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TURMEL: #1 Robin Hood Raid on Casino Turmel Trial Transcript



JCT: Since the Project Robin Hood raid on Casino Turmel case was
brought up in the Big Five Marijuana appeals at the Ontario 
Court of Appeal recently arguing against judges imposing new 
criminal sanctions, rather than Parliament, I've decided to to 
publish the transcripts of the trial on the biggest gaming house 
raid in Canadian, probably world, history. 28 tables/155 dealers. 
See: http://www.cyberclass.net/turmel/gambler.htm 

930721
#93-18193
               ONTARIO COURT (PROVINCIAL DIVISION)               
                      HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
                             against
                           JOHN TURMEL
                           **********
                           SHOW CAUSE 
   HELD BEFORE HIS WORSHIP JUSTICE OF THE PEACE R. SCULTHORPE
            on the 21st day of July, 1993 at Ottawa.
                           **********
               CHARGE:  S. 201(1) (2 counts), C.C.
                       S. 202(1)(e), C.C.
                       S. 202(1)(c), C.C.
                              **********
APPEARANCES:
A. Marin, Esq. Crown Counsel
J. Turmel Appearing for Self
     
CLERK OF COURT: I don't believe he has any counsel. I'll probably 
have to arraign him. John Turmel, you are charged that between 
the 25th day of February, 1992 and the 14th day of July, 1993, in 
the City of Ottawa in the said Region, unlawfully did keep a 
gaming house, to wit: units 107, 102, 103, 104, 105, 2335 St. 
Laurent Boulevard in the City of Ottawa and elsewhere in the 
Province of Ontario, contrary to section 201(1) of the Criminal 
Code of Canada.
     You are further charged that between the 25th day of 
February, 1992 and the 14th day of July, 1993, inclusive, 
unlawfully did keep a common betting house, to wit: units 107, 
102, 103, 104, 105, 2335 St. Laurent Boulevard in the City of 
Ottawa and elsewhere in the Province of Ontario, contrary to 
section 201(1) of the Criminal Code of Canada.
     You are further charged that between the 25th day of 
February, 1992 and the 14th day of July, 1993, inclusive, 
unlawfully did engage in the business of occupation of betting, 
contrary to section 202(1)(e) of the Criminal Code of Canada.
     You are lastly charged that between the 25th day of 
February, 1992 and the 14th day of July, 1993, inclusive, 
unlawfully did control monies for gambling related to the offence 
of engaging in the business of operation  of betting, contrary to 
section 202(1)(c) of the Criminal Code of Canada.
     COURT: Mr. Turmel, do you have counsel? 
     TURMEL: No, I don't. I have two law students who are going 
to be helping me. They are both here in court to witness what's 
going on. 
     COURT: All right. Mr. Marin, what's going on this morning? 
     MARIN: Yes, Your Honour, the Crown is consenting to the 
release of the accused on the following conditions I'm submitting 
to the Court. 
     COURT: Mr. Turmel, the Crown is prepared to release you on a 
$1,000 cash bail. You are to notify Sergeant R. Cleary of the 
Ottawa Police 24 hours prior to and in writing of any change in 
your address. You are to reside at 2918 Baseline Road, Nepean. 
Not attend at 2335 St. Laurent Boulevard, Ottawa and not attend a 
common gaming house as defined by the Criminal Code. Do you 
understand the conditions, sir? 
     TURMEL: Well, not quite. Does that mean I'm not supposed to 
be caught in another gaming house before my trial? 
     COURT: That's the intent of the condition, I would believe. 
     MARIN: If it could also be amended, Your Honour, not to 
attend or operate, please. 
     TURMEL: Well, is a poker game considered a gaming house to 
the Crown? If it is, I'll have to say no, and if poker is okay in 
my home, then, I'll say yes. 
     COURT: Mr. Marin? 
     MARIN: Well, the term is used as defined in section 197 of 
the Criminal Code, the common gaming house provision. If I can 
just refer the Court to section 197, where the game is defined as 
being a game of chance or mixed chance and skill. Section 197, 
Your Worship, under the definition common gaming house, the game 
is defined two definitions lower. 
     COURT: Mr. Turmel, You're going to have to have your student 
counsel look at section 197(1) of the Criminal Code. If you fall 
within the parameters of the definitions, then, you'll be in 
conflict. 
     TURMEL: Well, Your Honour, in 1981, when I was charged 
similarly, the Crown made a similar request and the Judge said it 
wouldn't be necessary because I was no threat to society and 
didn't impose any conditions at all and I'm just - I think these 
conditions are rather onerous - considering there is no risk of 
flight. I have a defensive offence set to go. I don't understand 
what all those conditions are about, especially when there seems 
to be such a vagueness as to what constitutes a gaming house. Is 
it fair for them to include words that they barely understand and 
expect me to live up to them. I consent that if I was convicted 
of something or charged with something, perhaps, but.... 
     COURT: Well, that's the fact, Mr. Turmel, you are charged. 
     MARIN: Your Worship, it is that I don't want to turn the 
show cause into a trial court. Perhaps, we could just stand it 
down. I'll speak to whoever he has to represent him and try to 
reach some type of agreement, otherwise, we'll run the show 
cause. 
     COURT: All right. I am not prepared to impose that condition 
as it stands in any event. It's way too broad as far as I'm 
concerned. As far as operating a gaming house, that is going to 
be up to a trial Judge to decide whether Mr. Turmel was or can be 
released on a minimum of a bond. Do you wish to run a show cause, 
then? As I said, Mr. Marin, Mr. Turmel, think, is well-known in 
the area. I do not believe the $1,000 cash is necessary. 
     MARIN: Okay. Thank you.
     COURT: Mr. Turmel, outside of the other conditions that you 
not attend at 2335 St. Laurent Boulevard, that you reside at 2918 
Baseline Rd., Nepean, that you keep the peace and be of good 
behavior, and notify Sergeant Cleary, do you have any objections?
     TURMEL: Just to the 2335 St. Laurent. Guaranteed that I am 
not going to re-open a casino there and put the employees in 
jeopardy, so, I see no reason why I shouldn't be able to go, for 
instance, plan my defence, discuss things, settle with my 
landlord, move things. I don't find 2335 St. Laurent has any 
reason for my being excluded from it, unless I were going to 
start another game, which I will not. 
     COURT: Well, Mr. Turmel, I have no trouble imposing that 
particular condition. It is the alleged site of the offence. 
     TURMEL: Okay.
     COURT: You will be released, then, on signing a $1,000 bond. 
You will appear back in court one week from today, on July 28, 
8:30a.m. in Courtroom Number Five. 
     TURMEL: May I, at this stage of the game, be allowed to 
request an opportunity to have a hearing to present motions to 
quash the charges before the plea? And may I request that Judge 
Lennox be seized of such motions, considering he is up on the 
information already. 
     COURT: That's beyond my parameters, Mr. Turmel. You can talk 
to your student counsel and...
     TURMEL: So, next week, it's just the plea?
     COURT: Yes. To indicate a plea in courtroom #5. In the 
meantime, you can ask the Crown for disclosure and any other 
pertinent data that you need. All right. You are free to go. 
**********

