Re: Qualia and QM

"Jim Balter" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> OmegaZero2003 wrote:
> > "Jim Balter" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
> > news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> >
> >>Ray Gardener wrote:
> >>
> >>>>>Interesting. Can you also remember pain?
> >>>>
> >>>>Enough to avoid repeating it.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>There you go. One can remember:
> >>>
> >>>  - That one felt something, and
> >>>  - That the feeling was unpleasant.
> >>>
> >>>but the qualia of the unpleasantness itself, that is not retained.
> >>
> >>The recollection of unpleasantness is itself unpleasant,
> >>enough to dissuade us from repetition.  The sensation upon
> >>recollection is indeed pale compared to the original,
> >>but it isn't absent.  Actually, in the case of psychological pain,
> >>the recollection can often produce pain worse than the original.
> >>
> >>Qualia must be understood within a cognitive framework;
> >>trying to find it in QM is an error of descriptive levels.
> >
> >
> > You finally got something right.
> >
> > It is indeed the case that reduction is a lossy process.
>
> That's not what I said, and I already pointed out that
> that's true of *naive* reductionism, but not reductionism
> as properly understood.

Nope - it is true of the defintion you put forth.

It is the case that there are serious flaws in at least 2 thereoms of Group
Theory. One relates to this topic; a system may be composed of its objects
and relationships (more properly -its processes - whether an object due to
our time-slicing convenience in terming a process an "object"), but
traversing from a level of description N, to either N-1 or N+1 levels
invariable either deletes information, or new, unpredicted information
emerges, respectively.

See Alwyn Scott's work and the work at Sante Fe Inst. for more inf.

To put it simply, reductionism even as properly understood, will leave out
information in the transform from N to N-1 that cannot be constructed, in
principle, from the processes inherent within level N-1.


>
> >
> >
> >>  If it
> >>
> >>>were, one could recall migraine headaches and the like and reexperience
> >
> > them
> >
> >>>exactly as if they were really happening (Ouch!).
> >>>
> >>>So we associate qualia with events actually happening as opposed to
> >
> > events
> >
> >>>remembered.
> >>>
> >>>Ray
> >>>
> >>>
> >>
> >>
> >>-- 
> >><J Q B>
> >>
> >
> >
>
>
> -- 
> <J Q B>
>