Re: Creativity

On 30 Nov 2003 02:32:06 GMT, Neil W Rickert <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> in
comp.ai.philosophy wrote:

>[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Lester Zick) writes:
>>On 29 Nov 2003 19:21:56 GMT, Neil W Rickert <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> in
>>comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>>>[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Lester Zick) writes:
>
>>>>Now in my original post I describe the illusion as real and said that
>>>>Glen denied the reality of the illusion. This was incorrect. (See,
>>>>David, this is how an admission of error is done.) As Wolf correctly
>>>>pointed out to me I should have used the term perceptual illusion in
>>>>the sense of having perceptual antecedents subject to photographic
>>>>validation. When in fact taken in the terms indicated above the
>>>>illusion is not perceptual at all but an objective cognitive illusion
>>>>created by circumstantial cognitive conditions.
>
>>>Your terminology is strange.  It is normal to call this a perceptual
>>>illusion.
>
>>You know I've been looking at replies and maybe I've just been using
>>these terms too long to judge how people respond to what I'm trying to
>>suggest. Let me see if I can clarify the critieria I use for the
>>distinction I'm trying to draw.
>
>>I think most people consider this a perceptual illusion because it
>>deals with visual referrents. Instead I'm trying to highlight where
>>the illusion occurs. If we use photographic tests as criteria the
>>illusion we're dealing with here does not originate in perceptual
>>organs. In other words it just doesn't exist in perceptual terms
>>because it cannot be seen.
>
>Photography is not a perceptual system.  It is an optical system.

Yes I agree and one of the things I pointed out previously is that it
is not an absolute criterion of what one sees visually. However if
photos do not show the lunar effect then we either have to explain the
anomaly on the basis of differences between optical and visual systems
or simply go with the photographic evidence.
>
>The eyes are not a perceptual organ.  They are a sensory organ.
>The brain could perhaps be considered a perceptual organ.

>From my perspective I consider them perceptual organs. The term
sensory organ seems ambiguous to me. Skin is also a sensory organ. I
think the difference really depends on what we mean by perception
versus sense. I'm not sure there is an absolute distinction to be made
but the term perception seems more appropriate.

The brain itself is definitely not a perceptual organ. In my
estimation it is a cognitive organ and coordinates differences
between perceptions and perceptual organs. This represents a fine
distinction and admittedly reflects my own understanding and
interpretation of differential mechanics but I nonetheless believe it
is correct.

>
>>An illusion like seeing water in the desert is perceptual in nature
>>because it can be photographed.
>
>That should make it optical in nature.  Why not call it an
>optical illusion?

Well for one reason because it can be photographed. So the subject
matter is certainly optical but the illusion itself does not lie in
the optics but in the perceptual interpretation. Once again I'm
categorizing illusions not according to subject matter but according
to where the illusion itself arises. And plainly that is not in the
optics.

I realize all this may seem rather problematic as these kinds of
illusions have been known by various names in the past and typically
categorized according to the origin of the subject matter for the
illusion. I'm not wedded to the specific terminology in this context.
I just think it's more constructive for analytical purposes if we
classify illusions according to where the illusion actually comes into
play instead of subject matter. As pointed out previously relative
length illusions between parallel line segments drawn with opposing
arrowheads are also optical and visual but the illusion is not. So I
consider it more appropriate to call the illusion cognitive rather
than optical or perceptual.

>
>>                                In this regard it is really seen and
>>whatever illusion exists simply represents a misinterpretation of what
>>is actually seen. This kind of illusion I refer to as perceptual
>>because the perceptual referrents are really out there and are
>>confirmed experimentally.
>
>>Now in the case of what I call a cognitive illusion related to the
>>senses the illusion really isn't seen despite its visual
>>representation. The objects seen are seen but there is some distortion
>>of the visual field that leads to a misconstruction of what is seen.
>>And without the ability to be seen - as confirmed in photographs - I
>>consider that it cannot have been seen as the mind interprets it and
>>cannot represent a visual perceptual illusion to this extent. There
>>has to be some cognitive misconstruction.
>
>You are making a case why this case should not be called an
>optical illusion.  But the term "perception" normally refers to
>something that goes well beyond optics or sensory detection.

It may well and I'm sure it does in many contexts both scientific and
practical. And I certainly consider that visual perception goes way
beyond optics and sensory detection as well in the case of something
like the skin. The problem I have at the moment occurs when optics
denies a visual effect such that - accepting the optical criterion as
definitive - a particular visual effect cannot have been seen but must
have been constructed somehow after the fact of perception.

Then where do we assign the cause to identify the origin of the
illusion in mechanical terms? If we define (as I would for current
purposes) visual perception simply as the construction of images from
light rays originating in points on a common plane in the visual
sensory field then photographic criteria indicate that results
actually seen in the mind contain exaggerations not present in the
visual sensory field. So I assign the source of the exaggerations to
cognition rather than perception.

