Re: The Effects of a Global Thermonuclear War in 1988 (Re: NuclearWar, 1980's)

In message <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, zolota 
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes
> "Dave J" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
> news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > Robert J. Kolker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
> > news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > >
> > >
> > > Yang Li wrote:
> > >
> > > >
> > > > Do you launch anther strike at Soviet cities and population at this
> > > > time? Is it morally acceptable to kill innocent civilians and destroy
> > > > their society because your own has been condemned?  Justify.
> > >
> > > Because Revenge is Sweet. Didn't you know that. Don't get mad. Get even.
> > > The Main Thing is never to be the sucker or boob that is left holding
> > > the bag. Better everyone should die, than that.
> > >
> >
> > or you can say it in one of those well-modulated professional soldier
> voices
> > like in the Clancy movies "we need to eliminate their centers of
> production,
> > and their ability to continue to make war". We already proved we'd do it
> at
> > Dresden and Tokyo.
>
> Dresden had nothing to do with war production and given that the war ended a
> few weeks later it's destruction had little effect on "ability to continue".
> It was either an experiment or a warning to the red army, that's all.
> Unnecessary killings of civilians are war crimes, that raid was just the
> most obvious.

See:

Letter to the Sunday Telegraph. I forgot to note the date.

As a correspondent pointed out, Dresden was bombed because it was a 
military target. (Letters Feb 20). The city's destiny was sealed at the 
Yalta conference (on Feb 4 1945) and, as Winston Churchill's 
interpreter, I heard and watched Stalin with his deputy Chief of Staff, 
General Antonov, urgently ask us to bomb roads and railways to stop 
Hitler tranferring divisions from the West. Antonov stressed the 
importance of Dresden as a vital rail junction, saying there was a "uzel 
svyazi" - literally, "communications knot".

Churchill and Roosevelt had to agree as they were indebted to Stalin for 
relieving pressure on our front during the German Ardennes winter 
counter-offensive.

The RAF and US strategic air force succeeded in their military objective 
but tragically and unintentionally they inflicted enormous loss of 
civilian life.

Whether these facts might change Jorg Haider's opinion of Churchill (or 
Stalin?) remains to be seen.

Hugh Lunghi
Fleet, Hampshire

Another letter:

John Batho says that Churchill's greatest crime was bombing Dresden. 
(Letters Feb 20). As someone who's grandparents died from German 
bombers, who's aunt had her house destroyed around her, who's mother 
became seriously ill through the strain, and someone who spent his young 
nights cowering in air-raid shelters, I later bombed Dresden with no 
compunction whatsoever.
G. Abrahams
Birchington, Kent

Also see:

The study is a very lengthy document, but here are its conclusions:

III. CONCLUSION

The foregoing historical analysis establishes the following definitive 
answers to the
recurring questions concerning the February 1945 bombings of Dresden by 
Allied
strategic air forces:
a. Dresden was a legitimate military target
b. Strategic objectives, of mutual importance to the Allies and the 
Russians, underlay
the bombings of Dresden.
c. The Russians requested that the Dresden area be bombed by Allied air 
forces.
d. The Supreme Allied Commander, his Deputy Supreme Commander, and the 
key
British and American operational air authorities recommended and ordered 
the
bombing of Dresden.
e. The Russians were officially informed by the Allies concerning the 
intended date of
and the forces to be committed to the bombing of Dresden.
f. The RAF Bomber Command employed 772 heavy bombers, 1477.7 tons of 
high
explosive and 1181.6 tons of incendiary bombs, and American Eighth Air 
Force
employed a total of 527 heavy bombers, 953.3 tons of high explosive and 
294.3 tons of
incendiary bombs, in the 14-15 February bombings of Dresden.
g. The specific target objectives in the Dresden bombings were, for the 
RAF Bomber
Command, the Dresden city area, including industrial plants, 
communications, military
installations, and for the American Eighth Air Force, the Dresden 
Marshalling Yards
and railway facilities.
h. The immediate and actual consequences of the Dresden bombings were 
destruction
or severe damage to at least 23 per cent of the city's industrial 
buildings; severe
damage to at least 56 per cent of the city's non-industrial buildings 
(exclusive of
dwellings); destruction or severe damage to at least 50 percent of the 
residential units
in the city's non-industrial buildings (exclusive of dwellings); 
destruction or severe
damage to at least 50 percent of the residential units in the city, and 
at least some
damage to 80 per cent of the city's dwellings; the total disruption of 
the city as a major
communications center, in consequence of destruction and damage 
inflicted on its
railway facilities; and death to probably 25,000 persons and serious 
injury to probably
30,000 others, virtually all of these casualties being the result of the 
RAF area raid.
i. The Dresden bombings were in no way a deviation from established 
bombing policies
set forth in official bombing directives.
j. The specific forces and means employed in the Dresden bombings were 
in keeping
with the forces and means employed by the Allies in other aerial attacks 
on
comparable targets in Germany.
k. The Dresden bombings achieved the strategic objectives that underlay 
the attack
and were of mutual importance to the Allies and the Russians.

The entire study can be found at:

http://www.earth-lights.net/dresden/Dresden_Bombing_Document.htm






















--
M.J.Powell