Re: Kaplan Inc. (Concord School of Law) Issue... ACLU Help Needed!

I read the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette article about the case  Flaherty v.
Keystone Oaks School District, 247 F. Supp.2d 698 (W.D. Pa. 2003)...

The Pittsburgh ACLU represented a "WHITE" plaintiff  Jack Flaherty in
that case...

First they secured damages, attorneys' fees and emergency relief ...

Same facts and relevant law, but you're "BLACK!"

Don't hold you're breath waiting for the ACLU to help you. 

[EMAIL PROTECTED] ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote in message news:<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>...
> Second Posting From ACLU Site
> 
> November 13, 2003 
> 
> Witold Walczak 
> American Civil Liberties Union 
> Greater Pittsburgh Chapter 
> 313 Atwood Street 
> Pittsburgh, PA 15213 
> 
> RE: YOUR REQUEST TODAY 
> 
> Dear Mr. Walczak: 
> 
> Brief Summary of the Facts : 
> 
> 1. This case involves a "transfer student" and a "for-profit" online
> law school's alleged denial of an October 2000 start, because of race
> (African American). That is, the plaintiff contends the Director of
> Enrollment advised him on several occasions that the Administration
> had "changed their mind" about his admission because his race "wasn't
> the preferred demographic they envisioned as being included with the
> first group of graduates."
> 
> 2. Plaintiff did start in January 2001, but claims he was systemically
> isolated, excluded and intentionally denied important features of the
> online law study program, and denied any direct involvement with the
> first group of graduates.
> 
> (A) In particular, denied the signature aspect of the online law
> school "Professor-led" group chats for the only 3rd year course the
> school said was available in 2001. Plaintiff contends that the chats
> wasn't held because the other 3rd year students were "absentee"
> students and really not participating with the online program.
> 
> (B) Plaintiff contends that he also wasn't invite to the fourth-year
> planning sessions the school held for the upper-level student in
> October 2001.
> 
> (C) Wasn't provided the advertised "student roster" the online law
> school says facilitates a highly interactive online campus. Plaintiff
> contends that the student roster was denied because the other 3rd year
> students were "absentee" students. Plaintiff also contends that the
> school advertised 600 to 1000 actively participating students but he
> only witnessed no more than 25 to 50 first and second year students.
> 
> 3. Plaintiff alleges that he complained throughout 2001 about unequal
> treatment.
> 
> 4. On January 5, 2002, plaintiff posted an inquiry on the
> "Student-to-Student Only" bulletin board, seeking information to prove
> his belief of racial discrimination.
> 
> 5. On January 6, 2002, a non black student, (STUDENT'S NAME REMOVED),
> answered the plaintiff's posting with a reply specifically identifying
> an unequal learning environment.
> 
> 6. Immediately, on January 6, 2002, plaintiff supplemented his
> complaint, adding the newly discovered (STUDENT'S NAME REMOVED)
> information.
> 
> 7. As had been a pattern of the for-profit law school, on January 7,
> 2002, in retaliation, they suspended the plaintiff's access to the
> online campus.
> 
> 8. Plaintiff thereafter requested assistance from the Tech department,
> and his certificates were corrected to allow access.
> 
> 9. Plaintiff then posted a "second" inquiry on the "Student to Student
> Only" bulletin board questioning the administration's failure to
> forward his final exam results and overall course grades, failure to
> provide registration information for the 2002 academic year that had
> already started, and the like.
> 
> 10. The for-profit law school, immediately, again in retaliation,
> suspended the plaintiff's access to the online campus. This time
> plaintiff received an error message that his account was no longer
> active and the Tech department advised that the administration was
> only allowed to correct a non active status.
> 
> 11. On January 9, 2002, plaintiff attempted again to access the online
> campus, this time plaintiff received an error message that the account
> had expired.
> 
> 12. Other students contacted the plaintiff and advised him that all of
> his posting had been removed and such was anomalous because posting of
> former students were still listed.
> 
> 13. On January 11, 2002, defendant Cassandra Colchagoff, Associate
> Dean, wrote plainly and clearly language substantiating a retaliatory
> motive to explain a 12 month suspension:
> 
> "After our first contact, you placed several postings to the Student
> Discussion Boards that question whether there are, in fact, other
> upper level students at Concord and course curriculum. You also stated
> that Concord had failed to provide you with your course and final exam
> grades, when that was untrue. Most glaringly, you disrpted students
> engaged in their studies in the Concord Chat Rooms with messages
> stating ?Important Message ? Concord is a Sham' suggesting that
> Concord's FYLSE results were inaccurate and that there were no upper
> level students. These clearly go to your allegations to me that we
> were engaged in fraud and misrepresentation of the school and, in
> fact, had fabricated our third and fourth year students."
