Re: Creativity

On 3 Dec 2003 01:42:56 GMT, Neil W Rickert <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> in
comp.ai.philosophy wrote:

>[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Lester Zick) writes:
>
>>On 2 Dec 2003 04:38:19 GMT, Neil W Rickert <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> in
>>comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>>>[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Lester Zick) writes:
>
>>>>Let me see if I can clarify what I was describing in mechanical terms.
>
>>>>Let's say we see the moon and each of us sees it in almost exactly the
>>>>same way in practical terms.
>
>>>>Now the moon itself is what I would call a material body. But that
>>>>materiality is not the same as what we see or what we know in
>>>>objective terms.
>
>>>If it is not the same, how could we possibly know that?
>
>>Here I'm just framing the problem for analytical purposes. Granted
>>that I haven't and don't prove the materiality of the moon, I think it
>>can reasonably be inferred from the consideration of alternatives.
>
>I am never quite sure of what you mean by "analytical".

Analytical or analyze just means to find the cause for one thing in
terms of others. The hypotenuse of a right triangle is equal to the
square root of the sum of the squares of the other two sides because
[. . . fill in the geometric proof . . .] And this proof explains why
that concept is true in analytical terms.

In general terms analysis refers to the identification of middle terms
between extreme terms.  In framing the problem for analytical purposes
I am establishing end terms by means of identifying what is to be
explained in terms of what prior to analyzing those terms and
identifying the middle term or cause for one in terms of the other.

>
>My question is how can the materiality of the moon be inferred.  It
>seems to me that your other assumptions have made such an inference
>impossible.  If it is possible, I would like to know how.

If an object has a weight of 2 lbs. that is a material property of the
object. Objects have many properties some we know and some we don't.
And those properties in turn have properties some we know and some we
don't. And the aggregate of all known and unknown and even unknowable
material properties are what I refer to as an object's materiality.
And his is the way I infer an object's materiality.

I further consider that a materiality represents a continuum amalgm of
all known, knowable, and unknowable properties because I don't see any
apparent physical boundary to those properties whatever they may
ultimately turn out to be.

>
>>>>                 The actual lunar materiality as it exists in space
>>>>represents a continuum amalgm of undifferentiated material properties
>>>>which I would call aggregated sensation.
>
>>>Who or what is having these sensations?  Or is that just a poor
>>>choice of terminology?
>
>>Once again I am not proving the assertion in analytical terms. I am
>>describing the implications of differential cognition if the doctrine
>>is correct. The who or what is whatever lies within the differential
>>envelope defined by the operation of taking differences.
>
>I am finding the word "sensations" quite confusing there.  You
>haven't added anything that helps.

Well I need a word to describe the raw impact of an object's
materiality on some being so I chose the term sensation so as not to
confuse it with the idea of perception which I use to denote some
selected aspect of that materiality taken as an objective material
property by perceptual organs.

>
>[snip]
>
>>>>                                           But it does mean that every
>>>>property known of the moon and everything else lies in the brain/mind
>>>>complex because that is where perception and cognition occur in terms
>>>>of differences and differences are the reason perception and cognition
>>>>occur inside the brain/mind complex and not anywhere outside.
>
>>>You wrote of a materiality of the moon.  That's a property.  If
>>>every property has to lie in the brain/mind complex, then the
>>>materiality of the moon would have to lie in the brain/mind
>>>complex.  Now where does that leave the moon itself?
>
>>This is a good point. It's true that the materiality of the moon is a
>>property. It's what I consider an inferred or deduced property in the
>>sense that it follows from the ability to consider properties of the
>>moon or anything else different from what we know of such objects in
>>any particular context.
>
>>The skin for example is a much better receptor for a broad array of
>>materiality aspects than the eye because it is much less decriminating
>>and what we perceive through the skin is a much grosser representation
>>of any object and yet is more representative of its materiality than
>>vision.
>
>>So the materiality of the moon or anything else perceived is a
>>property not seen but deduced or inferred and associated with
>>perceptual objects.
>
>But you are not explaining how such an inference would be
>possible.

