEL: And might I add that I don't believe Your Honour is 
seized of the trial at this point. If you look in the Lo 
affidavit, it is mentioned how, in another case in Quebec, the 
Judge who heard the motion to quash on insufficiency was one 
Judge. The Judge who heard autrefois acquit was another and the 
Judge who heard the trial was another. So, on the basis of that 
precedent and on the basis it would be illogical for you to be 
seized with all three of our trials over what is a question of 
pure law, this argument here, I would just like to point out I do 
not believe Your Honour is seized of our trials and, so, that 
that is another reason why you shouldn't worry too much about 
handling the three at the same time. You are not seized on this 
question of pure law. 

COURT: All right. Mr. Turmel, if you would like to proceed. 

TURMEL: Okay. Thank you. What I think I will do is, I will try 
and bring you up to date very quickly on our facts and where 
relevant, I will digress to show Mr. Lo's point of view and Mr. 
Booth's point of view. But, at this stage, I would start by 
pointing out that in 1989, I was running a black jack game at the 
Bayshore Hotel. Mr. Booth and Mr. Lo, friends of mine for many 
years, were there. We were raided. The game was charged with 
being a gaming house. And we did go to trial. 

Now, there was a trial of the found-ins before Judge Fontana and 
there was a trial of the keepers, myself and my brother, before 
Judge Lennox. Now, the found-in's trial was looked at by the 
Judge Fontana who concluded: "The evidence from the witness was 
that refreshments were available but there was no charge."

So, sales of refreshments would have been an important matter to 
the Judge. The next line is: "There was no fee to enter the game 
on the evidence...".

The next line: "There was no percentage of "'rake-off" by the 
house...". And turn the page, on page five, the second line, it 
says: "...if a player exercised his right to be a dealer, then 
that person played against him, that is Mr. Turmel..." So, Judge 
Lennox [Fontana] basically went over all five possible 
definitions of a gaming house and put the game I was running to 
test against it.

Now, if we go to his conclusions on page seven, which I think is 
clear enough that we all believe our right to play this style of 
gambling of card game is established within these lines. Now, the 
second paragraph:

"One must necessarily refer to the definition section, the new 
Section 197(1), where "common gaming house" is defined, and it is 
defined in five ways.

On the evidence alleged by the Crown, and accepting the testimony 
presented on behalf of the Crown by Mr. Turmel, the operation in 
this occasion clearly does not fall into the first four 
categories."

Now, if we take a look at the first four categories of the gaming 
house charges, the definitions, the first one is kept for gain. 
Now, usually, that is meant by case law to be gained out of the 
place, like a hotel or a restaurant or someone who sells 
cigarettes who nets more in the price than in the cost, whose 
business goes up because of having gambling activities in his 
place. If the place makes a gain, that is considered mainly the 
sales section. And he points out:

"...the operation in this occasion clearly does not fall into the 
first four categories. That is: a place kept for gain...".

So, Judge Fontana concluded, section (a) did not apply because of 
his understanding that gain was due to sales and that is how it 
has been interpreted in the past.

"...or for playing games where the bank is kept by one or more 
but not all of the players...".

So, that is section (b)(1), the exclusion section. "...where 
there is a rake-off...". That is section (b)(2). "...or where 
there is a fee charged.... That is section (b)(3). "Clearly, none 
of those first four criteria apply. If the operation on this 
occasion is to be caught, it must be caught with respect to sub-
section four...". Which is, the last line: "...in which the 
chances of winning are not equally favorable to all persons who 
play the game." 

Now, Judge Fontana eventually concluded that because I had signs 
on the wall that said everyone has the right to be the banker 
against me and that everyone must be the banker at least once 
against me, that given that set of rules by the symmetry of the 
game, if there were an advantage accruing to being the bank, that 
advantage had the potential of being shared back and forth and 
Judge Fontana concluded that Turmel-style blackjack was a series 
of two-man contests, multiple two-man games and on that basis 
having found no contraventions of the five definitions in the 
Criminal Code, he acquitted Mr. Lo and Mr. Booth of being found-
ins at my game at the Bayshore Hotel.

So,it boiled down to the no-sales, no exclusions, no fees, no 
rake-off, and all options that I have available to me, were also 
available to my friends, Mr. Lo and Mr. Booth.

RESUME

So, upon that basis, we now started playing, and I - of course, 
my case then came up before Judge Lennox and Judge Lennox simply 
concluded that I would assume, on the basis of issue estoppel, 
that he could not deliver a contradictory judgment to Judge 
Fontana's decision; that Judge Fontana had found no gaming house 
had existed because the found-ins had gotten a fair game. It 
necessarily meant that I had not run a gaming house, because I 
had not taken any unfair advantages and Judge Lennox also 
acquitted me.