> 
> 14. On January 17, 2002, defendant Cassandra Colchagoff, Associate
> Dean, wrote the plaintiff and advised the following in response to his
> email dated January 11, 2002 and subsequent communications:
> 
> "If you choose to seek readmission to Concord following the expiration
> of your suspension, you must do so in writing to the Dean. Readmission
> to the school is at the discretion of the Dean. Your request should
> include a statement that you understand the nature and severity of the
> actions that led to your suspension and what actions you will take to
> avoid further violations. You may included whatever other relevant
> statements you feel are appropriate. Your application for readmission
> will be considered in light of your entire academic record."
> 
> 15. On January 17, 2003, plaintiff filed a formal grievance with the
> Defendants providing, among other:
> 
> "It appears that your most recent action demonstrates further
> retaliation. You have disciplined me for discussions that you alleged
> without providing names, the times of any alleged discussion, etc. You
> asked me to respond to things that are vague and not specifically
> stated. Further, you have disciplined me despite knowing that you had
> blocked all of my communications on a day and time prior to the
> alleged conduct. You are well aware of such because I emailed you
> immediately following each time the school violated my first amendment
> rights."
> 
> 16. No hearing was provided and the for-profit online law school
> failed to provided any Title VI procedure to redress the plaintiff's
> discrimination concerns.
> 
> 17. In 2003, the for-profit online law school has knowingly refused to
> comply with the stated readmission procedure. That is, refused to
> communicate any responsible reply to the plaintiff's various "Petition
> for Reinstatement" and/or his many "Request for Due Diligence."
> 
> 18. In short, this case involves a retaliatory 12 months suspension in
> plain and clear violation of rights protected by the United States
> Constitution, Amendments I and XIV and the Pennsylvania Constitution
> Article 1 and 7. Flaherty v. Keystone Oaks School District, 247 F.
> Supp. 2d 698 (W.D. Pa. 2003). See also: Killion v. Franklin Regional,
> 136 F. Supp. 2d 446 (W.D. Pa. 2001).
> 
> 19. The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of
> time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury. See Elrod v.
> Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373, 49 L.Ed. 2d 547 (1976). Abu-Jamal v. Price,
> 154 F.3d 128, 136 (3r Cir. 1998).
> 
> See also: Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (Due Process and Liberty
> Hearing Requirement); and, General building Contractors Assn. Inc. V.
> Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 389-390 (1982) (Conduct that violates the
> Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment also violates
> Section 1981).
> 
> See: Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 281 (2001); United States v.
> Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 732, n. 7 (1992); and, Alexander v. Choate, 469
> U.S. 287, 293 (1985) discrimination that violates the Equal Protection
> Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment committed by an institution that
> accepts federal funds also constitutes a violation of Title VI.
> 
> 20. Defendants have intentionally obstructed and delayed any legal
> redress since January 2002.
> 
> 21. Plaintiff has been denied, for 23 months, among other, First
> Amendment Protections, "due process" and a "liberty" interest in his
> "good name," rights guaranteed by Title VI, and rights guaranteed by
> the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Section
> 1981. The suspension has placed his ability to comply with the "study
> plan" approved by the State Bar of California that mandates no
> interruption of legal studies.
> 
> 22. Defendant(s) at all times was an institution receiving federal
> assistance from the U.S. Department of Education subject to Title VI
> of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title VI provides: "no person in the
> United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin,
> be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or
> subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
> federal financial assistance." 42 USC section 2000d.
> 
> 23. A student may bring a contract action to enforce the specific
> promises made by his university. Britt v. Chestnut Hill Collage, 429
> Pa. Super. 263, 632 A.2d 557 (1993); Cavaliere v. Duff's Business
> Inst., 413 Super. 357, 605 A.2d 397 (1992); Paladino V. Adelphis
> Univ., 89 A.D.2d 85, 454 N.Y.S.2d 868, 873 (1992); Wickstrom v. North
> Idaho Collage, 111 idaho 450, 725 P/2d 155, 157 (1986); Behrend v.
> Ohio App., 2d 155 (1986); Behrend v. Ohio App., 55 Ohio App. 2d 135,
> 379 N.E. 617, 620 (Ohio App. 2d 1977).
