The Truth about the Samarra Battle

Forwarded with Compliments of Government of the USA in Exile (GUSAE):
Free Americans Resisting the Fourth Reich on Behalf of All Species.

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The Inside Skinny of the Biggest Battle Since the Iraq War Ended

by A Combat Leader

http://www.hackworth.com/ 1 December 2003
www.globalresearch.ca    2 December 2003
The URL of this article is: http://globalresearch.ca/articles/HAC311A.html
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12/01/03:  >From David Hackworth

The convoy which was attacked while driving through Samarra was not a
supply convoy as reported, but was carrying large amounts of new
Iraqi currency to stock local Iraqi banks and US greenbacks used to
pay for goods and services the US forces need to accomplish their
missions in Iraq. This convoy was heavily guarded by Abrams Tanks and
Bradley Fighting Vehicles. It was akin to a huge Brinks Truck
delivery.

The reports of 54 enemy killed will sound great on the home front,
but the greater story is much more disturbing and needs to be told to
the American Public.

When we received the first incoming rounds, all I could think of was
how the hell did the Iraqis (most of these attackers being criminals,
not insurgents) find out about this shipment? This was not broadcast
on the local news, but Iraqi police knew about it. Bing, Bing Bing.
You do the math.

Of greater importance is the scale of the attack and the coordination
of the two operations. Iraqi Rebel Guerrilla Units elements still
retain the ability to conduct synchronized operations despite the
massive overwhelming firepower of the "Iron Hammer" offensive this
month.

Hack, most of the casualties were civilians, not insurgents or
criminals as being reported. During the ambushes the tanks, brads and
armored HUMVEES hosed down houses, buildings, and cars while using
reflexive fire against the attackers. One of the precepts of "Iron
Hammer" is to use an Iron Fist when dealing with the insurgents. As
the division spokesman is telling the press, we are responding with
overwhelming firepower and are taking the fight to the enemy. The
response to these well-coordinated ambushes was as one would expect.
The convoy continued to move, shooting at ANY target that appeared to
be a threat. RPG fire from a house, the tank destroys the house with
main gun fire and hoses the area down with 7.62 and 50cal MG fire.
Rifle fire from an alley, the brads fire up the alley and fire up the
surrounding buildings with 7.62mm and 25mm HE rounds. This was
actually a rolling firefight through the entire town.

The ROE [rules of engagement] under "Iron Fist" is such that the US
soldiers are to consider buildings, homes, cars to be hostile if
enemy fire is received from them--regardless of who else is inside.
It seems to many of us this is more an act of desperation, rather
than a well-thought-out tactic. We really don't know if we kill
anyone, because we don't stick around to find out. Since we are
armored troops and we are not trained to use counter-insurgency
tactics, the logic is to respond to attacks using our superior
firepower to kill the rebel insurgents. This is done in many cases
knowing that there are people inside these buildings or cars who may
not be connected to the insurgents.

The belief in superior firepower as a counter-insurgency tactic is
then extended down to the average Iraqi, with the hope that the
Iraqis will not support the guerrillas and turn them in to coalition
forces, knowing we will blow the hell out of their homes or towns if
they don't. Of course in too many cases, if the insurgents bait us
and goad us into leveling buildings and homes, the people inside will
then hate us (even if they did not before) and we have created more
recruits for the guerrillas.

The Commander of the 3rd Brigade Combat Team, Colonel Frederick
Rudesheim, said after this battle that "We are going to continue to
take the fight to this enemy. This is the most significant contact we
have had to date in the city of Samarra. We are going to have to
respond accordingly."

This is a great attitude for a combat commander to have when fighting
an armored force on force, but Colonel Rudesheim is not trained in
Counter-Insurgency and my soldiers are taking the heat. We drive
around in convoys, blast the hell out of the area, break down doors
and search buildings; but the guerrillas continue to attack us. It
does not take a George Patton to see we are using the wrong tactics
against these people. We cannot realistically expect that Stability
and Support Operations will defeat this insurgency.

As one would expect from using our overwhelming firepower, much of
Samarra is fairly well shot up. The tanks and brads rolled over
parked cars and fired up buildings where we believed the enemy was.
This must be expected considering the field of vision is limited in
an armored vehicle and while the crews are protected, they also will
use recon by fire to suppress the enemy. Not all the people in this
town were hostile, but we did see many people firing from rooftops or
alleys that looked like average civilians, not the Feddayeen reported
in the press. I even saw Iraqi people throwing stones at us, I told
my soldiers to hold their fire unless they could indentfy a real
weapon, but I still can't understand why somebody would throw a stone
at a tank, in the middle of a firefight.

Since we did not stick around to find out, I am very concerned in the
coming days we will find we killed many civilians as well as Iraqi
irregular fighters. I would feel great if all the people we killed
were all enemy guerrillas, but I can't say that. We are probably
turning many Iraqi against us and I am afraid instead of climbing out
of the hole, we are digging ourselves in deeper.

--  A COMBAT LEADER

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) Copyright D Hackworth 2003  For fair use only/ pour usage iquitable
seulement.
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