At the same time, the Crown had charged me and them, me with 
keeper of a common betting house. And, of course, they were 
charged with found in a common betting house. Now, upon a total 
absence of evidence of any betting house going on and we will go 
into the case law for betting house a little bit later, Judge 
Lennox did conclude that there was no betting house, because 
betting is book-making and the finding of cards does not 
constitute a prima facie case of betting house, it does of gaming 
house, and, therefore, Judge Fontana dismissed the found-in, the 
betting house charge against Mr. Booth and Mr. Lo.

When came the question at the gaming house keeper trial, the 
Crown withdrew the charge rather than have it dismissed by Judge 
Lennox.

So, basically, I was put in peril of the betting house and gaming 
house charges in 1989. Mr. Lo and Mr. Booth were both put in 
peril of being convicted of being found in a gaming house and a 
betting house and we were all successfully acquitted.

A short note, I was charged with keeper of a common betting house 
in Quebec a couple of years later and the charges were dismissed 
by the Judge. So, another rational showing that you can't do 
book-making with cards.

And finally in 1993 - now, immediately late 1991, I started 
playing in my home where I had been playing poker and black-jack 
for many years and I realize now by seeing the officer's witness 
statements that I was investigated at that time. No charges were 
laid. Then I opened a slightly larger game on Baxter Road with 
four black-jack tables our to five black-jack tables and two to 
three poker tables. And I realized by the police reports that 
that game was investigated and I was not charged. And, then, in 
November, I expanded and I moved to the Topaz Plaza in a larger 
premises where I was again investigated in January/February by 
the Ottawa Police and, again, I was not charged. And, then, in 
March and April, I decided to expand into other towns, Toronto, 
Niagara Falls, Brockville, and announced that I was going to be 
establishing this new type of small "mom and pop" "cheers with 
chips" casinos which didn't seem to exhibit any of the problems 
that a large casino as being contemplated and at that stage, the 
police did a fourth investigation and low and behold, found 
something wrong. 

Now, they haven't told anybody what it is yet and we're still 
trying to find out what it is they think we started to do wrong 
in May/July of 1993 that we didn't do wrong for the previous two 
years, but it is on the basis of the fact that the charges have 
been identically laid, that we now come before you on a motion to 
plead the special pre-plea of autrefois acquit. 

Now, autrefois acquit was pleaded by myself in Quebec in 1991 and 
it was refused by the Judge and since then, I found what I 
believe to be some quite important case law to buttress by 
argument that autrefois acquit should apply in this case of a set 
of rules being put on trial and acquitted, rather than 
necessarily the person who was operating those set of rules and I 
would like to move into the second in the case book after the 
Fontana decision, the case of Carrier and I believe it's in 
Quebec. This is a case of a pamphlet which was charged with being 
seditious and the pamphlet was acquitted. Now, the gentleman in 
question here, Mr. Carrier had been charged with distributing 
this allegedly illegal pamphlet and had been acquitted on the 
grounds that the pamphlet was not seditious. So, thereby, 
establishing a right to issue that pamphlet.

Later on, when the Crown again charged Mr. Carrier with 
distributing the same pamphlet, he now argued autrefois acquit. 
Now, autrefois acquit, the Crown argues back that autrefois 
acquit only applies to situations which stem out of the same time 
and the same place, saying the same incident, for instance.

Now, in this case, it is doubtful if Mr. Carrier was in exactly 
the same place and certainly not the same time when he was again 
charged with distributing this pamphlet, which had been formally 
acquitted, and I would just point out where it says:

"The Crown on its side, makes a distinction between the plea of 
autrefois acquit and res judicata and says: "The plea of res 
judicata, if it exists, cannot be registered at this stage of the 
proceedings; the only pleas that can be registered at this stage 
of the proceedings...". And that is true. Only after we have 
pleaded can we use it. But, the last line: "The Crown adds that 
the plea of autrefois acquit cannot be accepted or granted 
because it is not a matter of the same offence." And that's 
dealing with the same time and same place. It was a different 
pamphlet on a different street corner on a different date. Now, 
if you go down to the next paragraph, about four lines in, it 
says: "It is true to say that the plea of res judicata generally 
serves as the basis for a plea of autrefois acquit but here it is 
necessary to make a distinction. If the desired conditions are 
proved in a manner to justify acceptance of a plea of autrefois 
acquit, the principle of res judicata will be decided at the same 
time in the plea of autrefois acquit and the two pleas will be 
merged into one but, on the other hand, if one is not within the 
conditions required so that autrefois acquit be accepted, the 
accused would always have the recourse of using res judicata at 
his trial." Now, the point is, this case of autrefois acquit, if 
we go down to the next paragraph, middle line, the quote, it 
says: "It is a fundamental principle that out of the same set of 
facts a series of prosecutions is not to be allowed." And, 
finally, the second-last line in that "...the offences are 
practically' the same...".[*] Now, it's the "practically" here 
and it could be meant to - you know - state that it doesn't have 
to be necessarily exactly, but, on page 78, top paragraph, fourth 
line, last two. words, it says: "The true test seems to be that 
to establish a plea of autrefois acquit it must be shown either: 
(1)..." - that's "either" - "...(1) that the defendant had been 
previously acquitted of the same offence." Well, in our case, we 
all have been and that has been shown by the decision of Justice 
Fontana and Justice Lennox, which is in the case book, or: "(2) 
that he could have been convicted...", Or, "(3) that the two 
offences are substantially the same." Now, again, it's that word 
"substantial" that is going to be the crux later on because we 
are saying that in our case of these set of rules, which Judge 
Fontana compared to the definitions of the gaming house, and 
concluded that a game run under these rules, does not constitute 
a gaming house. It just so happens that the offences Mr. Booth 
and I are charged with, are substantially the same and the 
offence I was charged with is substantially the same to the one I 
was acquitted with in 1989. So, in the Carrier case, we find that 
in a situation - now, if we zoom off - fundamentally, the end 
point is on page 85, second-last paragraph, up about six lines, 
page 85. The second-last paragraph and six lines from the bottom 
where it says: "Fundamentally, what the accused is charged with 
is with having distributed a pamphlet. He was found not guilty a 
first time and although he is prosecuted in different terms it is 
the same act with which he is charged," So, if we turn it over 
onto page 86, the very last lines, the Judge said: 

