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On Sat, 29 Nov 2003 14:23:18 GMT, "Glen M. Sizemore" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote: >LZ: Glen Sizemore maintains that experimental behavioral analysis can >control and predict behavior through behavioral contingencies. So what >else is new? I can do the same thing by tying a chain to a rat's ankle >nailing it to the floor and predicting the exact radius of motion for >the rat. > >I maintain that experimental analysis of behavior does not yield >universal results on behavior at all. What it actually identifies are >environmental constraints on behavior some of which may be very subtle >in nature. My own take on the differential origin and nature of >cognition in fact leads me to suggest that no experimental analysis >will ever be able to yield universal results for very specific >reasons. > > >GS: Wow! That's two good experiments you've come up with Zick. Chain a rat's >leg to the floor and measure the Moon Illusion with calipers. Add to that a >few interstitial frames of reference and one wonders what science would do >without a genius like you. But I will make some substantive points - you don >'t need me to make you look like a fool. But it helps. By the way IFOR's is an analytical not experimental rationale. Which is really what surprizes me about your obviously being it so vividly impressed by it. > >The difference between manipulating contingencies and chaining a rat's leg >to the floor is in the usefulness of the findings. Yes I agree. Chaining a rat's leg to the floor is a very much more useful way to determine its combat radius than more subtle but ultimately exactly comparable behaviorist experimental descriminants. > > Actually, it is >conceivable that you could learn something by chaining a rat's leg to the >floor, but it wouldn't involve predicting the maximum distance the rat could >travel from the point at which the chain is affixed, since this is largely >explicable in terms that have nothing to do with behavior. Yes I've noticed rats tend to stand transfixed in one spot even without experimental constraints like mousetraps so eupehmistically labelled contingenies in the behaviorist lexicon. > >Your second paragraph reflects a profound misunderstanding on your part >regarding how experimental science operates. In experimental science one >constrains one's subject matter so that the effects of various manipulations >may be easily observed and measured. This is how one establishes >experimental control of the subject matter. Once one obtains reliable >effects, one may relax or otherwise alter the constraints in order to >explore the generality of the findings. Once one has evidence that the >findings in question are reliable and possess some generality, one can >attempt to exert control in situations that diverge considerably from the >laboratory - and each time one is successful here, the generality of the >original phenomenon is increased. > Yes. This is exactly what I thought behavioral experimental rationales amounted to. The non experimental emitted behavior I can't understand is why you think this yields anything like universal validity and generality - assuming such ideas still remain in the behaviorist lexicon. Basically you're just extrapolating particular results from one experimental population to another without comprehending the mechanics involved in the behavior of either. In other words you're just guessing and hoping. And even when you achieve some cross applicabity you're still left with problematic and particular insights unless you constrain other populations through contingencies. Regards - Lester
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