> 
> 24. A student may also bring an interference with contract action in
> Pennsylvania if plaintiff and defendants were contractually bound at
> the time of the alleged tort. Atlantic paper Box, Co. V. Whitman'S
> Chocolates, 844 F. Supp. 1038, 1047 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
> 
> II. Plaintiff's attempts to serve the summons and complaint: 
> 
> 1. On November 10, 2003, Jonathan Grayer, Chairman and CEO, Kaplan
> Inc., 888 Seventh Avenue, New York, NY 10106, was additionally served
> individual copies of the complaint and summons (issued by Robert
> Barth, Clerk Western District Pennsylvania).
> 
> 2. Rule 4 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain parties
> to cooperate in saving unnecessary costs and service of the summons
> and complaint. That is, Plaintiff additionally served the defendants
> by overnights mail on September 30, 2003 and the Kaplan Higher
> Education local campus (ICM School of Business)
> 
> 3. On September 22, 2003, plaintiff served the defendants individual
> copies of a Notice of Lawsuit and Request for Waiver of Service of
> Summon, and the Wavier of Summons Form.
> 
> 4. The defendants, all located in the United States, despite being
> notified of the pending action by a plaintiff asking for a wavier of
> service of the summons, failed to cooperate in saving unnecessary
> costs of service of the summons.
> 
> 5. Plaintiff contends: if a defect in process is found, Rule 4(h) does
> not require that the party be served anew as if the first service of
> process did not exist.
> 
> (A) The date the action was commenced, however, relates back to the
> date the first process was served (September 30, 2003); and
> 
> (B) The rules clearly contemplate that the court may have personal
> jurisdiction over a defendant served with imperfect process, corrected
> vis-a-vis service of a second summons (October 15, 2003). Sanderford
> v. Prudential Ins. Co., 902 F.2d 897; 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 8908; 16
> Fed. R. Serv. 3d (Callaghan) 1381.
> 
> 6. Further, plaintiff contends the insufficiency of process defense is
> waiveable. The rules provide for mandatory waiver of the defense of
> insufficiency of process if not included in a defense motion or
> responsive pleading. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h). According to the Court
> Docket a defense motion and/or responsive pleading required by
> November 4, 2003.
> 
> 7. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 "Is a flexible Rule that should be liberally
> construed so long as a party receives sufficient notice of the
> complaint." United Food & Commercial Workers Union v. Alpha Beta Co.,
> 736 F.2d 1371, 1382 (9th cir. 1984), citing, FTC v. Compagine de
> Saint-Gobain-Pont-A-Mousson, 205 U.S. App. D.C. 172, 636 F.2d 1300,
> 1312 & n. 61 (D.C. Cir. 1980); 4C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal
> Practice & Procedure: Civil Section 1083, at 332-33 (1969)
> [Hereinafter]; 4A Federal Practice Section 1083, at 10.
> 
> 8. "The Federal Rules do not contemplate that a party may simply
> ignore pleadings it receives. That is, neither the text of the Federal
> Rules, nor judicial interpretation placed in the rules by the Federal
> Courts contemplate that a party may totally ignore pleadings and
> notices it receives in an unfounded assurance that a technical
> omission absolves him or her or it from responding Here, emphasis
> added as a result of the requested emergency injunctive relief. Billy
> v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 102 F.R.D. 230, 234, (W.D. Pa. 1984); See
> Commercial Casualty Ins. Co. V. Consolidated Stone Co., 278 U.S. 177,
> 180, 49 S.Ct. 98. 99. (1929). See both Plaintiff's Motion to Compel
> and Motion for Restraining Order.
> 
> 9. Fed. R. Civ. P 55 (a), provides that the Court may enter default
> judgment "when a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief
> is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by these
> rules." See October 15, 2003, Court Docket entry : "Answer Due
> November 4, 2003."
> 
> III. Temporary Restraining Order (Denied Nov. 7, 2003) and November 7,
> 2003, Order of Court Unconstitutionally Denies the Plaintiff access to
> the courts (Requires and IFP litigant to pay U.S. Marshal fees and
> costs).