"...it is my duty to allow the plea of autrefois acquit presented 
by the defence and to discharge the accused." So, we have an 
example here where the time that the pamphlet was distributed and 
the place where the pamphlet was distributed and, perhaps, even 
the victim who accepted this supposedly seditious pamphlet, were 
all different; different sets of facts and, yet, the Judge does 
uphold that because in substance, the defendants had a right to 
distribute this pamphlet, which was judged not to be seditious, 
that autrefois acquit did apply.

So, when the Crown argues that autrefois acquit must stem out of 
the original incident, I would point out that the autrefois 
acquit was found to apply in the Carrier case where it did not 
stem out of the original incident at all. Not the same time, not 
the same place, not the same victim.

So, of all the great cases I found to buttress the argument for 
autrefois acquit being applicable in cases where time and place 
are immaterial, that is one of the best.

Now, if we step over to the next case which is Deserted wives, I 
believe, Conneley vs. Director of Public Prosecutions. I got mine 
yellowed here. We have on page 1256 at the top, second paragraph, 
where it says, "Per Lord Morris...", 1256, second paragraph: "Per 
Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest. On a plea of autrefois acquit it 
must be considered whether the crime charged in the later 
indictment is the same, or in effect the same, as the crime 
charged in the former indictment and it is immaterial that the 
facts under examination or the witnesses called in in the later 
proceedings are the same as those in the earlier proceedings." 
And three lines down, it says: "The offence must be exactly the 
same in law." Well, in our cases, it is exactly the same in law, 
but, what is kind of funny is, it is the same three people again, 
playing the same game. So, we have an interesting problem arising 
here. We have a found-in who has got a great argument for 
autrefois acquit. He played a game. The Judge told him it was 
legal for him to continue playing that game. He continued to do 
so. He is now back in front of this Court. And, finally, on page 
1259, the next page over, at the bottom, last two lines, where it 
says: "The authorities show that the courts have applied the 
doctrine to cases not only of "the same offence" but also of 
"substantially the same offence," and also to cases where a 
conviction on a second indictment would be inconsistent with 
acquittal on the first." Now, I'm sure if Mr. Lo did make it to 
trial on these two identical Indictments, the Judge would find 
that, sure enough, it was exactly the same game being played, 
right? Okay? So, that Mr. Lo would certainly be facing an 
inconsistent conviction in consideration of his original 
acquittal.

So, this is definitely, I believe, a beautiful example of why 
autrefois acquit should apply in this case. 

Now, step over to the next case, which is called In re Deserted 
Wives' Maintenance Act - that's the next tab - and you will see 
on the top right hand page, and that's page 681, it says that a 
certificate of acquittal: "...shall be a bar to any subsequent 
information or complaint for the same matter...".

Not offence, "matter". Again, Mr. Lo's point of view, seated at a 
black-jack table facing a certain set of rules, which originally 
were deemed fair, which nothing changed, it would seem that his 
certificate of acquittal should be a bar to any such subsequent 
information or complaint for the same matter and this is 
identically the same matter.

Now, the second-last paragraph on that page, three lines up from 
the bottom, it says: "The only evidence admissible on the issue 
of the jurisdiction of the former court is the formal record of 
conviction or acquittal."

So, that once you have Judge Fontana's decision, it's really only 
a question of law from this point on. So, at no point, I believe, 
do we have to bring in any facts. We just have to look at the 
actual Indictments and the decision and see if it should apply.

--
Abolitionist Slave Leader John C."The Banking Systems Engineer" Turmel
for UNILETS interest-free time-based currency in U.N. resolution C6
to Governments in the http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration.htm 
http://www.cyberclass.net/turmel 519-756-1325 USENET: can.politics