Re: Creativity

[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Lester Zick) writes:

>On 2 Dec 2003 04:38:19 GMT, Neil W Rickert <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> in
>comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>>[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Lester Zick) writes:

>>>Let me see if I can clarify what I was describing in mechanical terms.

>>>Let's say we see the moon and each of us sees it in almost exactly the
>>>same way in practical terms.

>>>Now the moon itself is what I would call a material body. But that
>>>materiality is not the same as what we see or what we know in
>>>objective terms.

>>If it is not the same, how could we possibly know that?

>Here I'm just framing the problem for analytical purposes. Granted
>that I haven't and don't prove the materiality of the moon, I think it
>can reasonably be inferred from the consideration of alternatives.

I am never quite sure of what you mean by "analytical".

My question is how can the materiality of the moon be inferred.  It
seems to me that your other assumptions have made such an inference
impossible.  If it is possible, I would like to know how.

>>>                 The actual lunar materiality as it exists in space
>>>represents a continuum amalgm of undifferentiated material properties
>>>which I would call aggregated sensation.

>>Who or what is having these sensations?  Or is that just a poor
>>choice of terminology?

>Once again I am not proving the assertion in analytical terms. I am
>describing the implications of differential cognition if the doctrine
>is correct. The who or what is whatever lies within the differential
>envelope defined by the operation of taking differences.

I am finding the word "sensations" quite confusing there.  You
haven't added anything that helps.

[snip]

>>>                                           But it does mean that every
>>>property known of the moon and everything else lies in the brain/mind
>>>complex because that is where perception and cognition occur in terms
>>>of differences and differences are the reason perception and cognition
>>>occur inside the brain/mind complex and not anywhere outside.

>>You wrote of a materiality of the moon.  That's a property.  If
>>every property has to lie in the brain/mind complex, then the
>>materiality of the moon would have to lie in the brain/mind
>>complex.  Now where does that leave the moon itself?

>This is a good point. It's true that the materiality of the moon is a
>property. It's what I consider an inferred or deduced property in the
>sense that it follows from the ability to consider properties of the
>moon or anything else different from what we know of such objects in
>any particular context.

>The skin for example is a much better receptor for a broad array of
>materiality aspects than the eye because it is much less decriminating
>and what we perceive through the skin is a much grosser representation
>of any object and yet is more representative of its materiality than
>vision.

>So the materiality of the moon or anything else perceived is a
>property not seen but deduced or inferred and associated with
>perceptual objects.

But you are not explaining how such an inference would be
possible.

>>We do send up unmanned rockets to measure properties of the moon
>>and of other things.  How could that possibly work if properties
>>lie in the brain/mind complex?

>Considered from this perspective it's amazing that any of this does
>work. Yet the fact that a rocket seen only in our brain/mind complex
>does go to a moon object seen only in our brain/mind complex is a
>testament to the extraordinary cognitive development of the brain/mind
>complex and the huge effort devoted to the inferential and deductive
>mental analysis of those kinds of circumstances over the past several
>thousand years.

But you are not saying anything that would help explain why what
actually happens could be consistent with your theory.

>>>The typical solipsist views material aggregates as lying within the
>>>brain/mind complex and when he uses the terms objective or subjective
>>>what he is referring to are whether those things subject to his will
>>>or not. And most opponents of solipsism contend that subjective things
>>>lie inside the brain/mind complex and objective things lie outside.
>>>However this is an entirely fallacious distinction and badly misjudges
>>>the whole meanings of the terms subjective and objective.

>>When you say it is a fallacious distinction, are you implying that no
>>distinction exists between solipsism and its alternatives?  Or are
>>you saying that the distinction exists but is different from the
>>above?

>I'm saying that there is a viable basis for dismissing solipsism but
>that the meanings of objective and subjective are misjudged in this
>context and thus used inappropriately for rejecting solipsism. The
>correct basis for rejecting solipsism is that materiality aggregates
>do not and cannot lie within the brain/mind complex because
>inferential and deductive logic considerations indicate they lie
>outside the skin, skull, etc.

But that's just a bunch of words.  You assert that inferential and
deductive logic considerations can solve the problem.  But you never
indicate how.

>                              If someone chooses to ignore these kinds
>of inferential considerations that's his priviledge. But if he chooses
>to do so I think he's going to have a pretty hard time even seeing the
>moon much less figuring out where it is.

So far there isn't anything to ignore.  Is this just an exercise in
evading all of the questions, or can you actually produce these
asserted inferential and deductive logic considerations?

[snip]

>>If properties are the results of differences, then how exactly do we
>>determine these differences?  Are you saying that there is some sort
>>of "difference operation" that can be performed on material
>>circumstances?  And if the material circumstances exist outside the
>>brain, and the differences (otherwise known as properties) exist only
>>inside the brain, then is there some magic going on that creates
>>these differences only inside?

>This is pretty much the idea except that it isn't magic. If we look at
>material aspects of some materiality, what can we say about them? One
>important thing that I could suggest is that they have more or less
>indefinite bounds in physical spatial terms perhaps extending out as
>far as the optical horizon in space around 15 billion light years.
>It's true that the significance of those properties diminishes greatly
>just a few centimeters or meters away from what we call the surface of
>an object but I can't see any basis or reason to deny that those
>properties permeate space more or less indefinitely in all directions.

>And the same would be true of any aspect of the materiality of our
>brains as well. However the difference between two aspects of those
>materialities would not. It would only correspond to the difference
>between them and would be finite and limited. I assume that whatever
>difference operation is involved leaves the difference in the brain.
>Or perhaps we might define the brain in terms of differences left in
>the brain by that operation on the assumption that the brain can only
>work on differences and needs the results of differences as the
>mechanical basis for information and whatever it can know.

Okay.  But you have a very vague term "materiality", which you have
not explained.  And you expect to make progress by determining fairly
precise differences between aspects of a vague materiality.

What is the mechanism or procedure that can do this?  And how can
the determined difference be any less vague than that of which
the difference are taken?

[snip]

>>For the present, I remain skeptical of your "differential cognition",
>>because there seem to be far too many loose ends.

>You know if the idea of differential cognition is actually correct,
>I'm faced with the very difficult problem of trying to communicate it
>in the most efficacious way.

That can be a problem.

>                             I could have started at the top and
>worked down. But I chose to start somewhere in the middle because you
>guys seem interested and capable of disciplined thought on the subject
>of cognition and the mechanics involved.

>If I had started at the top I think I would have lost the audience
>immediately because it really begins with a very brief outline of
>metaphysics as the science of reality. (And no I'm not tripping out
>and going religious. When I say metaphysics as science I mean
>analytical considerations and conclusions as hard as any found in
>geometry or any other kind of analytical science.)

Maybe you should skip the metaphysics, and describe the mechanisms
that do the work.  Finding mechanisms is, after all, what AI is all
about.