Re: Creativity

"Lester Zick" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
organ.
>
> From my perspective I consider them perceptual organs. The term
> sensory organ seems ambiguous to me. Skin is also a sensory organ. I
> think the difference really depends on what we mean by perception
> versus sense. I'm not sure there is an absolute distinction to be made
> but the term perception seems more appropriate.

Perhaps looking at it this way might help:

There are recepts: those processes that impinge upon a sense organ (the
reflected light form a flower's surface process impinges upon the retina).

There are percepts; those processes in brain that result from a transform of
a recept; in this case there are VCx brain processes that deal with the
signal from the eyes.

There are concepts; those processes in brain that result from a transform of
a percept (from the VC for example) into some type of categorical
information/knowledge (that is a flower I am looking at)

There are introcepts; those processes in brain that examine its own
(consciouss) processes.


>
> The brain itself is definitely not a perceptual organ.

There are parts that are perceptual in the scenario I outlined above.

>In my
> estimation it is a cognitive organ and coordinates differences
> between perceptions and perceptual organs.


>This represents a fine
> distinction and admittedly reflects my own understanding and
> interpretation of differential mechanics but I nonetheless believe it
> is correct.
>
> >
> >>An illusion like seeing water in the desert is perceptual in nature
> >>because it can be photographed.
> >
> >That should make it optical in nature.  Why not call it an
> >optical illusion?
>
> Well for one reason because it can be photographed. So the subject
> matter is certainly optical but the illusion itself does not lie in
> the optics but in the perceptual interpretation. Once again I'm
> categorizing illusions not according to subject matter but according
> to where the illusion itself arises. And plainly that is not in the
> optics.
>
> I realize all this may seem rather problematic as these kinds of
> illusions have been known by various names in the past and typically
> categorized according to the origin of the subject matter for the
> illusion. I'm not wedded to the specific terminology in this context.
> I just think it's more constructive for analytical purposes if we
> classify illusions according to where the illusion actually comes into
> play instead of subject matter. As pointed out previously relative
> length illusions between parallel line segments drawn with opposing
> arrowheads are also optical and visual but the illusion is not. So I
> consider it more appropriate to call the illusion cognitive rather
> than optical or perceptual.
>
> >
> >>                                In this regard it is really seen and
> >>whatever illusion exists simply represents a misinterpretation of what
> >>is actually seen. This kind of illusion I refer to as perceptual
> >>because the perceptual referrents are really out there and are
> >>confirmed experimentally.
> >
> >>Now in the case of what I call a cognitive illusion related to the
> >>senses the illusion really isn't seen despite its visual
> >>representation. The objects seen are seen but there is some distortion
> >>of the visual field that leads to a misconstruction of what is seen.
> >>And without the ability to be seen - as confirmed in photographs - I
> >>consider that it cannot have been seen as the mind interprets it and
> >>cannot represent a visual perceptual illusion to this extent. There
> >>has to be some cognitive misconstruction.
> >
> >You are making a case why this case should not be called an
> >optical illusion.  But the term "perception" normally refers to
> >something that goes well beyond optics or sensory detection.
>
> It may well and I'm sure it does in many contexts both scientific and
> practical. And I certainly consider that visual perception goes way
> beyond optics and sensory detection as well in the case of something
> like the skin. The problem I have at the moment occurs when optics
> denies a visual effect such that - accepting the optical criterion as
> definitive - a particular visual effect cannot have been seen but must
> have been constructed somehow after the fact of perception.
>
> Then where do we assign the cause to identify the origin of the
> illusion in mechanical terms? If we define (as I would for current
> purposes) visual perception simply as the construction of images from
> light rays originating in points on a common plane in the visual
> sensory field then photographic criteria indicate that results
> actually seen in the mind contain exaggerations not present in the
> visual sensory field. So I assign the source of the exaggerations to
> cognition rather than perception.
>
> Of course I fully realize that visual perception is a hugely complex
> phenomenon and the definition given above may not be adequate. And as
> noted above I'm not wedded to the exact terminology for exhaustive
> analytical purposes apart from the present case. However at the very
> least I think we have to conclude that the illusion is created at some
> kind of post perceptual level because it includes exaggerations and
> distortions not present in the visual sensory field.
>
> >
> >In one theory of perception (the sense data theory), the sensory
> >organs are said to deliver sense data.  Then perceptual systems
> >analyze these data to deliver perceptions.  For vision, the sense
> >data might include patches of color, while the perceptual output
> >might include cats, people, tables and other objects.
