Re: Allegory; Radical Interpretation; Principle of Charity

The Other <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:

> OK, here you go.  I'm interested in what you think about this stuff.

     After reading along a little way, I figured out where I had
misunderstood.  I thought that you were talking about an 
application of the principle of charity to allegory, rather than
allegory as the principle applied.

> First, the reference:
 
> Gerald Bruns, "Midrash and Allegory: The Beginnings of Scriptural 
> Interpretation."  In R. Alter and F. Kermode, eds. The Literary Guide 
> to the Bible.  Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
> 1987. 625-646. 

     Thanks for the quotes.  I cut them for space, but I'll keep
them handy.

> The author then continues with a discussion of the "rule of faith" as
> expressed variously by Tertullian, Irenaeus, and Augustine.
 
> If anybody's read this far, I'm interested in their comments.  This
> principle of charity as defined by Wilson seems bizarre to me.

     Wilson, I dunno, but the same fits Davidson, or maybe worse. 
Understanding others requires generally counting them right?  
Disagreeing prohibits you from seeing them as rational creatures 
-- even from considering them to have beliefs?  In his case I 
partly agree:  I have no reaon to think that D is being rational.  
But it's very clear he has beliefs, and I'd be wrong to
conclude he isn't saying anything.  Talking crap is still a kind
of talking.

     Later on he criticized his position, or at least the way he
had put it before:

     [The Principle of Charity] counsels us quite generally 
     to prefer theories of interpretation that minimize 
     disagreement.  So I tended to put the matter in the
     early essays, wanting to stress the inevitability 
     of the appeal to charity.  But minimizing 
     disagreement, or maximizing agreement, is a confused 
     ideal.  The aim of interpretation is not agreement
     but understanding.  My point has always been that 
     understanding can be secured only by interpreting in a 
     way that makes for the right sort of agreement.  The 
     'right sort', however, is no easier to specify than to 
     say what constitutes a good reason for holding a 
     particular belief."

                  _Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation_ xvii 
     http://tinyurl.com/wqsq 

     That strikes me as a pretty good corrective to the nonsense
you quoted, or at least to its central mistake:  mixing up 
agreement with understanding.  But Bruns is onto something in an
unintended way, since allegory often works on Davidson's 
earlier principle.  The Church Dads, for example, seem convinced
that agreement with them is the touchstone of truth, and 
allegory is often the tool they use to make the Bible conform to
their beliefs -- i.e., to read it charitably.

     I might have something different to say after I've read the
rest of the essay.

-- Moggin

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