19930806
#93-18193
              ONTARIO COURT (PROVINCIAL DIVISION)               
                     HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
                            against
                          JOHN TURMEL
                          **********
              MOTION TO QUASH FOR INSUFFICIENCY
        HELD BEFORE THE HONOURABLE JUDGE J.D. NADELLE
            on August 6, 1993 at Ottawa, Ontario.
                          **********
            CHARGE:  S. 201(1)
           CHARGE:  S. 201(1) (2 counts), C.C.
                    S. 202(1)(e), C.C.
                    S. 202(1)(c), C.C.
                              **********
APPEARANCES:
A. Marin, Esq. Crown Counsel
M. Edelson Appearing for Defence
     
NOTICE OF APPLICATION

TAKE NOTICE that an application will be made for an Order 
quashing the Information 

1) on the basis that the Applicant has not been reasonably 
informed of the substantive offence and the acts or conduct which 
allegedly form the basis of the charges, 

2) that the Applicant is unable to make full answer and defence 
and to know the case he has to meet, and, 

3) that the Information has not charged a crime known to the law; 
and, 

4) on the further basis that the Information is defective in 
substance for the failure of the offences as charged to satisfy 
the mandatory requirements of s. 581(3) of the Criminal Code of 
Canada, 

5) and because the offences as charged are capable of 
encompassing a multitude of separate and distinct activities.
Michael D. Edelson, 
     
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN TURMEL

I, JOHN TURMEL, of the City of Nepean, in the Province of 
Ontario, OATH AND SAY AS FOLLOWS:

4. That the Landlord, Howard Appotive of the premises at Topaz 
Plaza, located at 2335 St. Laurent Blvd. in the city of Ottawa 
indicated to me that I had ten (10) days commencing the 16th day 
of July, 1993 within which to bring a motion to quash the 
Information.

