Re: Creativity

On Sat, 29 Nov 2003 17:13:59 GMT, "Glen M. Sizemore"
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:

>>LZ: And Glen's assertion simply denies the effect without an explanation.
>>So what is there for psychological theories to explain?
>>
>>GS: What are you talking about? I don't deny that the Moon Illusion exists,
>>I deny that it can be explained in terms of optics. The Moon Illusion is a
>>psychological phenomenon. Unlike mainstream psychologists, however, I am
>not
>>interested in metaphorical explanations in terms of the brain or alleged
>>mind making inferences about "what is out there." I am interested in the
>>sorts of histories that people and animals must have in order to experience
>>the illusion. Most people interested in this illusion already know that it
>>depends on "depth cues" (i.e., stimuli that vary with distance from the
>>observer), and they hint that it is our history of interacting with the
>>world that is responsible.
>>
>LZ: Based on what I've seen so far in various posts we can conclude
>certain things about the lunar paradox. Many testify to the existence
>of a lunar horizonal size illusion and have over many centuries. Yet
>the illusion cannot be photographed. Now I also maintain that there
>has to be some atmospheric lensing effect affecting the apparent lunar
>horizonal size because stars also appear to rise sooner and set later
>than canonical expectations due to atmospheric refraction . However
>let's leave this aside.
>
>GS: I didn't know that "canonical expectations" rise.

Only to accommodate behavioral predictions. I could have said ". . .
than canonical expectations suggest . . ." but it reads correctly
regardless. In any event it's good to know you retain a canonical
sense of humor.
>
>LZ: Now in my original post I describe the illusion as real and said that
>Glen denied the reality of the illusion. This was incorrect. (See,
>David, this is how an admission of error is done.) As Wolf correctly
>pointed out to me I should have used the term perceptual illusion in
>the sense of having perceptual antecedents subject to photographic
>validation. When in fact taken in the terms indicated above the
>illusion is not perceptual at all but an objective cognitive illusion
>created by circumstantial cognitive conditions.
>
>GS: I don't understand why you cannot write coherently. What is a
>"perceptual antecedent?" What is meant by "objective cognitive illusion
>created by circumstantial cognitive conditions?"

Well I write to the level of the reader. If you don't understand words
not in the behaviorist lexicon I suggest you get a dictionary and do a
little reading yourself.
>
>LZ: But the curious thing about all this is that here we have an objective
>condition reported throughout centuries yet a condition that only
>exists within the brain/mind complex having no direct perceptual
>basis.
>
>GS: Most psychologists would say that the illusion is "perceptual."

If this is the case then most psychologists are wrong. If the illusion
cannot be photographed it obviously does not represent a perceptual
illusion but an interpretive cognitive problem.

>                                                                                      
>                        Thus,
>you are using the term "perceptual" in a way that view would understand.

Yes my views also have a hard time understanding words they see.

>                                                                                      
>                                It
>renders your "position" incomprehensible. And, also, you are using the term
>"objective" in a totally idiosyncratic way. This also renders your
>"position" incomprehensible.

I use the term objective to refer to identifiable and analyzable
properties in the brain. What you would call the mind I think.
>
>LZ: So the question then becomes if such an illusion has no direct
>perceptual basis[...]
>
>GS: Even mainstream psychologists do not talk about "perception" in the
>fashion that you are. When we present a circle with a break in it
>tachistoscopically, an observer is likely to report that he or she saw an
>unbroken circle - and this would be viewed as an issue concerning
>"perception."

What do photographs of the same perspective show? You're the one
equating photographs with definitive visual evidence - not me. If they
show no break in the circle then by your own definition the problem is
perceptual. If they show a break the problem is cognitive. There are
many overlaps in this sense because the eyes are moving and people
constantly move and reorient their heads. But if you want to use
photos as definitive criteria of perceptual effects then I suggest you
do so.
>
>LZ: [...]what basis does it have? My answer of course would be
>that it has to have some cognitive basis not involving perception
>directly.
>
>GS: But this is an incomprehensible statement, as is virtually all of what
>you post.

I certainly concur. But only because you speak and comprehend
exclusively in a polyglot combination of behaviorist jargon and argot.
>
>LZ: Glen obviously demurs. But I would like then to ask if the illusion is
>indeed triggered by depth cues as Glen suggests what kind of
>triggering is involved.
>
>GS: What kinds of "triggering" are there?

Whatever causes the cognitive misinterpretation.
>
>LZ: Glen prefers to investigate the histories of
>those who see the illusion[...]
>
>GS: No, I would prefer to directly impose histories and, thus, produce
>animals that do or do not "see the illusion."

