Re: A troubling paradox...

"Jim Balter" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> OmegaZero2003 wrote:
> > "Jim Balter" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
> > news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> >
> >>Patty wrote:
> >>
> >>>Jim Balter wrote:
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>>The point of the quote is the claim that *even then*, the blind
> >>>>person would not know "what red is like".  It's meant as an
> >>>>argument against physicalism.  See, e.g.,
> >>>>http://host.uniroma3.it/progetti/kant/field/ka.html
> >>>>
> >>>
> >>>It strikes me that factsAbout(x) is not the same thing as
> >>>experienceOf(x) ... and as every school girl knows that to read a book
> >>>about how to ride a bike is quite another thing from learing to ride a
> >>>bike.  In the case of Mary, she has all the factsAbout(seeing-red) ...
> >>>we could even with a slight of hand give her
> >>>factsAbout(experienceOf(seeing-red)); but she will not get
> >>>experienceOf(seeing-red) unless we let her out of the room.
> >>>
> >>>But I fail to see how this is a legitimate argument against a suitably
> >>>phrased physicalism.  A set of facts is a set of facts, a set of
> >>>experiences is quite another thing.
> >>
> >>At issue is not merely the experience of seeing red,
> >
> >
> > The blind_man argument exposes the experience of seeing red as the
*primary*
> > constituent of knowledge *about*.
> >
> > It is via identity with. All other knowledge *about* X is secondary;
which
> > is why the sighted person has difficulty getting the blind man to
understand
> > *fully* what seeing *is*.
>
> Your comments on this subject are quite naive (and insufferably
> arrogant).  I suggest reading
> http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/robomaryfin6.htm
> to get a better sense of what the thought experiment
> does and does not "expose".

Your comments on this subject are quite naive (and insufferably  arrogant).

I suggest you educate yourself on Franklin Merrill-Wollf's work, as I first
posted to you, to show that there are more intrpretations and uses for the
blind man story/anechdote than you have so far discovered.

Talk of arrogance; do you think your found refernce/use is the only one?
Sheesh!  Yours is easiest to find (as is appropo to your abilities), but not
the first, nor the only use of the anecdote.  When you have the breadth in
this area, please come back with what you have found.





>
>
> >>but
> >>(allegedly) the *knowledge* of "what red is like".
> >>The claim is that *all* the facts should include
> >>*all* knowledge.  I agree that there's a sleight of hand
> >>involved, but it's a very subtle one -- I'd argue that
> >>calling something "knowledge" doesn't make it knowledge,
> >>at least not of the sort that matters here.
> >>
> >>Your treatment would apply to zombies as well (they can ride bikes and
> >>look at red things), but supposedly we're conscious, and all these
> >>thought experiments are based on *that* distinction.
> >>
> >>Now that I think of it though, I wonder if zombiephiles
> >>would claim that zombies, even those that ride bikes,
> >>don't know how to ride bikes.  And if they wouldn't claim that,
> >>then why don't zombies also know what red is like?
> >>Seems to make the whole zombie concept, in fact the whole
> >>dualist concept, incoherent, eh?
> >>I now recall that Dennett has been working with this theme lately,
> >>posing thought experiments about RoboMary to his students --
> >>he sent me an email about it in response to a query,
> >>but I think it's on a disk in a bag in a box on a shelf somewhere.
> >>Let's try google ... okay!
> >>http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/robomaryfin6.htm
> >>
> >>-- 
> >><J Q B>
> >>
> >
> >
>
>
> -- 
> <J Q B>
>