5. The premises known as Casino Turmel employ approximately one 
hundred (100) individuals on a full time basis.

6. The Landlord of the said premises has advised me that if I do 
not obtain a decision that I must move out of the aforesaid 
premises.
     
COURT: Mr. Edelson, you've brought a Motion to Quash the 
Information. 

EDELSON: Yes, the last count in the four count Information refers 
to 202(1)(c). If we refer to 202(1)(c), it says: "Every one 
commits an offence who (c) has under his control any money or 
other property relating to a transaction that is an offence under 
this section...". And you'll note, Your Honour, that the further 
wording says: "related to the offence of engaging in the business 
or occupation of betting..."  Now, because of the wording in the 
Information, there's no offence known to law. Your Honour will 
note the wording that has been chosen by the authorities here is 
that he: "...unlawfully did control monies for gambling related 
to the offence...". et cetera. "Gambling" is nowhere defined, 
which is another difficulty we have because nowhere in the Code. 
We have "gaming". We have "betting", "gaming houses" and "betting 
houses". We have "bet" defined, but "gambling" is not defined.

Working backward through count four, there's no offence known to 
law in count four and, therefore, it's a nullity ab initio and 
must be quashed, is not capable of amendment. 

The first count of the Information refers to, "unlawfully keeping 
a gaming house", and it is not an offence known to law to keep a 
gaming house. The offence known to law is the keeping of a common 
gaming house and that's the only thing that's defined under 197 
as a criminal act. This is not an offence known to law and is 
void ab initio, count one, and, therefore, must be struck down. 
It cannot be amended, in my respectful submission, given the case 
law I'll be referring to momentarily. 

That leaves our focus, Your Honour, on counts two and three, "did 
keep a common betting house", and three, "did engage in the 
business or occupation of betting". Now, these counts are 
deficient under 583. Section 197 is the definition section and 
under that section, "common betting house means a place that is 
opened, kept or used for the purpose of..." Your Honour can see 
already in the opening definition that there are three different 
modes. It can be opened. It can be kept or it can be used for 
specific purposes.

"(a) Enabling, encouraging or assisting persons who resort 
thereto to bet between themselves or with the keeper...". So 
there are, in addition to that, four different modes in which the 
offence can be committed and then, under subsection (b), which is 
a disjunctive section: "Enabling any person to receive, record, 
register, transmit or pay bets or to announce the results of 
betting". There are, it would appear, six or seven further modes 
under that subsection. 

Now, the second related definition is the "common gaming house" 
definition, because of the absence of the proper definition, we 
have the five different modes, subsection (a) and the four under 
subsection (b) under which this particular offence can be 
committed. It is our submission, Your Honour, that these are, as 
defined by Wiz, diverse and unrelated modes of committing the 
offence and that's the key. There are numerous and diverse ways 
in which the gaming -- common gaming house offence can be 
committed, as well as the common betting house offence and these 
are the central points of attack. 

The law, of course, Your Honour, has changed somewhat in the last 
15 years with respect to technical averments as we're all aware. 
The former 510 is now 583 of the Code, which talks about 
sufficiency of a particular count and it says that:

"No count in an indictment is insufficient by reason of the 
absence of details where...the count otherwise fulfills the 
requirements of section 581...". And then, they go on to say that 
it's not insufficient only because it doesn't name the means by 
which the alleged offence was committed and that, of course, 
would be an argument available to the Crown. However, the courts 
have held that that section does not save an invalid information. 
It does not, and these are the key words use in case after case, 
"does not carry the facts from the -- averred in the information 
from the general to the particular", and that, of course, is the 
central test that's always applied and is applied in Wiz 
Developments, does the information in its wording carry the 
averment from the general to the particular so as the accused 
knows sufficiently what it is he's being called upon to answer? 

Section 601, Your Honour, of course, is the next section of 
relevance to us and that is the section relating to the accused's 
right to move to quash. It must be done prior to plea where it is 
alleged there's a defect on the face of the information and it is 
our submission that that is the section under which we are 
entitled to move today to have these counts quashed.

What I'd like to do, Your Honour, if I may, is, historically, 
just summarize the development of the law on the issue of 
quashing informations. There have been several misinterpretations 
by appellate courts of the central judgment on gaming, the 
Manitoba Court of Appeal decision in Bingo Enterprises. In 
Milberg, our Ontario Court of Appeal made a decision which has 
been taken by other courts, such as the Quebec Court of Appeal in 
a gaming case, as having overturned Bingo Enterprises. In other 
words, as having said, "We don't follow Bingo. We don't agree 
with Bingo". 

