Re: Matter, Information, and Mind

> I don't see the mind as another type of substance that is not granted
> to, say, asteroids. On the other hand, I am not going to propose an
> illogical and nonsensical theory like anomalous monism, either.


Well, materialists start with the physical world and attempt to define
reality as deriving from Matter. But since there is a strong logical
suggestion that the universe is metaphysical, a better approach might be to
start with the metaphysical, and treat the physical as being a a perceptual
derivation. In that sense, Mind is better labelled as Meta, which is simply
the deeper (and truer) metaphysical aspect of reality. In this framework,
quantum phenomena are not only tolerated but wholly expected as a logical
consequence. Waves become natural, and particles are the oddity.

The difficulty with monism is: how can one thing be many things? Why does
plurality exist in the physical?

If we equate the universe as a whole to an unobservable quantum particle
(because there is no external frame of reference by which to see the
universe as a whole), then the monic exists as a dynamic unresolved wave
rather than as a particle with a discrete form. Which is to say, the
universe is a possibility space. The continual observation of one
possibililty after another creates the perception of time and cause and
effect, like frames in a movie. The world lines of observers connect those
frames which form logical relationships which we perceive as the laws of
physics.

This unfortunately moves the mystery further out, because the specific
mechanism of subjective experience is still left unaddressed. However,
things like qualia seem less mysterious, because the explanatory direction
is to treat qualia as fundamental Meta and then wonder why it strongly
relates with Matter. Which is to say, why does the subjective experience
perceive a physical world? Why can't we know (as Kant said we couldn't) the
real world as it actually is (the noumena)?

Kant may have been wrong in a sense. Qualia, after all, is something
computers don't know about. We actually do see and know more than what is
merely "out there". So we do sense the Meta, except that it is always paired
with Matter. We do not see red by itself, but we see red objects. The
pairing is also quite specific -- we sense the qualia of red whenever a
particular wavelength of light enters our eyes.

In fact, all of our qualia sensations can be reduced to interpretations of
energy, which is what Matter fundamentally is (E = mc^2). So this issue of
qualia is somehow related not to objects per se, but to the energy being
transferred between them.

If qualia (subjective experience) were fundamental, we could also structure
it like this. Imagine that a single retinal rod/cone can experience color
qualia. However, that is all it can do. It has no higher form of Mind or
memory by which to consider the experience differently. However, it is able
to forward or transfer this experience to a more complex Mind. So when we
see color, we "know what it is like to be" a retinal cell. We also "know
what it is like to be" a nerve cell when our fingers touch something, and so
on. We treat these qualia as things that a central "I" or "me" is
experiencing, unaware that the qualia was experienced lower down. Our minds
may only be capable, in fact, of grouping and organizing the large multitude
of quale events into a coherent whole.

This model sounds like a complication but I suggest it because it offers
explanation for why different electrical signals in the brain are perceived
as different qualia forms. If the sensory units themselves are doing the
experiencing, then their particular form dictates the form of the
experience. So eye cells always experience color, ear cells always
experience sound, etc. The central "I" in the brain has little choice but to
experience things in those ways since the experiences are actually happening
"out at the edges of the network". But for this model to work,
experience/qualia would have to be a more fundamental property, available to
things much simpler than the brain.

Ray