> 
> 1. David Stewart Cercone, United States District Judge, wrote on
> November 7, 2003, the following Order of Court:
> 
> "AND NOW this 7th day of November, 2003, upon due consideration of pro
> se plaintiff's motion to compel (Doc. No. 15), IT IS ORDERED that the
> motion be, and the same hereby is, denied. The record lacks any
> indication that the ICM School of Business & Medical Careers is a
> registered agent for service of process for any of the corporate
> defendants. In addition, the record unequivocally reveals that the
> individual defendants have not been served by hand delivery at their
> places of residence. Finally, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 does
> not authorize service by mail under any circumstances applicable to
> this case;
> 
> IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that upon due consideration of pro se
> plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order (Doc. No. 17), IT
> IS ORDERED that the motion be, and the same hereby is, denied; and
> 
> IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that upon consideration of pro se plaintiff's
> motion for new summons and marshall service (Doc. No. 16), the motion
> be, and the same hereby is, granted in part, provided plaintiff (1)
> supplies the Clerk of Courts with valid and accurate addresses
> reflecting the principal place of business for each corporate entity
> or its registered agent for service of process within the state of its
> principal place of business, as appropriate; and to the extent
> plaintiff seeks to sue named individual in his or her individual
> capacity, the address of the residence of each individual defendant;
> and (2) provides to the Marshal prior to service of the summons any
> fees and costs requested by the united States marshall Service. To the
> extent plaintiff seeks to have defendants bear the costs of such
> service, the motion is denied without prejudice to renew following the
> completion of proper service. A determination of whether the
> reimbursement of costs is appropriate under 4(d)(2) will not be made
> by the court until (A) the respective defendant has been properly
> served with the complaint, (B) the respective defendant has enter an
> appearance in this action and (C) plaintiff thereafter proffers
> sufficient proof of his compliance with all requirements of Rule 4(d)
> with regard to the particular defendant."
> 
> 2. Plaintiff has In Forma Pauperis status. 
> 
> IV. Unexplained Lost of Mailed Pleadings and/or Unexplained Delay
> Docketing of Mailed Pleading (Similar to previous "Bobo Cross
> case-fixing" activities involving the Allegheny County Court of Common
> Pleas that had specifically targeted the plaintiff)
> 
> 1. On October 26, 2003, by mail plaintiff filed a Rule 65(b) Motion
> for Temporary Restraining Order seeking, among other, immediate relief
> to facilitate reinstatement (for an October 2003 start). Although the
> Judge's chamber's acknowledged that it received its copy, the pleading
> for unexplained reasons wasn't docketed and the Clerk's office later
> claimed it wasn't received. Therefore such was filed by hand delivery
> on October 28, 2003.
> 
> 2. On November 5, 2003, (Name Removed) signed a U.S. Mail Return
> Receipt, 7003 2260 0003 3717 9172. However, for a second time a
> pleading wasn't processed by the Office of the Clerk for the Western
> District of Pennsylvania. That is the pleading (Second Motion for
> Default Judgment and Restraining Order) wasn't docketed and the mail
> for unexplained reasons disappeared. Therefore such was filed by hand
> delivery on November 6, 2003.
> 
> 3. It appears that someone is attempting to frustrate (deny) the
> plaintiff's access to the courts, by destroying his mail (pleadings).
> See also the November 7, 2003, Order of Court mandating payment of
> U.S. Marshal fees and costs.
> 
> 4. Plaintiff has filed a formal complaint with the local Duty Agent of
> the FBI and the Chief Judge of the Western District Pennsylvania,
> Donette W. Ambrose. (Please Note, The Chief Judge Donette Ambrose
> sentenced Bobo Cross to federal prison for fixing cases against me).
> 
> V. Please Note Unexplained Delay Department of Education
> Investigation:
> 
> 1. Lastly, for unexplained reasons my May 30, 2002, complaint filed
> with the United States Department of Education Office of Civil Right
> San Francisco Office was subsequently transferred to the Seattle
> Washington Office for investigation.
> 
> 2. The OCR Case File 09022116 contains information substantiating that
> the San Francisco Office had made an early determination that a named
> Respondent, Kaplan, Inc. at all times was an institution receiving
> federal assistance from the U.S. Department of Education subject to
> Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
> 
> 3. However, the Seattle Office OCR immediately closed the case citing
> a lack of jurisdiction.
> 
> 4. Plaintiff was therefore forced to complain from June 2002 until
> February 2003, to get the Seattle OCR Office to investigate.
> 
> 5. On February 25, 2003, in an apparent attempt to further help
> Kaplan, Inc., the Seattle Office issued a notice of allegations
> letter, but excluded the majority of the discrimination allegations,
> including the January 17, 2002, retaliatory suspension.
> 
> 6. On October 10, 2003, Gary Jackson, Director, Seattle OCR Office,
> justified his office failure to investigate the majority of the
> allegations, including the January 17, 2002, suspension, as follows:
> 
> "In our letter we pointed out that, since your complaint was received
> on May 30, 2002, the 180-day period over which OCR had jurisdiction to
> take action began on December 1, 2001. Therefore, we did not accept
> for resolution any allegations based on actions that occurred before
> December 1, 2001."
> 
> 7. Interesting, plaintiff had pointed out since June 2002, the January
> 17, 2002, retaliatory suspension is plain and clear within the 180-day
> period that began on December 1, 2001, as were the majority of the
> other allegations.
> 
> s/ 
> (NAME REMOVED)