COURT: Well, they didn't overturn it. They just don't agree with 
it. 

EDELSON: Exactly. They had no power to overturn it... 

COURT: Right.

EDELSON:...effectively, but they're saying, "We distinguish 
Bingo", or, "We don't agree or follow Bingo". And what's 
interesting, Your Honour, is that's what I thought they said the 
first time I read Milberg and then, in re-reading it, it became 
clear to me that that's not at all what the Court of Appeal was 
saying. 

You'll recall, Bingo followed Wiz, which had just been decided 
and dealt with the issue of not only the sufficiency of the 
information, but on the issue of the ability under what was then 
732, as I recall, to amend an information when it was viewed as 
being insufficient. Now, in Bingo, the charge is virtually on all 
fours to our count number one, assuming the common gaming house 
averment was there. If Your Honour looks at page 292, it says:

"On the 18th of March, 1982, did unlawfully keep a common gaming 
house contrary to the provisions of the statute in such case made 
and provided." Your Honour will note at the top portion of 292 in 
the head-note, Wiz is referred to and applied by the Manitoba 
Court of Appeal and they point out common gaming house as having 
several separate and distinct activities included in the 
definition. They simply recite what is now 197 that I've just 
recited to you. It goes on to say:

"The accused says that although the charge follows the wording of 
185(1), it fails to identify what aspect of their conduct over 
the nine months or 15 days is alleged to be criminal." The court 
goes to Wiz Developments and says:

"It is determinative of the appeal. The charge does not meet the 
mandatory  requirements of 510(3) of the Code and is, therefore, 
ab initio vitiated."   

Quoting from Mr. Justice Lamer, as he then was, the court said: 

"The statute under which the information at bar has been laid 
casts a broad net and the prohibition is directed at many diverse 
and unrelated uses of aircraft in Canada." Now, this definition, 
"diverse and unrelated uses", is the foundation of an application 
of this sort. The court at the bottom, Your Honour, second last 
paragraph about the fourth line up talks about Wiz and says:

"The circumstances in this appeal are analogous. In both cases, 
the charges in the Information are words of the enactments that 
describe the offences. The Aeronautic Act defines the operation 
of a commercial air service...". 

And then, they go on: 

"The Criminal Code defines a common gaming house to include a 
number of separate and distinct activities. In neither case, do 
the charges describe the offences in such a way as to lift them 
from the general to the particular." 

Second last line: 

"particulars have never been considered as a proper mean to cure 
vitiated informations for defects of substance...". 

I'd like to go directly to Milberg, Your Honour, if I may, while 
we have those words fresh from Bingo. It's the only reference in 
the case to Milberg and, again, I must say I read this wrongly 
the first time. This is the first paragraph: 

"We are obliged to note our respectful disagreement with the 
opinion of the Manitoba Court of Appeal, R. v. Bingo Enterprises 
Ltd.". Now, when you read that, I said, "Well, they're not going 
to follow Bingo", but, then, I read on. It says:

"...that Wiz Developments overruled R. v. Griss and Gruber."

Now, pausing there for a moment, they don't say, "We disagree 
with the principle of Bingo". They say, "We disagree with that 
portion of the judgment in Bingo where they say Wiz overruled 
Griss." 

Griss and Gruber was a betting house case in which the court said 
that book-making was, like prostitution, basically one and not 
several diverse activites and shouldn't be specified. And yet, in 
1987, the Manitoba Court in Wilson in a betting house case 
specifically over-ruled Griss and is now cited right in the 
Criminal Code for the required sufficiency of gaming and betting 
houses. Of course, Milberg is also cited for the not-required 
sufficiency of bawdy-houses. It was certainly made very clear. A 
judge would have to be pretty French to still think the bawdy-
house ruling over-ruled the gaming house ruling when they 
actually disagreed with a betting house ruling.

That's all I'm saying in this judgment. Now, this, unfortunately 
has been misread because the Quebec Court of Appeal in Billon-Rey 
and the Crown jumps on the bandwagon and says that the same thing 
applies. In other words, the Ontario Court of Appeal has chosen 
not to follow Bingo. But, of course, that's not what they say. 
"We disagree with the interpretation of Bingo where they say Wiz 
overrules Griss." That's all they say. They never say, on the 
issue of gaming, that Bingo doesn't apply.

