INSIDE SKINNY OF THE BIGGEST BATTLE since the war ended

Thanks K

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http://www.sftt.org/cgi-bin/csNews/csNews.cgi?database=Special%20Reports%20Hack.db&command=viewone&op=t&id=92&rnd=16.346899020788562

A Combat Leader Gives THE INSIDE SKINNY OF THE BIGGEST BATTLE SINCE
THE WAR ENDED

The convoy which was attacked while driving through Samara was not a 
supply convoy as reported, but was carrying large amounts of new Iraqi 
currency to stock local Iraqi banks and US greenbacks used to pay for 
goods and services the US forces need to accomplish their missions in 
Iraq. This convoy was heavily guarded by Abrams Tanks and Bradley Fighting 
Vehicles. It was akin to a huge Brinks Truck delivery.

The reports of 54 enemy killed will sound great on the home front, but the 
greater story is much more disturbing and needs to be told to the American 
Public.

When we received the first incoming rounds, all I could think of was how 
the hell did the Iraqis (most of these attackers being criminals, not 
insurgents) find out about this shipment? This was not broadcast on the 
local news, but Iraqi police knew about it. Bing, Bing Bing, You do the 
math.

Of greater importance in the scale of the attack and the coordination of 
the two operations. Iraqi Rebel Guerilla Units elements still retain the 
ability to conduct synchronized operations despite the massive 
overwhelming firepower "Iron Hammer" offensive this month.

Hack, most of the casualties were civilians, not insurgents or criminals 
as being reported. During the ambushes the tanks, brads and armored 
HUMVEES hosed down houses, buildings, and cars while using reflexive fire 
against the attackers. One of the precepts of "Iron Hammer" is to use an 
Iron Fist when dealing with the insurgents. As the division spokesman is 
telling the press, we are responding with overwhelming firepower and are 
taking the fight to the enemy. The response to these well coordinated 
ambushes was as a one would expect. The convoy continued to move, shooting 
at ANY target that appeared to be a threat. RPG fire from a house, the 
tank destroys the house with main gun fire and hoses the area down with 
7.62 and 50cal MG fire. Rifle fire from an alley, the brads fire up the 
alley and fire up the surrounding buildings with 7.62mm and 25mm HE 
rounds. This was actually a rolling firefight through the entire town.

The ROE under "Iron Fist" is such that the US soldiers are to consider 
buildings, homes, cars to be hostile if enemy fire is received from them 
(regardless of who else is inside. It seems too many of us this is more an 
act of desperation, rather than a well thought out tactic. We really don't 
know if we kill anyone, because we don't stick around to find out. Since 
we armored troops and we are not trained to use counter-insurgency 
tactics; the logic is to respond to attacks using our superior firepower 
to kill the rebel insurgents. This is done in many cases knowing that 
there are people inside these buildings or cars who may not be connected 
to the insurgents.

The belief in superior firepower as a counter-insurgency tactic is then 
extended down to the average Iraqi, with the hope that the Iraqis will not 
support the guerillas and turn them in to coalition forces, knowing we 
will blow the hell out of their homes or towns if they don't. Of course in 
too many cases, if the insurgents bait us and goad us into leveling 
buildings and homes, the people inside will then hate us (even if they did 
not before) and we have created more recruits for the guerillas.

The Commander of the 3rd Brigade Combat Team, Colonel Frederick Rudesheim, 
said after this battle that "We are going to continue to take the fight to 
this enemy. This is the most significant contact we have had to date in 
the city of Samarra. We are going to have to respond accordingly."

This is a great attitude for a combat commander to have when fighting an 
armored force on force, but Colonel Rudesheim is not trained in 
Counter-Insurgency and my soldiers are taking the heat. We drive around in 
convoys, blast the hell out of the area, break down doors and search 
buildings; but the guerillas continue to attacks us. It does not take a 
George Patton to see we are using the wrong tactics against these people. 
We cannot realistically expect that Stability and Support Operations will 
defeat this insurgency.

As one would expect from using our overwhelming firepower, much of Samarra 
is fairly well shot up. The tanks and brads rolled over parked cars and 
fired up buildings where we believed the enemy was. This must be expected 
considering the field of vision is limited in an armored vehicle and while 
the crews are protected, they also will use recon by fire to suppress the 
enemy. Not all the people in this town were hostile, but we did see many 
people firing from rooftops or alleys that looked like average civilians, 
not the Feddayeen reported in the press. I even saw Iraqi people throwing 
stones at us, I told my soldiers to hold their fire unless they could 
indentfy a real weapon, but I still can't understand why somebody would 
throw a stone at a tank, in the middle of a firefight.

Since we did not stick around to find out, I am very concerned in the 
coming days we will find we killed many civilians as well as Iraqi 
irregular fighters. I would feel great if all the people we killed were 
all enemy guerrillas, but I can't say that. We are probably turning many 
Iraqi against us and I am afraid instead of climbing out of the hole, we 
are digging ourselves in deeper.