Re: Creativity

On 29 Nov 2003 19:21:56 GMT, Neil W Rickert <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> in
comp.ai.philosophy wrote:

>[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Lester Zick) writes:
>
>>Now in my original post I describe the illusion as real and said that
>>Glen denied the reality of the illusion. This was incorrect. (See,
>>David, this is how an admission of error is done.) As Wolf correctly
>>pointed out to me I should have used the term perceptual illusion in
>>the sense of having perceptual antecedents subject to photographic
>>validation. When in fact taken in the terms indicated above the
>>illusion is not perceptual at all but an objective cognitive illusion
>>created by circumstantial cognitive conditions.
>
>Your terminology is strange.  It is normal to call this a perceptual
>illusion.

You know I've been looking at replies and maybe I've just been using
these terms too long to judge how people respond to what I'm trying to
suggest. Let me see if I can clarify the critieria I use for the
distinction I'm trying to draw.

I think most people consider this a perceptual illusion because it
deals with visual referrents. Instead I'm trying to highlight where
the illusion occurs. If we use photographic tests as criteria the
illusion we're dealing with here does not originate in perceptual
organs. In other words it just doesn't exist in perceptual terms
because it cannot be seen.

An illusion like seeing water in the desert is perceptual in nature
because it can be photographed. In this regard it is really seen and
whatever illusion exists simply represents a misinterpretation of what
is actually seen. This kind of illusion I refer to as perceptual
because the perceptual referrents are really out there and are
confirmed experimentally.

Now in the case of what I call a cognitive illusion related to the
senses the illusion really isn't seen despite its visual
representation. The objects seen are seen but there is some distortion
of the visual field that leads to a misconstruction of what is seen.
And without the ability to be seen - as confirmed in photographs - I
consider that it cannot have been seen as the mind interprets it and
cannot represent a visual perceptual illusion to this extent. There
has to be some cognitive misconstruction.

Perhaps we should characterize the first form of illusion a perceptual
misinterpretation and the second a cognitive misconstruction. I don't
really know and don't really understand how the miscontruction occurs.
However if we rely on photographic criteria there is no doubt that the
illusion is not present in the perceptual image itself but only occurs
subsequently. Similar types of cognitive illusions would be various
kinds of diagrams and such which seem to change from inside to outside
and lines drawn with opposite arrowheads. These also represent
cognitive illusions in my estimation despite the fact that they too
deal with perceptual phenomena. The perspective faculties of cognition
are simply unable to descriminate effectively and yield either
contradictory or fluctuating evaluations of whatever relations are
involved.

Of course there is also a further type of illusion which is conceptual
in nature. Things like the paradox presented by Fred a few days ago
represent conceptual illusions because that's where the problem
occurs.

>
>>But the curious thing about all this is that here we have an objective
>>condition reported throughout centuries yet a condition that only
>>exists within the brain/mind complex having no direct perceptual
>>basis. So the question then becomes if such an illusion has no direct
>>perceptual basis what basis does it have? My answer of course would be
>>that it has to have some cognitive basis not involving perception
>>directly.
>
>Again, you seem to be misusing terminology.  With standard usage,
>this has a perceptual basis.  I would not say it has a "cognitive
>basis", except in so far as perception is part of cognition.
>
>I'm also not sure how you are using "objective condition" here.
>Since the effect is psychological, it would not normally be
>considered objective.

Here again I may have misjudged the interpretation of terms I use
routinely. Properties are objective simply in result of being known
and identifiable. They can be anywhere - inside the mind outside
wherever the properties themselves indicate through perspective. The
manipulation of properties in taking differences is a subjective
process because it represents a material manipulation, that is, a
manipulation done in material terms that results in differences
between material circumstances. But the result of that difference is a
differential property having objective significance.

What kind of significance of course remains to be determined.
Perceptually objective properties have specific perceptual
antecedents. And those properties which are seen and yet have no
perceptual antecedent are objective cognitive properties for that
reason.
>
>>Glen obviously demurs. But I would like then to ask if the illusion is
>>indeed triggered by depth cues as Glen suggests what kind of
>>triggering is involved. Glen prefers to investigate the histories of
>>those who see the illusion - which is completely consistent with the
>>behaviorist mantra describe previously in a collateral thread but
>>which can only yield particular truth relating to the circumstantial
>>aspects of a variety of individuals but having no general universal
>>applicability of scientific necessity.
>
>>In other words Glen claims the circumstantial histories of reporting
>>individuals would explain the illusion whereas I claim it would do
>>nothing of the kind in universal scientific terms because the only
>>thing capable of doing that is the mechanical explanation for the
>>triggering of depth cues in cognitive terms.
>
>It would seem more likely that behaviorists consider explaining the
>illusion, or discussing what people see or perceive to be off limits,
>but that their verbal behavior in these circumstances can very much
>be part of what behaviorism investigates.
>
>>Obviously the illusion is cognitive rather than perceptual in origin
>>and to the extent it is an illusion reflects a cognitive manifestation
>>of differential mechanics (which of course is just my explanation for
>>cognition in general mechanical terms).
>
>There is your strange usage again.
>
>It seems to me that to say "the illusion is cognitive rather than
>perceptual" would be to say that the illusion depends on how you are
>thinking about it.  However, since the illusion is observed before
>you start thinking about it, then "perceptual illusion" would appear
>to be the better term.

I hope the explanation above clarifies the analysis from my
perspective. In categorizing and describing an illusion I am focusing
on where the problem occurs and not just the subject matter of the
illusion. And if the illusion has perceptual subject matter but cannot
be perceptual in origin I consider that it has to be cognitive in
origin for that reason.

I think when you use the term cognitive above to indicate how you
think about the illusion you are really using the phrase thinking
about in reference to abstract thoughts regarding the illusion.
Whereas when I use the term cognitive in this context I am talking
about the manipulative mechanics of the cognitive faculty in handling
perceptual information.

I hope this clarifies how I am using these terms and why.
>



Regards - Lester