COURT: If that is correct, then, am I not still bound by Griss 
and Gruber?

EDELSON: My view is no because they refer to different offences.

COURT: Griss and Gruber was betting house, almost identical.

EDELSON: Not gaming, though. Milberg says it's every one who 
keeps a common bawdy house. It has nothing to do with gaming 
whatsoever and I'm going to come back to a judgment by Judge 
Fontana of this court where he also is called upon to quash a 
similar information and, in my view misinterprets the Milberg 
reading of Bingo, but he makes a distinction himself in any event 
between being a found-in, because of the very narrow definition 
of what it is to be a found-in and the issue of gaming and when 
one looks at Milberg, we have to look at what the charge was. 
It's keeping a common bawdy house and court says:

"Many offences are capable of being committed in more ways than 
one. the charge of keeping a common bawdy house is not of that 
nature. While the offence may be perpetrated a number of 
different ways, it cannot be said to be diverse or unrelated and 
that it is not necessary to refer in the information the 
particular part of the definition of the offence it is intended 
to be invoked at trial." 

And, of course, Bingo does refer to the gaming section, not the 
bawdy house section. The court in Milberg says bawdy house. It's 
very simple. It's either acts of prostitution or indecency. That 
is one averment. It's all related and that's all there is to it. 
However, gaming is different and as the Court of Appeal of 
Manitoba said in Bingo, is more analogous to the situation in 
Wiz, dealing with the Aeronautics legislation, than this. Milberg 
simply says that they disagree with the interpretation of Bingo 
Enterprises, that Wiz Developments overruled Griss and Gruber, 
that's all they're referring to. 

They're not saying, Bingo doesn't apply in circumstances of this 
sort. They're not disagreeing with Bingo per se. They're simply 
disagreeing with one statement made earlier in the Bingo 
judgment. 

Now, the other case which I feel duty bound to bring to your 
attention is Billion-Rey at the Quebec Court of Appeal because it 
is a case of a common gaming house. The wording would be exactly 
-- virtually exactly the same as our Information. What's 
interesting, of course, is that they misinterpret, again, what 
the Court of Appeal did in Milberg. It says: 

"Three years later, the Ontario Court of Appeal was called upon 
to rule on exactly the same circumstances as those in the present 
case on an exactly identical indictment." 

is where the Quebec Court of Appeal falls into error. It wasn't 
the same indictment. It was a totally different charge with 
totally different elements and it did not have the unrelated and 
diverse elements as referred to in the Supreme Court of Canada. 

So, in my submission, one, again, has to carefully delineate what 
was the information in each charge that was before the particular 
court. The court says: "In Milberg, the Ontario Court of Appeal, 
taking a different position from that taken in the 1984 judgment 
by the Manitoba Court of Appeal, concluded the indictment as 
drafted was valid." And all the court does is they quote part of 
Milberg and at the end says: "I completely share this point of 
view". 

But having fallen into the error at the beginning of saying that 
they were called upon to rule on exactly the same circumstances 
as those in the present case and on exactly the identical 
indictment, of course, it's no surprise that they fall into error 
because Milberg and Bingo are totally different. Milberg does 
not, for our purposes in terms of stare decisis, overrule Bingo 
and it doesn't bind this court on gaming charges. The argument is 
that Bingo is the only one of the appeals which properly is 
before this court on the issue of gaming, is properly decided on 
the issue of gaming and is a case which I urge Your Honour to 
find favor in. 

Milberg does not overrule it for the purposes of Ontario in 
binding this court because it's on a totally different issue that 
a Quebec Court of Appeal, then, falls in the same error by 
suggesting that Milberg was about the same facts, same indictment 
when, of course, it's totally different, totally different 
offence and totally different elements comprising the offence. 

If Your Honour finds that you are not attracted to the argument I 
make distinguishing Milberg and Bingo and Billion-Rey, and Wiz, 
it's over in reference to the counts one and two. It's 
potentially over. 

Now, a quote from Ryan, the Ontario Court of Appeal, which dealt 
with the precise location of an impaired driving:

"The Court of Appeal reasoned that the rationale of Wiz was based 
not on the failure to set out the time or location of the 
offence, but rather on the failure to identify the particular act 
which was alleged to have constituted the offence". 