I imagine it would be the same way any non perceptual inference would
be drawn with respect to a perceptual object. We don't perceive
properties like mass. Yet we know about them in conceptual terms
because we infer them from perceptual considerations.
>
>>>We do send up unmanned rockets to measure properties of the moon
>>>and of other things.  How could that possibly work if properties
>>>lie in the brain/mind complex?
>
>>Considered from this perspective it's amazing that any of this does
>>work. Yet the fact that a rocket seen only in our brain/mind complex
>>does go to a moon object seen only in our brain/mind complex is a
>>testament to the extraordinary cognitive development of the brain/mind
>>complex and the huge effort devoted to the inferential and deductive
>>mental analysis of those kinds of circumstances over the past several
>>thousand years.
>
>But you are not saying anything that would help explain why what
>actually happens could be consistent with your theory.

I'm not sure what I could explain here that you would consider to help
explain anything consistent with my theory. My theory of differential
cognition explains why perceptions and cognitions occur within an
envelope because differences must be taken and results confined to a
specific locus because the results of differences are finite in size.
I maintain that differences are taken as the basis of perception and
cognition and that the processes, antecedents, and results associated
with those differences are what define and govern those operations.

If you're asking me to show you where specific differences are taken
and exist I can only point to the brain and say "there." But if you're
asking for locations within the brain as validation for the theory it
just doesn't work that way because the considerations I use to justify
and prove the theory in scientific terms are analytical in nature and
not empirical. I have certain ideas on the subject but these are all
very speculative because I am not a neuroscientist. Neuroscience and
ai need to understand what they are looking for in mechanical terms,
and that is all I can provide using analytical methods. I provide a
theory of differential cognition to comprehend the mechanics of the
brain/mind complex which is radically different from any I've ever
heard of. But the application of that theory to the brain/mind complex
lies in the province of neurological science and not general analysis.

>
>>>>The typical solipsist views material aggregates as lying within the
>>>>brain/mind complex and when he uses the terms objective or subjective
>>>>what he is referring to are whether those things subject to his will
>>>>or not. And most opponents of solipsism contend that subjective things
>>>>lie inside the brain/mind complex and objective things lie outside.
>>>>However this is an entirely fallacious distinction and badly misjudges
>>>>the whole meanings of the terms subjective and objective.
>
>>>When you say it is a fallacious distinction, are you implying that no
>>>distinction exists between solipsism and its alternatives?  Or are
>>>you saying that the distinction exists but is different from the
>>>above?
>
>>I'm saying that there is a viable basis for dismissing solipsism but
>>that the meanings of objective and subjective are misjudged in this
>>context and thus used inappropriately for rejecting solipsism. The
>>correct basis for rejecting solipsism is that materiality aggregates
>>do not and cannot lie within the brain/mind complex because
>>inferential and deductive logic considerations indicate they lie
>>outside the skin, skull, etc.
>
>But that's just a bunch of words.  You assert that inferential and
>deductive logic considerations can solve the problem.  But you never
>indicate how.

The how is perpective. I really don't see what the problem is here.
You call what I write a bunch of words. I'm not sure what alternative
you might have in mind to words in bunches or otherwise. What is it
you're looking for that I'm supposed to explain?

>
>>                              If someone chooses to ignore these kinds
>>of inferential considerations that's his priviledge. But if he chooses
>>to do so I think he's going to have a pretty hard time even seeing the
>>moon much less figuring out where it is.
>
>So far there isn't anything to ignore.  Is this just an exercise in
>evading all of the questions, or can you actually produce these
>asserted inferential and deductive logic considerations?