Of course I fully realize that visual perception is a hugely complex
phenomenon and the definition given above may not be adequate. And as
noted above I'm not wedded to the exact terminology for exhaustive
analytical purposes apart from the present case. However at the very
least I think we have to conclude that the illusion is created at some
kind of post perceptual level because it includes exaggerations and
distortions not present in the visual sensory field.

>
>In one theory of perception (the sense data theory), the sensory
>organs are said to deliver sense data.  Then perceptual systems
>analyze these data to deliver perceptions.  For vision, the sense
>data might include patches of color, while the perceptual output
>might include cats, people, tables and other objects.
>
>I don't personally agree with sense data theories of perception.  But
>I mention it to indicate the ways that "perception" is used.

I can see that there are significant areas of disagreement in naming
these categories. And even more so in terms of boundaries. The only
definite thing in my own differential analysis of the mechanics
involved requires that perception be considered the result of
differences between material differences and that cognition be taken
as the result of differences between perceptions.

Beyond that we're looking at a huge array of properties and functions
that differential mechanics doesn't explain or even address in its
present form. And not only visual perception but aural, smell, touch,
etc. as well. I don't think this makes me a bad person because I can
at least explain ideas like perception, cognition, and abstract
thought in mutually consistent categorical terms of differences and
their compounding in terms of one another. Whereas before we were
stuck with a complex of ostensible definitions having no analytical
consistency and necessity whatsoever in any kind of definitive terms.
>
>>Perhaps we should characterize the first form of illusion a perceptual
>>misinterpretation and the second a cognitive misconstruction. I don't
>>really know and don't really understand how the miscontruction occurs.
>>However if we rely on photographic criteria there is no doubt that the
>>illusion is not present in the perceptual image itself but only occurs
>>subsequently.
>
>Photographic systems do not produce perceptual images.  They produce
>optical images.
>
>I think you would be less confusing if your distinction were between
>optical illusions and perceptual illusions, instead of calling them
>respectively perceptual illusions and cognitive illusions.

There may be some justice to this suggestion. My own preference is to
name them according to the source of the problem rather than the
source of the subject. However we shall just have to see.
>
> --------------
>
>>Here again I may have misjudged the interpretation of terms I use
>>routinely. Properties are objective simply in result of being known
>>and identifiable. They can be anywhere - inside the mind outside
>>wherever the properties themselves indicate through perspective. The
>>manipulation of properties in taking differences is a subjective
>>process because it represents a material manipulation, that is, a
>>manipulation done in material terms that results in differences
>>between material circumstances. But the result of that difference is a
>>differential property having objective significance.
>
>How does that apply?  What properties are you referring to here?
>The actual size of the moon is a property.  The angle subtended by
>the light from the moon is a property.  Whether it looks big or
>small is an appearance, rather than a property.
>
>I would use "objective" for the properties, but not for the
>appearances.

Well the problem here is that technically appearances are every bit as
much properties as other properties. They just have different
properties from other properties. It is the ability to state some
characteristic of a property that makes it objective and a property to
begin with. And personally I don't think that there is any definitive
rationale for segregating appearances from other properties even in
conventional epistemology. Certainly distinctions can be and are
drawn. But they have to be drawn in terms of properties.

I get the impression from what you suggest above that what you
consider objective properties are really external in nature. However
in the threads Solipsism Again and Again and Again and Thinking Inside
the Envelope I point out that this is not a viable distinction between
objective and subjective characteristics. (Admittedly the threads were
not directed to this newsgroup.)

What I will point out for general edification is that everything that
is a property whether seen, thought about, or considered in any way
whatsoever is seen, thought about, and considered within the envelope
of the brain. In other words there is no specifically objective
reality outside the brain/mind complex. And everything we know and can
know of reality inside or outside the brain/mind complex takes place
right in the brain/mind complex.

Now this succinct declaration may startle some people in science. But
I assure you this is exactly what happens. There is a reality outside
but we can only know of this reality from inferences drawn in terms of
spatial perspective relations occuring within the brain/mind itself.
In this regard everything we see and can know occurs within the mind.

Consequently there is no viable internal/external distinction between
objective and subjective properties and these characteristics have to
be defined in other terms for rigorous analytical purposes.

>
>>I hope this clarifies how I am using these terms and why.
>
>I hope I have clarified what is more typical usage, and why.

This may well be. My only justification is that I was not trying to
obscure the problem through terminology but to indicate that I
consider the lunar illusion at least post perceptual in origin
regardless of where the subject matter itself originates.

Terminology was never the issue in this regard. I just used terms
which I take to be analytically justifiable in mechanical terms but
obviously appear unfamiliar and idiosyncratic in conventional terms.
>



Regards - Lester