> >
> >I don't personally agree with sense data theories of perception.  But
> >I mention it to indicate the ways that "perception" is used.
>
> I can see that there are significant areas of disagreement in naming
> these categories. And even more so in terms of boundaries. The only
> definite thing in my own differential analysis of the mechanics
> involved requires that perception be considered the result of
> differences between material differences and that cognition be taken
> as the result of differences between perceptions.
>
> Beyond that we're looking at a huge array of properties and functions
> that differential mechanics doesn't explain or even address in its
> present form. And not only visual perception but aural, smell, touch,
> etc. as well. I don't think this makes me a bad person because I can
> at least explain ideas like perception, cognition, and abstract
> thought in mutually consistent categorical terms of differences and
> their compounding in terms of one another. Whereas before we were
> stuck with a complex of ostensible definitions having no analytical
> consistency and necessity whatsoever in any kind of definitive terms.
> >
> >>Perhaps we should characterize the first form of illusion a perceptual
> >>misinterpretation and the second a cognitive misconstruction. I don't
> >>really know and don't really understand how the miscontruction occurs.
> >>However if we rely on photographic criteria there is no doubt that the
> >>illusion is not present in the perceptual image itself but only occurs
> >>subsequently.
> >
> >Photographic systems do not produce perceptual images.  They produce
> >optical images.
> >
> >I think you would be less confusing if your distinction were between
> >optical illusions and perceptual illusions, instead of calling them
> >respectively perceptual illusions and cognitive illusions.
>
> There may be some justice to this suggestion. My own preference is to
> name them according to the source of the problem rather than the
> source of the subject. However we shall just have to see.
> >
> > --------------
> >
> >>Here again I may have misjudged the interpretation of terms I use
> >>routinely. Properties are objective simply in result of being known
> >>and identifiable. They can be anywhere - inside the mind outside
> >>wherever the properties themselves indicate through perspective. The
> >>manipulation of properties in taking differences is a subjective
> >>process because it represents a material manipulation, that is, a
> >>manipulation done in material terms that results in differences
> >>between material circumstances. But the result of that difference is a
> >>differential property having objective significance.
> >
> >How does that apply?  What properties are you referring to here?
> >The actual size of the moon is a property.  The angle subtended by
> >the light from the moon is a property.  Whether it looks big or
> >small is an appearance, rather than a property.
> >
> >I would use "objective" for the properties, but not for the
> >appearances.
>
> Well the problem here is that technically appearances are every bit as
> much properties as other properties. They just have different
> properties from other properties. It is the ability to state some
> characteristic of a property that makes it objective and a property to
> begin with. And personally I don't think that there is any definitive
> rationale for segregating appearances from other properties even in
> conventional epistemology. Certainly distinctions can be and are
> drawn. But they have to be drawn in terms of properties.
>
> I get the impression from what you suggest above that what you
> consider objective properties are really external in nature. However
> in the threads Solipsism Again and Again and Again and Thinking Inside
> the Envelope I point out that this is not a viable distinction between
> objective and subjective characteristics. (Admittedly the threads were
> not directed to this newsgroup.)
>
> What I will point out for general edification is that everything that
> is a property whether seen, thought about, or considered in any way
> whatsoever is seen, thought about, and considered within the envelope
> of the brain. In other words there is no specifically objective
> reality outside the brain/mind complex. And everything we know and can
> know of reality inside or outside the brain/mind complex takes place
> right in the brain/mind complex.
>
> Now this succinct declaration may startle some people in science. But
> I assure you this is exactly what happens. There is a reality outside
> but we can only know of this reality from inferences drawn in terms of
> spatial perspective relations occuring within the brain/mind itself.
> In this regard everything we see and can know occurs within the mind.
>
> Consequently there is no viable internal/external distinction between
> objective and subjective properties and these characteristics have to
> be defined in other terms for rigorous analytical purposes.
>
> >
> >>I hope this clarifies how I am using these terms and why.
> >
> >I hope I have clarified what is more typical usage, and why.
>
> This may well be. My only justification is that I was not trying to
> obscure the problem through terminology but to indicate that I
> consider the lunar illusion at least post perceptual in origin
> regardless of where the subject matter itself originates.
>
> Terminology was never the issue in this regard. I just used terms
> which I take to be analytically justifiable in mechanical terms but
> obviously appear unfamiliar and idiosyncratic in conventional terms.
> >
>
>
>
> Regards - Lester
>