You know it doesn't really help anyones understanding of anything to
accuse me of evading the difficulty you're having in comprehending the
meanings of the word bunches I use. I'm trying to find some basis of
mutual comprehension to explain what you find obscure or confusing.
But you aren't helping very much in finding any common explanatory
ground. You just say you don't understand this or that and apparently
expect me to go on explaining instead of suggesting more specifically
what kind of explanation would satisfy you.

>
>[snip]
>
>>>If properties are the results of differences, then how exactly do we
>>>determine these differences?  Are you saying that there is some sort
>>>of "difference operation" that can be performed on material
>>>circumstances?  And if the material circumstances exist outside the
>>>brain, and the differences (otherwise known as properties) exist only
>>>inside the brain, then is there some magic going on that creates
>>>these differences only inside?
>
>>This is pretty much the idea except that it isn't magic. If we look at
>>material aspects of some materiality, what can we say about them? One
>>important thing that I could suggest is that they have more or less
>>indefinite bounds in physical spatial terms perhaps extending out as
>>far as the optical horizon in space around 15 billion light years.
>>It's true that the significance of those properties diminishes greatly
>>just a few centimeters or meters away from what we call the surface of
>>an object but I can't see any basis or reason to deny that those
>>properties permeate space more or less indefinitely in all directions.
>
>>And the same would be true of any aspect of the materiality of our
>>brains as well. However the difference between two aspects of those
>>materialities would not. It would only correspond to the difference
>>between them and would be finite and limited. I assume that whatever
>>difference operation is involved leaves the difference in the brain.
>>Or perhaps we might define the brain in terms of differences left in
>>the brain by that operation on the assumption that the brain can only
>>work on differences and needs the results of differences as the
>>mechanical basis for information and whatever it can know.
>
>Okay.  But you have a very vague term "materiality", which you have
>not explained.  And you expect to make progress by determining fairly
>precise differences between aspects of a vague materiality.

I explain the idea of materiality pretty thoroughly above.
>
>What is the mechanism or procedure that can do this?  And how can
>the determined difference be any less vague than that of which
>the difference are taken?

I don't know as it is any less vague. In computers the mechanism would
probably be the exclusive-or or logical difference. In biological
organisms I don't know what the mechanism would be.
>
>[snip]
>
>>>For the present, I remain skeptical of your "differential cognition",
>>>because there seem to be far too many loose ends.
>
>>You know if the idea of differential cognition is actually correct,
>>I'm faced with the very difficult problem of trying to communicate it
>>in the most efficacious way.
>
>That can be a problem.
>
>>                             I could have started at the top and
>>worked down. But I chose to start somewhere in the middle because you
>>guys seem interested and capable of disciplined thought on the subject
>>of cognition and the mechanics involved.
>
>>If I had started at the top I think I would have lost the audience
>>immediately because it really begins with a very brief outline of
>>metaphysics as the science of reality. (And no I'm not tripping out
>>and going religious. When I say metaphysics as science I mean
>>analytical considerations and conclusions as hard as any found in
>>geometry or any other kind of analytical science.)
>
>Maybe you should skip the metaphysics, and describe the mechanisms
>that do the work.  Finding mechanisms is, after all, what AI is all
>about.

The problem with ai so far has been that it has developed a fantastic
array of mechanisms none of which do the job quite correctly because
no one it seems has any exact idea what that job is. Mechanisms we
have plenty of. It's the nature of the job that needs to be explained.
You can define the job in any problematic practical way you want and
throw mechanisms at it all day long and still not understand what it
is that all the combinations of mechanisms are actually supposed to be
doing. You know what you hope they're doing but no clue as to exactly
how they're supposed to be doing it. Sure, I'll skip the metaphysics.

I'm beginning to sense a level of asperity and dissatisfaction again
that isn't really constructive or helpful. So I suggest we just ponder
what has been said for a while rather than engaging further in a
futile dialog that just emphasizes our mutual lack of any real basis
for explanatory comprehension. You're welcome to the last word.
>



Regards - Lester