Now, in Douglas, they say:

"In our opinion, the kind of information that will be necessary 
to satisfy this test will vary depending on the nature of the 
offence charged. What particularity will be needed with respect 
to a given charge will "depend on the circumstances. From these 
cases, it can be seen that an indictment is adequate if it 
contains sufficient details to give the accused reasonable 
information with respect to the charge and to enable the accused 
to identify the transaction so as to permit the adequate 
preparation of the defence. Whether an indictment is sufficient 
will depend on the offence charged and the facts of the case." 

Our interest is the acts involved and the nature of the offence 
and it's only when you look at those very specific items can you 
make a determination whether 601 should apply to the quashing of 
the Information before you and my argument is that Milberg has no 
application to gaming house because it's a different offence and 
Bingo does apply and for that reason. The two offences should be 
quashed in any event.

Now, there was a subsequent judgment, Your Honour, in the 
Manitoba Queens Bench, R. v. Wilson, and that was also a similar 
case where Bingo was, of course followed in the Manitoba courts. 
Our research did not turn up any other case directly on point 
dealing with the quashing of a gaming house information, whether 
for or against. What we did turn up was a judgment, as I said to 
you at the start, of Judge Fontana of this court and I'd like to 
provide you with a copy in R. v. Booth, Lo, Michael Mahfouz and 
Tasso Paliovarkas.  

COURT: That's not the one in tab 15. 

EDELSON: It is, but it's not the right portion. This is the 
portion where they sought to quash the information. The portion 
you have is the acquittal portion. This is the part, Your Honour, 
and I thought you should be aware of it for several reasons, 
where, at the beginning, it was Mr. Grace and Mr. Sagle appearing 
for the accused and the motion you'll see at page 2, Mr. Sagle 
says:

"Before arraignment and plea, I have a motion under 601 objecting 
to the Information. I'm objecting the charge based on the fact 
that it's too vague under 510(3)." Your Honour, it's important to 
keep in mind this distinction, was found-in in a common gaming 
house as opposed to keeper of a common gaming house and we have 
all of these gentlemen here as found-ins. 

COURT: He argued Bingo and Wilson as well. 

EDELSON: In the course of argument, Bingo came up, Milberg came 
up, all of the cases were referred to. Now, this is Miss Cote, 
and listen to what she says in raising Milberg which, again, 
superficially is the Crown's strongest suit here:

"The Court of Appeal proposed in those days, Justice Cory, as he 
then was, Robins and Finlayson states: "We are obliged to note 
our respectful disagreements with the opinion of the Manitoba 
Court of Appeal in Bingo Enterprises Ltd.". 

Stops there. That's, of course, not what the sentence says as 
I've read it to you. It goes on to say that Wis didn't overrule, 
et cetera. So she presents to Judge Fontana the notion that our 
Court of Appeal, which she apparently does from reading from the 
decisions in quotations, not only disagreed with, but effectively 
said that the Manitoba Court of Appeal judgment in Bingo 
Enterprises is not to be followed. 

Now, I'm sure that was inadvertent and I can see how she made the 
mistake, but, clearly, she was wrong in that direct quotation 
because she reads only half the sentence. Now, what's interesting 
is Judge Fontana, unfortunately, has not seen the cases at this 
point. He says: 

"Mr. Sagle, what am I to do with the expressed rejection of Bingo 
Enterprises case in the Ontario Court of Appeal?". 

Well, of course, now, he's fallen into the trap because it's not 
a rejection of Bingo. Well, Mr. Sagle says: 

"Actually, if I'm not mistaken, I don't think it refers to 
Bingo." 

The court says:

"Well, at the bottom of page 7...". 

So he clearly has been handed the case. Mr. Sagle says:

"It doesn't actually overrule Bingo. It says it disagrees with 
that opinion, overruled an earlier case. 

And Mr. Sagle's back on the issue again. He's clearly reading the 
sentence as it should be read. Then, there's some discussion 
about this passage. There seems to be great confusion between not 
only counsel but the court as to what really happens in Bingo and 
Milberg: SAGLE: "There is a principle from Bingo that they seem 
to disagree with. It could take a little while to figure this 
out, but it doesn't seem to be saying that Bingo would be 
overruled if it was in Ontario. It just seems to say that part of 
what was mentioned in Bingo, that the principle that seemed to 
come out of it and the ratio, perhaps, was stretching too far. It 
doesn't really overrule Bingo, at least my first reading of it."


--
Abolitionist Slave Leader John C."The Banking Systems Engineer" Turmel
for UNILETS interest-free time-based currency in U.N. resolution C6
to Governments in the http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration.htm 
http://www.cyberclass.net/turmel 519-756-1325 USENET: can.politics



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