Which at best would only produce a particular historical explanation
for the paradox and would not explain it at all in universal terms. In
other words the same particular historical explanation might not even
apply to the same population in subsequent experiments.
>
>LZ:[...]- which is completely consistent with the
>behaviorist mantra describe previously in a collateral thread but
>which can only yield particular truth relating to the circumstantial
>aspects of a variety of individuals but having no general universal
>applicability of scientific necessity.
>
>GS: No finding is "by necessity" applicable to other circumstances. You
>simply do not have a clue as to how experimental science operates. If I
>figure out what sorts of histories are necessary to produce pigeons that don
>'t see the illusion and pigeons that do, and then I show that the same
>effects can be produced in monkeys (and any pigeon I use, for that matter),
>it lends credence to the generality of what is reported. It doesn't mean
>that I can produce the effect in any species, but it suggests that I might
>be able to.

I may not have a clue as to how experimental science operates but I
have clue as to how science operates. And if no finding is by
necessity applicable to other circumstances then it isn't general and
isn't universal. It is particular, historical and specific to the
population and circumstances studied.

The real problem is that you are not studying behavior at all in such
contexts. You are studying which set of environmental contingencies
operate to produce certain kinds of behavior and hoping to apply the
results to other populations.

In order to study behavior you have to experiment not on behavior per
se but on the causes of behavior. And you can't that do if the only
cause of behavior you recognize is other behavior in historical terms.

In point of fact all you're really doing is training under variable
environmental constraints and contingencies and those contingencies
represent your experimental variables rather than the behavior of the
experimental populations.

>
>LZ: In other words Glen claims the circumstantial histories of
>reportingindividuals would explain the illusion[...]
>
>GS: No. I am claiming that if I experimentally demonstrate control over the
>phenomenon, then explanation, at least at the behavioral level, has been
>achieved.

Explanation of the particular constraints and contingencies involved
in the imposed history perhaps. But certainly no explanation nor
comprehension of the behavior involved.
>
>LZ: [...]whereas I claim it would do
>nothing of the kind in universal scientific terms because the only
>thing capable of doing that is the mechanical explanation for the
>triggering of depth cues in cognitive terms.
>
>GS: But how would you demonstrate "explanation?" If you produced the
>phenomenon, it would be in particular circumstances. How would you know that
>you could produce it in other circumstances - like with subjects other than
>the ones you just used? Or other species?

Well the physical sciences do it with experimental extrapolation of
the causes of material interactions like mass, force, acceleration,
velocity, etc. and equations formed in terms of such causes. The only
approach I know of in behavioral realms is analytical in nature in
identifying the general cause of behavior in mechanical terms. But
unfortunately that involves taking differences and I see no way to
form equations in such terms unless there are accidental
considerations constraining differential reactions.

Which indicates to me that there is no general methodology applicable
to behavior in universal terms except the logical analysis of
differences and their implications in terms of one another. In effect
I can say for example that if a being is conscious certain kinds of
behavior and behavioral considerations apply. And I can say this in
categorical terms. But I cannot tell you definitively that such and
such a being is conscious. We can only infer this by ostensible
characteristics like speech.
>
>LZ: Would the mechanical explanation for the triggering be reflected in
>the histories of reporting individuals? Undoubtedly. Somewhere. The
>only question would be where? And that I contend cannot be established
>without reference to the actual mechanics for the triggering because
>that is what describes the thing we would be looking for in historical
>terms and not merely circumstantial similarities.
>
>GS: What matters a great deal in science is making something happen
>consistently. I, too, would like an explanation of behavior in
>neurobiological terms, but neurobiology is nowhere near this.

Certainly concur.
>
>LZ: Obviously the illusion is cognitive rather than perceptual in
>origin[...]
>
>GS: Most mainstream psychologists would say that perception is a kind of
>cognition.

I have a specific analytical view that considers perception as a
categorically lower level of behavior in terms of differences than
cognition. In other words I consider the functional hierarchy to run
material differences, perception, cognition, and then consciousness.
However I readily admit that this is only my own analytical frame of
reference and presumes somewhat on the term perception to characterize
the lowest level of differences among material differences.
>
>LZ: [...] and to the extent it is an illusion reflects a cognitive
>manifestation
>of differential mechanics (which of course is just my explanation for
>cognition in general mechanical terms).
>
>GS: You spew gibberish, and that is all.
>
Glad you recognize replies in kind.


Regards - Lester